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LEGISLATIVE COURTS, ARTICLE III, AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
ELLEN E. SWARD*
Congress has established numerous judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies, collectively called "legislative courts," that do not have the
characteristics of courts established in accordance with Article III
of the Constitution. With some exceptions, where Congress has
been able to establish such non-Article III legislative courts
consistent with the Constitution, the Supreme Court generally has
not required juries for adjudication that takes place within these
tribunals. Professor Sward analyzes the Court's Article III and
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence and questions the
constitutionality of many types of jury-less adjudication in the
legislative courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Article III of the United States Constitution governs the
"judicial Power of the United States."' The Constitution itself,
however, establishes only one court-the Supreme Court.2  Article
III and Article I then give Congress the power to establish "inferior
Courts."'3 Like the Supreme Court, inferior courts established under
Article III must have judges who "shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and ... [whose compensation] shall not be
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See id
3. d2; see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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diminished during their Continuance in Office."'4 The life tenure and
salary protections reflect the separation of powers principle behind
our constitutional government, ensuring that judges are independent
of the political process.'
Nevertheless, the power of Congress to establish judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies outside of the constraints of Article III
apparently has never been doubted. Often collectively called
"legislative courts,"6 such bodies are usually justified under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to "make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution [its powers under the Constitution]. 7 The first legislative
courts were established by some of the early Congresses, which
created military tribunals8 and territorial courts,9 and provided for
the adjudication of some matters by executive agencies, a precursor
to the modem administrative agency.10
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees to citizens suing or being sued in the federal courts the
right to a jury trial in "Suits at common law.""1 The Seventh
Amendment has been interpreted to require a jury trial in those civil
cases that would have required one in England in 1791-the year the
Seventh Amendment was ratified. Under modem interpretations,
4. Id art. III, § 1.
5. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (Alexander Hamilton); Gordon G. Young, Public
Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor,
35 BUFF. L. REV. 765,768 (1986).
6. The term "legislative courts" apparently first appeared in American Insurance Co.
v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). I will use the terms "legislative courts,"
"Article I courts," and "non-Article III courts" interchangeably.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 18.
8. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article 111, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 920 (1988).
9. See J.W. SMURR, TERRITORIAL JURISPRUDENCE 155-77 (1970).
10. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 919-20.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The full text of the Seventh Amendment is as follows:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
Id. While the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, all of the states have their
own constitutional or statutory guarantees of a civil jury trial. See, e.g., KAN. CONsT. BILL
OF RIGHTS § 5; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1731 (West Supp. 1998).
12. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); United States v. Wonson, 28 F.
Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973)
(examining the history of the Seventh Amendment as it relates to the modern federal right
to a civil jury trial).
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that includes cases arising under statutes that did not exist in 1791 if
the statute provides for rights and remedies analogous to those that
existed at common law.13 The Seventh Amendment also requires a
jury when a case includes both legal and equitable issues, 4 though
such cases would have been heard without a jury in England in 1791.1
The key difference between legislative courts and Article III
courts is the absence of life tenure and salary protections for judges
in legislative courts. A common, but not universal, difference is the
absence of a jury trial in legislative courts. The power of Congress to
divert disputes to legislative courts is a subject of considerable
discussion in the cases and commentary.' 6 The extent to which that
power can be used to divest parties of the right to a jury trial remains,
however, largely unexamined. Indeed, cases and commentators often
consider the Seventh Amendment issue as derivative of the Article
III issue, and thus not worthy of separate attention. 7
In this Article, I will demonstrate that the Seventh Amendment
has independent force that needs to be reckoned with in legislative
courts. To that end, I will first present, in Parts II-IV, a
comprehensive analysis of the Supreme Court's Article III
jurisprudence regarding legislative courts-primarily administrative
13. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
14. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959).
15. In England in 1791, separate courts for law and equity generally meant that legal
and equitable issues were not heard together. Occasionally, however, a court of equity
might determine legal issues under the so-called "cleanup doctrine," which provided that
if equity had jurisdiction of a matter, it also could hear and decide related legal issues. See
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 231 (Spencer
W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941). Courts of law, whose jurisdiction was limited to common
law writs, could never hear and decide equitable matters. See S.F.C. MILSOM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 33-36 (2d ed. 1981).
16. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 8; Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 197; Richard
B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in
the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REv. 85 (1988); Young, supra note 5.
17. The Supreme Court has said that Congress's power to assign adjudication of
"public rights" matters to a legislative court determines the right to a jury trial. See Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977)
(allowing jury-less adjudication in an administrative agency). The Court repeated this
proposition 12 years later, but its holding did not necessarily link Article III and the
Seventh Amendment. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989)
(holding that a jury was required for a common law fraudulent conveyance action, but not
addressing whether the non-Article III bankruptcy courts could determine the matter with
or without a jury). I have found only one article, other than student notes, that has
focused on the right to jury trial in legislative courts, though others have addressed the
issue in passing. See Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. LaFave, Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory,
4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 407 (1995).
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agencies. In doing so, I will, in some cases, flesh out the analysis from
the bare bones of the Court's statements. This is necessary because
the Court's Article III jurisprudence often drives its discussion of
Seventh Amendment issues, particularly with respect to
administrative agencies. I will then, in Parts V and VI, add the
Seventh Amendment into the analysis, discussing both what the
Court has said about jury trials in various legislative courts and what
it has overlooked. The organization of this analysis is complex, as
there are several dimensions to the problem. Among them are the
various kinds of legislative courts that have been created, the values
that Congress and the courts seek to vindicate in choosing one kind
of court over another, the kinds of issues presented in such courts,
and the various constitutional justifications that have developed. I
will try to integrate these dimensions without losing sight of any of
them. Thus, I begin, in Part II, with a catalogue of the kinds of
legislative courts that currently exist. In Part III, I describe the
values that underlie Article III, legislative courts, and the Seventh
Amendment. These first two parts provide a foundation for the
analysis that follows.
Parts IV and V are the core of the Article, as they describe in
detail the most important of the constitutional justifications for
legislative courts: the "public rights" doctrine and the balancing test
that has evolved from it. This doctrine is used primarily to justify
adjudication in administrative agencies, though bankruptcy courts
have also figured in its development. Part IV discusses the Article III
problem. In discussing the public rights doctrine and the balancing
test, I first describe the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
doctrine. I then try to make sense of the doctrine, first by
cataloguing and re-defining the range of issues, from pure public to
pure private, that are encompassed within the doctrine, and then by
discussing the propriety of using the doctrine to justify adjudication
in administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts-the two kinds of
legislative courts where it has been used. In Part V, I relate the
doctrine to Seventh Amendment issues. As to the Seventh
Amendment issues, I will describe what the Supreme Court has said
about how the right to a jury trial relates to the public rights doctrine
and the balancing test, and identify the constitutional constraints and
the policy considerations that relate to the choice of jury-less
adjudication in a legislative court.
Part VI then briefly describes three other justifications for the
use of legislative courts and their implications for the Seventh
Amendment: waiver, sovereign immunity, and the plenary power
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rationale. These justifications generally apply to legislative courts
other than administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, though
waiver can operate in any kitid of court. My analysis of these
justifications will have a structure similar to that of my analysis of the
public rights doctrine and the balancing test.
This analysis will emphasize two major problems with the
current doctrine. First, the Court's Article III jurisprudence is
incomplete, inconsistent, and, at times, nearly incomprehensible. I
try to identify the main problems and suggest some analytical points
that might clarify the issues. Second, the Court when it analyzes
legislative courts, has not given adequate consideration to the history,
language, and values behind the Seventh Amendment. If the Court
were to do so, it would probably find that the Seventh Amendment
operates, in some instances, as an independent check on Congress's
power to assign adjudication to legislative courts sitting without a
jury. Thus, my analysis suggests that many types of jury-less
adjudication that are now commonplace would be unconstitutional.
Such a finding has the potential to be quite disruptive given the role
that legislative courts play in modem adjudication. I will suggest
some methods for minimizing that disruption, though I concede that
maintaining the status quo, however weak its constitutional base, may
be more pragmatic and therefore more attractive. Better the devil
we know.
II. VARIETIES OF LEGISLATIVE COURTS
The several varieties of legislative courts differ significantly
among themselves and have different political and theoretical
geneses, but they share one characteristic: their judges do not enjoy
life tenure and salary protection.18  Legislative courts include
administrative agencies, adjuncts, courts for claims against the
United States, territorial courts, and military courts.'9 All of them
have been held not to violate the requirements of Article III, at least
in most circumstances. Some legislative courts use juries, but the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the right to a jury trial in
legislative courts is not particularly clear or well-developed. In this
section, I will briefly describe the various legislative courts and their
use of the jury.
18. For discussions of these kinds of adjudicators, see Fallon, supra note 8, at 918-26;
Redish, supra note 16; Saphire & Solimine, supra note 16; Young, supra note 5, at 768-69.
19. Non-Article III adjudication can occur in other contexts as well, even if no fixed
court is established. One example is mandatory arbitration. See infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
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A. Administrative Agencies
The most significant kind of legislative court is the
administrative agency. Agencies, of course, are much more than
courts, which distinguishes them from the other kinds of legislative
courts discussed here. Rather, agencies administer regulatory
statutes and benefit programs by making rules that implement and
clarify the statutes, and by enforcing the statutes and the rules
through administrative adjudication." Federal agencies handle some
350,000 adjudications every year,21 eclipsing the 240,000 cases filed
every year in federal courts.2Y When agencies adjudicate matters,
they do not employ juries; indeed, agencies are supposed to bring
expertise to the matter, and that expertise is inconsistent with the use
of lay decision makers?23 Thus, agency adjudication is conducted by
administrative judges, many of whom are employees of the agency.24
B. Adjuncts
Adjuncts function within the Article III district courts and are
under the supervision of district court judges. They operate under a
reference from the district court, which can withdraw that reference
20. For descriptions of the administrative process, see 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1994); RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (2d ed. 1992); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1984). The statement in the text is a gross
oversimplification, as agencies are quite varied in the work they do. They are, however, all
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994), so their basic
structure and governance will have some general similarities.
21. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 393 (4th ed. 1996).
22 See 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE: WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 30 tbl.5 (1990).
23. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 90 (1965)
(stating that "the concept of expertise on which the administrative agency rests is not
consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder").
24. There are two kinds of administrative judges. Administrative law judges
("ALJs"), numbering about 1000 throughout the federal agencies, are responsible for
adjudicating disputes and have certain protections designed to ensure their independence,
See John H. Frye, III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1992). There are also about 2700 administrative
adjudicators, most of whom have duties in addition to adjudication, and whose
independence is less protected than that of the ALJs. See id. at 353. Agencies have
procedures designed to keep those employees responsible for adjudication separate from
those with responsibility for investigation and prosecution. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994)
(providing that an employee engaged in investigation or prosecution functions cannot
participate in adjudicatory decisionmaking); PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, § 9.3.5 (noting
that § 554(d) separation of functions requirements apply only to formal adjudication).
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at any time.' The best known of these adjuncts are the magistrate
judges,26 who assist the district judges by managing discovery,2 7
hearing pretrial motions,28 and, if the parties consent, conducting
trials.2 9 The system of magistrate judges was held in 1980 not to
violate Article III. Bankruptcy courts are also considered
adjuncts,3 ' though their format differs significantly from that of
magistrate judges. While magistrate judges take part in cases
brought originally in an Article III court and follow the Article III
court's rules, bankruptcy judges operate within a separate court. To
be sure, the bankruptcy courts are deemed to be a "unit" of the
district courts,32 but the bankruptcy courts have their own rules,
separate from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases can
sometimes be commenced directly in bankruptcy courts.3
Bankruptcy courts have a wide-ranging jurisdiction over matters both
central to and related to bankruptcies. 4 They also have considerable
independent procedural authority, including the power to conduct
trials .3  They largely operate independently of the district courts,
even if nominally under the district courts' control. 6
25. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994) (allowing district courts to refer matters to
bankruptcy courts); id. § 636 (describing powers and duties of magistrates and the power
of judges to refer matters to magistrates). See generally Linda Silberman, Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131
(1989) (examining modem judicial adjuncts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
26. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994).
27. See, e.g., D. KAN. R. 72.1.1(c).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
29. See id § 636(a)(3). Magistrates can decide non-dispositive matters themselves,
with only deferential review by the district court. See id. § 636(b)(1). They can hear and
make recommendations as to dispositive matters such as summary judgment motions, but
the district court must make a de novo "determination" of the matter. See id. The Court
has held that the district court is not required to conduct a de novo "hearing." See United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980). In other words, the district judge makes her
own decision based on evidence that the magistrate has heard but the judge has not. The
parties also can consent to a magistrate's hearing and deciding dispositive matters. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
30. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683.
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
32. See id.
33. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1002. Some districts have a bankruptcy clerk, and in those
districts, cases can be commenced by filing a petition with the bankruptcy clerk.
Otherwise, cases must be filed with the district court's clerk. See id. at advisory
committee's note to the 1987 amendments.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
35. See id. § 157(e).
36. In 1982, the Supreme Court held the 1978 version of the law establishing
bankruptcy courts unconstitutional on the ground that it gave too much of the judicial
power of the United States to non-Article III courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion). Congress revised the
1999] 1045
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The Supreme Court has held that there is a constitutional right
to a jury trial for private legal claims adjudicated in the bankruptcy
courts.37 Both magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges can conduct
jury trials, but only with the consent of the parties;" without that
consent, the jury trial must be held before a district court judge.
Because consent is required, litigants who elect to have their jury
trials conducted by magistrate judges or bankruptcy judges have
effectively waived their claim to an Article III judge.39
C. Courts for Claims Against the Government
Congress has also established some courts that adjudicate claims
against the government. These include the Tax Court,40 which
adjudicates claims by taxpayers who dispute deficiency
determinations by the Internal Revenue Service, and the United
States Court of Federal Claims,4' which adjudicates a variety of
proprietary claims against the United States, such as contract claims.
These courts have judges who are appointed for fixed terms,42 and
jurisdictional statute in 1984, making it clear that bankruptcy jurisdiction was given
initially to an Article III district court, which then had the power to make a blanket
reference of bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy court. See Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 101, 104, 98 Stat. 333, 333, 340
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334 (1994)). Bankruptcy courts can decide "core" matters
on their own, with only deferential review by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
They can hear "non-core" matters and make recommendations as to their disposition to
the district judge, who conducts a de novo review. See id. § 157(c). Certain matters,
however, must be heard by the district courts. See id. § 157(b)(5) (mandating that
personal injury and wrongful death claims be heard by the district courts); id. § 157(d)
(mandating that matters arising in part under federal laws affecting interstate commerce
be heard by the district courts). These provisions are very similar to the provisions in the
magistrate statute distinguishing between dispositive and non-dispositive matters. See
supra note 29. But see infra notes 246-55 and accompanying text (showing that the effect
of these provisions in the bankruptcy court is very different from those governing on the
magistrates). The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the
bankruptcy courts under the revised statute.
37. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,55-56 (1989).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994) (magistrate judges); id. § 157(e) (bankruptcy
judges).
39. See infra notes 395-401 and accompanying text for a discussion of the power of
litigants to waive Article III protections.
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1994). For a general overview of the United States Tax
Court's history and process, see HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT:
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 395-493 (1979); Types of Tax Court Jurisdiction, 15 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 42,058 (1998).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
42. See, e.g., id. § 172(a) (establishing 15 year terms for judges in the Court of Federal
Claims); id. § 7443(e) (establishing 15 year terms for Tax Court judges).
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they operate without juries.43
The Court of Federal Claims is also empowered to hear
compulsory counterclaims by the government against persons
bringing suit there.' In a breach of contract claim by a citizen against
the government, for example, the government would have to assert
any counterclaim it had for breach of the same contract, and there
would be no jury trial for the government's claims against the
citizen.45 Such claims by the government otherwise would normally
be brought in an ordinary federal court where a jury would be
available to decide legal rights and remedies.46
D. Territorial Courts
Territorial courts are established by Congress in connection with
its power to make all necessary rules and regulations regarding
United States territories;47 these courts generally deal with local law,
much like the state courts. Territories under the country's
jurisdiction today include Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and various Pacific island territories, all of which have local
courts created by territorial constitutions or legislatures with
authorization from Congress.4s The District of Columbia also has
local courts, though they are authorized by a different clause of the
Constitution than the ordinary territorial courts.49 Territorial courts
were assumed to be constitutional under Congress's Article I powers
as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century,50 but were
43. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941). See infra notes 432-67
and accompanying text for a discussion of the justification for jury-less adjudication in
such courts.
44. See CLAIMS Cr. R. 13(a).
45. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426,440 (1880).
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1994) (granting district courts jurisdiction over civil actions
brought by the United States); United States v. Rosati, 97 F. Supp. 747, 748-49 (D.N.J.
1951) (holding that a jury trial is available when United States brings suit); cf. Robert G.
Skelton & Donald F. Harris, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Jury Trials: The Constitutional
Nightmare Continues, 8 BANKR. DEvS. J. 469, 491-97 (1991) (discussing counterclaims and
the right to a jury trial in bankruptcy courts).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
48. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424-1(a) (1994) (Guam); id. § 1611(a) (Virgin Islands).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The local courts in the Disfrict of Columbia
were created by Congress rather than by a local legislative body. See District of Columbia
Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111, 84 Stat. 475, 475 (codified at
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (1995)).
50. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). The Court in Canter
suggested that a legislative court could not have any of the jurisdiction described in Article
III. See id. at 546. That conclusion has been disputed, in part because if it were true, there
could be no appeal from legislative courts to Article III courts. See Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,545 n.13 (1962).
1999] 1047
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
not explicitly held constitutional until 1973.51 For the most part, local
courts in the territories use juries.5 2
Most of the territories also have federal courts of some kind.
The United States district courts in Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia are created under Article III, so their judges have the
tenure and salary protections of other Article III judges, and the
Seventh Amendment applies.5 3 Some territories, however, have an
anomalous federal court in addition to their local courts.54 Though
denominated "United States District Courts," these courts, which
consider both matters that fall within the Article III powers of the
federal courts and some local territorial matters, are not Article III
courts.' It has been held that the Constitution does not require jury
trials in such courts in either criminal or civil cases.5 6 The federal
district courts in those territories, however, are bound by procedures
enacted by the local legislatures, and both Guam and the Virgin
Islands have provided for jury trials. 7 The District of Columbia is
different. It has an Article III United States District Court, where
51. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973) (upholding District of
Columbia local courts).
52. See, e.g., 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 22104 (1995); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 321 (1994).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 88 (1994) (District of Columbia); id. § 119 (Puerto Rico); see also
LaForest v. Autoridad de Las Fuentes Fluviales de Puerto Rico, 536 F.2d 443, 446 (1st Cir.
1976) (holding that civil plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico have the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
54. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1994) (Guam); id. § 1611(a) (Virgin Islands); id.
§ 1821 (Northern Mariana Islands).
55. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bryan, 738 F. Supp. 946, 948 (D.V.I.
1990).
56. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) (holding that Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial does not extend to territories not incorporated into the
union absent congressional intent to do so); American Pac. Dairy Prods. v. Siciliano, 235
F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that there is no right to a jury trial in civil suits in the
District of Guam); Pugh v. United States, 212 F.2d 761, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1954) (stating that
the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to criminal cases in the District of
Guam). The matter is more complicated than these cases suggest, however. See infra
notes 491-518 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of the right to jury
trial in these courts. Since the decision in Balzac, the district court in Puerto Rico has
been made into an Article III court. See 28 U.S.C. § 119 (1994).
57. See, e.g., 7 GUAM CODE ANN. § 22104 (1995) (providing for jury trials in civil
cases at law in which the amount in controversy exceeds $20 and for criminal cases where
possible punishment is more than 60 days imprisonment or fine is in excess of $500); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 321 (1994) (providing for jury trial in civil actions "except otherwise
provided by law"). This reliance on local legislatures for the jury trial right makes sense if
territorial courts are analogized to state courts because the Seventh Amendment does not
apply to state courts. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.8, at 256 n.12 (1986); see also
infra notes 500-05 and accompanying text (discussing varied approaches towards providing
jury trials taken in U.S. territories and the District of Columbia).
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the Seventh Amendment applies.58 It also has non-Article III local
courts, and the Supreme Court has held that the Seventh
Amendment applies to them as well.59
E. Military Courts
Another kind of legislative court is the military court, which
adjudicates crimes committed by military personnel. Military courts
are established under Congress's power to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."61
Military courts were found to be constitutional in 1857.62 Military
courts do not handle civil matters at all, so the Seventh Amendment
is not implicated in their creation or operation.63
F. Summary
All five kinds of legislative courts have been upheld under
Article III of the Constitution. A civil jury is constitutionally
required for some cases in only two: the adjuncts and the local courts
in the District of Columbia. In Parts IV, V, and VI, I will try to make
some sense of this state of affairs.
III. ARTICLE III, NON-ARTICLE III, AND SEVENTH AMENDMENT
VALUES
If we are to assess accurately the legal and political issues
relating to jury-less non-Article III adjudication, we must identify the
values that underlie the two kinds of courts and the Seventh
Amendment. These values should inform our choice of an
adjudicatory method, if the Constitution permits a choice at all.
A. Article III Values
The life tenure and salary protection that Article III judges
enjoy are designed to protect our interests in separation of powers
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 88.
59. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974). For a discussion of these
strange permutations, see infra notes 491-518 and accompanying text.
60. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-821 (1994).
61. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
62- See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65,83-84 (1857).
63. See 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDERIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL
PROCEDURE § 2-11.00 (1991). "Juries" composed of service personnel are employed in
military courts, but such juries are selected by the authority that convenes the court-
martial. See 1 id. § 15-11.00. Article III and Sixth Amendment provisions related to the
criminal jury do not apply. See 1 id. I will, for the most part, ignore military courts in this
Article because I am concerned with the right to a civil jury.
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and an independent judiciary.64 While separation of powers is an
institutional interest, the independent judiciary has both institutional
and personal aspects-it is valuable to reinforce the separation of
powers, but it also helps ensure individual litigants a fair hearing.
1. Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances
One of this country's founding principles is that the executive,
legislative, and judicial powers should be vested in separate entities. 65
Indeed, the legislative, executive, and judicial functions are described
in separate articles of the Constitution.66 This structure stems from a
belief among the founders that concentration of all three functions of
government in the same hands leads to tyranny.67 Strict separation of
powers, however, is unattainable and may be undesirable because the
efficiency costs would be too great.' Thus, a better characterization
of the constitutional structure is probably "checks and balances,"
though we tend to use the term "separation of powers." A system of
checks and balances tolerates some overlap of function, but provides
many ways for each branch to check the others.69 One of the most
64. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986);
Fallon, supra note 8, at 937-38, 941.
65. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison). For additional overviews of
the history and meaning of the separation of powers doctrine, see W.B. GWYN, THE
MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); Letter from John Jay to Thomas
Jefferson (Aug. 18, 1786), in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 271, 272 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1954); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in 10
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 602, 603; Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical
American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 394-415 (1935);
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30
WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 303-22 (1989). For critiques of the separation of powers
doctrine under modem American government, see JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND
LEGITIMACY 15-20 (1978); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of
Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REv. 592, 607-13 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 573, 596-640 (1984).
66. Article I describes the legislative power, Article II describes the executive power,
and Article III describes the judicial power.
67. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
68. See Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time for All Good Men..., 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 387,387-88 (1989).
69. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387-88 (3d ed. 1996)
(distinguishing between the description of federal structure as a separation of powers,
which suggests autonomous branches, and description as checks and balances, which
suggests overlap); see also FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 258 (1985) (arguing that separation of
powers had been abandoned in favor of checks and balances in the framing of the
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important judicial checks on the other, political, branches of
government is the power of judicial review.70 The life tenure and
salary protections help to reinforce this structure. Judges who need
not fear removal from office or loss of salary from opposing the
political branches are more likely to be willing to exercise that
important power of judicial review. Thus, separation of powers, with
its system of checks and balances, is an institutional value that
benefits all citizens equally, insofar as all citizens have an interest in
preventing government tyranny. While there has always been some
overlap of function among the three branches in the federal
government,7' the Supreme Court has generally tried to monitor
encroachments by one branch of government on the others and to
prevent those encroachments that are unacceptable.72
2. Judicial Independence
The judicial independence that results from separation of powers
is an institutional value-it benefits all of us equally to know that the
courts cannot be manipulated by the political branches, even if we
never use the courts ourselves. But individual litigants also have a
personal interest in judicial independence that the life tenure and
salary protections help to preserve.73 An independent judiciary helps
to guarantee a fair and impartial assessment of litigants' cases,
unaffected by the political pressures of the day.74 In particular,
persons pressing unpopular positions should have a greater
Constitution).
70. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (asserting the power of
judicial review); THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
71. See Verkuil, supra note 65, at 322.
72. See i&t at 311-12.
73. Apart from the separation of powers, there also might be a due process right to an
independent judiciary. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958). In
Wiener, a former member of the War Claims Commission who had been appointed by
President Truman filed suit for back pay, claiming that he had been illegally removed from
the Commission by President Eisenhower, who wished to appoint his own nominee to the
position. See id. at 349-50. Congress had created the Commission in 1948 to adjudicate
war claims, but had not expressly provided for the removal of a commissioner. See id. at
350. The Supreme Court held that the judicial character of the Commission mandated
that it remain free from the control or influence of the executive and legislative branches.
See id at 355-56. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the President lacked the power to
remove a member of a non-Article III adjudicatory body. See id. at 356.
74. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 848-51
(1986) (noting that the tenure and salary provisions of. Article III reflect both a structural
interest in separation of powers and a personal interest in an independent judiciary). I am
suggesting that separation of powers is both an end in itself and a means to achieving an
independent judiciary. The latter has both institutional and individual aspects.
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confidence that their positions will receive a fair hearing if the judge
cannot lose her job or have her salary reduced for siding with them.
B. Non-Article III Values
Congress may constitute a legislative court for a variety of
reasons. Legislative courts may bring a greater efficiency to the
adjudication of certain matters than an Article III court provides, or
they may allow the use of expert decision makers, which is thought to
increase both efficiency and accuracy. Congress could also create
non-Article III courts because it desires to keep control over its
regulatory programs in one of the political branches, though that
motivation is less legitimate given the separation of powers principle
that underlies our form of government.
1. Efficiency
Procedures in Article III courts are often cumbersome and time-
consuming.75 Liberal joinder of claims and parties under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allows cases to become quite complex.76
Discovery, pre-trial motions, and the jury trial can all make Article
III litigation a prolonged, expensive experience." As a result, a
movement toward alternative litigation strategies has been gaining
momentum, fueled by congressional enactments,7" judicial
experimentation,79 and abandonment of the courts by prospective
litigants.80  Legislative courts can provide important efficiency
75. See generally Symposium, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 217 (1985) (examining problems with civil litigation and their potential solutions).
76. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (counterclaims and cross-claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 14
(third-party practice); FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (joinder of claims and remedies); FED. R. Civ. P.
20 (permissive joinder of parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (intervention).
77. See A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 219,227-36 (1985).
78. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, § 103(a), 104
Stat. 5089, 5090-96 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)) (requiring each
district court to implement measures to confront cost and delay in litigation).
79. One such experiment that is beginning to gain acceptance occurs in the mass tort
context where the court must determine individual damages for a large number of victims.
Some courts have held trials on a representative sample of cases and then extrapolated the
average damage award to the remaining victims. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109
F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1997); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 792-93 (9th Cir.
1996). But see Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1998)
(requiring individual determinations of damages in an asbestos exposure case).
80. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (discussing the
development of alternative dispute resolution); LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES:
CoNFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS, FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1990)
(discussing various techniques for settling disputes in families, business, and the legal
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benefits. They may employ simpler procedures that allow litigation
to progress more rapidly and at lower cost, though they are bound by
constitutional due process requirements."' They may adjudicate
matters without juries, which add time and expense to litigation.'
They may use expert decisionmakers, who can get to the heart of the
issue more quickly.8 3
Once a non-Article III court has a case, there may be additional
efficiency gains from allowing the court to hear related matters s4
This is much like the efficiency justification in Article III courts for
the compulsory counterclaim rule, which requires the assertion of
counterclaims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as
the original claim." Indeed, non-Article III courts sometimes have
compulsory counterclaim rules of their own, which require litigants to
assert claims in legislative courts that would otherwise be cognizable
in Article III courts.8 6
The very success of legislative courts has created another
efficiency justification. Legislative courts-especially administrative
agencies-handle so many cases every year that it would now be
impossible to abolish them.87 The flood of litigation into Article III
courts that would result from such abolition would be overwhelming.
Thus, even if there had been no efficiency issues in the formation of
system, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication); Elwood F.
Oakley, III & Donald 0. Mayer, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and
the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism, 47 S.C. L. REV. 475, 477-80 (1996) (discussing
the increasing use of employer-mandated arbitration agreements).
81. See WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4 (1986);
PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, § 5.1.3. Due process does not require Article III courts to
have time-consuming, cumbersome, and expensive procedures. In theory, we could gain
efficiency advantages by streamlining Article III procedures, and some of the "reforms" of
recent years are intended to do exactly that. It may be easier, however, to set up
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms than to make revolutionary changes in existing
Article III procedures-especially if those changes are perceived as offering less
protection to litigants.
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
193 n.1 (1996); HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 71-81 (Greenwood Press 2d
ed. 1978) (1959); Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 317-18 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
83. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in favor of the
use of expert decision makers).
84. Hearing related matters avoids the waste of judicial resources that occurs when
multiple litigation is necessary. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 855-58 (1986) (holding that expertise and efficiency are valid reasons for
Congress to authorize the CFTC to hear common law counterclaims).
85. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a).
86. See, e.g., FED. CL. R. 13(a).
87. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 925; supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text
(contrasting the volume of cases in legislative courts with those in Article III courts).
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legislative courts, efficiency concerns now weigh heavily in favor of
retaining those courts.
These efficiency benefits explain why Congress might want to
assign adjudication of some matters to courts using special
procedures, but they do not explain why Congress does not set up
such courts with judges who have life tenure and salary protection.
One answer is that the need for adjudication in legislative courts is
not static; if Congress abolished a program, for example, the system
could be saddled with a large number of judges with life tenure and
salary protection and nothing to do."8 Similarly, market forces could
result in large increases or decreases in the number of bankruptcy
filings, so Congress needs some flexibility to vary the number of
bankruptcy judgeships.
2. Expertise
One reason why some legislative courts are more efficient is that
they employ expert* decision makers, in contrast to the generalist
judges or lay jurors in Article III courts.8 9 It may be time-consuming
and expensive to try to educate Article III decision makers on the
intricacies of an esoteric field.90 Efficiency is not the only reason for
88. That does not seem to be a serious threat right now because many Article III
judgeships are going unfilled and existing judges are overworked as a result. See, e.g.,
Peter Baker, Clinton Says Republicans Are "Threat to Judiciary," WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1997, at A6; Angie Cannon & Ron Hutcheson, Many Unfilled Judgeships Causing Huge
Backlog, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 8, 1997, at A3, available in 1997 WL 6453280; Editorial,
Shirking Its Responsibility: Senate Doing Judicial System Disservice by Failing to Confirm
Federal Judges, PEORIA JOURNAL-STAR (Illinois), Oct. 15, 1997, at A4, available in 1997
WL 7679440.
89. The only current Article III courts with specialized subject matter jurisdiction are
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of International
Trade. The Federal Circuit has enough specialties that it has some of the benefits of a
generalist court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals concerning international trade, patent, and a variety of
specialized statutes). The Court of International Trade has a more limited jurisdiction,
much of which involves jurisdiction to review administrative decisions relating to tariffs
and trade. See id. §§ 1581, 1582, 1584. It can also hear counterclaims relating to such
matters, however. See id. § 1583.
90. The primary means of educating generalist judges and lay decision makers in
Article III courts is through expert witnesses. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991
WiS. L. REv. 1113, 1116. Many trials, however, become a battle of experts, making it
difficult for persons outside the field to make rational judgments. See, e.g., Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (showing disagreement
between experts over how soon a disease would manifest itself after exposure to toxic
chemicals); Andrew MacGregor Smith, Note, Using Impartial Experts in Valuation: A
Forum-Specific Approach, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1241, 1244-45 (1994) (criticizing the
current legal system for creating the "battle of the experts," which often leaves "the court
in little better position than when it started").
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using expert decision makers, however. While we value the
generalist judge as one who can bring a wide range of experience and
knowledge to bear on a problem, 91 the modem world presents us with
some issues that can only be understood by persons who are
specialists in a given field. In such instances, the task of educating lay
decision makers may be nearly impossible. Thus, some legislative
courts are explicitly created to take advantage of the greater accuracy
that may be had from decision makers who are experts in the field.92
This is especially true of administrative agencies.
The benefits that we gain from having expert decision makers do
not explain, however, why we could not have expert Article III
judges. Indeed, specialized Article III courts are not unknown. The
Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit are both Article III courts with specialized subject
matter jurisdiction,93 and there have been other such courts
throughout our history.94 If Congress decided to abolish a program,
however, we could find not only that we had a large number of judges
with nothing to do, but that they would be judges whose expertise
was so narrowly defined that they would be of little help either in the
generalized Article III courts or in other legislative courts. Of
course, such judges could presumably learn to have a broader
outlook, but that could take some time. Thus, for reasons of both
efficiency and expertise, Congress could well prefer to create
legislative courts whose judges do not have life tenure and salary
91. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN.
L. REV. 329, 331 (1991); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L.
REV. 745, 745-49 (1981); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive
Until 1984?: An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 761, 779-80 (1983); Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation?:
The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951).
92- See JAFFE, supra note 23, at 121-32.
93. See supra note 89 (describing the Federal Circuit and the Court of International
Trade); see also Gregory W. Carman, The Jurisdiction of the United States Court of
International Trade: A Dilemma for Potential Litigants, 22 STETSON L. REV. 157, 1,61
(1992) (discussing jurisdictional issues in the Court of International Trade); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1989) (examining the costs and benefits of specialization in the Federal Circuit).
94. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204, Pub. L. No. 77-421,
56 Stat. 23, 32 (expired 1947) (Emergency Court of Appeals) (overseeing price-fixing
adjudication during World War II); Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 539 (1910)
(repealed 1913) (Commerce Court) (overseeing cases involving the regulation of
commerce). Expert decision makers have a long history. Even in the twelfth century,
expert juries were sometimes impaneled. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 94-95 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1898) (describing a case involving a claim of spoiled fish that made use of a
jury of fishmongers).
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protections than to provide for specialized Article III courts.
3. Control
When Congress creates a regulatory program and provides that
adjudication of matters arising under its provisions be done in a non-
Article III court, it is likely that at least part of Congress's motive for
creating such a non-Article III court is control. Regulatory matters
will often have significant political content, and it is understandable
that Congress would prefer to maintain political control of all aspects
of the regulation, as it helps ensure that the regulatory program will
be carried out. Non-Article III adjudicators could be controlled, at
least to some degree, by the political appointment power." This non-
Article III "value," however, is in direct conflict with the Article III
values reflected in our constitutional structure. Actions that are
politically desirable are not necessarily constitutional, and courts are
intended to be politically unaccountable so that they can prevent
overreaching by the political branches. 6 Thus, we should be wary of
giving effect to this "value" except as to those matters where the
Constitution unequivocally gives Congress or the executive
unreviewable authority.97
C. Seventh Amendment Values
Seventh Amendment values are harder to identify. While they
95. Some administrative agencies are independent of any branch of government and
are less susceptible to such political control. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.4.1a; 1
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 2.5. Independent agencies include the Federal Trade
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3.4.4.1. Other agencies, however, are
controlled, usually by the executive, through the power of appointment: a new President
appoints the agency heads and so can set the agency's political agenda. The cabinet
departments are the primary examples of controlled agencies. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 20, § 2.5; PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, § 4.4.1. And because some rulemaking
occurs in the course of adjudication, that means adjudication is, to some degree, under the
control of the political branches. See, e.g., Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE
L.L 571, 610-15 (1970); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations
Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 254,264-65 (1968). See generally David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965)
(discussing the means employed by administrative agencies to create policy).
96. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35-65 (2d ed.
1962); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 74-75 (1986).
97. Such matters are extremely rare and can probably be identified through the
Article III court's application of the political question doctrine. See generally Fritz W.
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J.
517 (1966) (examining the Supreme Court's use of the political question doctrine).
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surely include the value of an independent decision maker, numerous
other justifications for the civil jury have been offered. These include
that the jury is a good decision maker; that it offers protection against
abuse of power by governmental and other institutional authorities;
that it brings community values into the judicial process; that it
checks the bureaucratization of the judiciary; that it helps to
legitimate judicial decisions; and that it educates the citizenry.9" I
summarize and restate these as the values of political participation
and deliberation.99
1. Independent Decisionmaker
Both Article III and the Seventh Amendment help to ensure
independent decision makers in federal adjudication. The salience of
this point has perhaps caused courts and commentators to conclude
that independence is the only important Seventh Amendment value
and that it is subsumed in the independence value of Article III, so
that no particular attention need be paid to the Seventh
Amendment.' This, however, is a mistake. First, as I shall show in
the next subsection, there are other Seventh Amendment values'0 '
that should also be acknowledged and preserved. Second, the jury
reflects independence values different from those of the Article III
judiciary. Article III is designed to make judges independent of
political pressure that could be exerted by the political branches of
government and by the people. The jury, by contrast, is designed to
be independent not only of the political branches, but even of the
judicial branch."m Indeed, the civil jury in pre-Revolutionary
98. See REPORT FROM AN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION/BROOKINGS SYMPOSIUM,
CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 8-11 (1992) [hereinafter
ABA/BROOKINGS REPORT].
99. See Ellen E. Sward, The Civil Jury in the United States (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). The ideas presented here are more fully developed in the first
chapter of this forthcoming book.
100. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53-54 (1989); Young,
supra note 5, at 781.
101. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
102. See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 708-10. The independence of judicial actors,
including judges and juries, is of relatively recent origin. Until the late seventeenth
century, juries were under the control of judges, and judges were substantially under the
control of the political branches. See Sward, supra note 99, at ch. 2. Jury independence
was established in 1670 in Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670). There,
an English court held for the first time that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts.
See id. at 1010-14. For a thorough discussion of Bushell's Case, see THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 200-64 (1985); for a discussion of its role
in the evolution of the modem jury, see John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to
Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
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America played an important role in resisting British oppression,
which was enforced through the courts, and the Seventh Amendment
was justified in part on that model.103 The jury's independence from
the judicial branch is also evident from the different mechanisms by
which Article III and juries maintain their independence. Article III
ensures independence of the judiciary by means of the tenure and
compensation provisions.104 Juries, by contrast, are unaccountable,
and therefore independent, because they are selected more or less
randomly,"°5 they are brought together for just one case, they disband
afterward, and they have no obligation to justify themselves.0 6 In
201, 206-12 (1988). Judicial independence emerged at about the same time, in the
"Glorious Revolution" of 1688. See Verkuil, supra note 65, at 305. The independence of
both juries and judges was an important consideration for the Framers in constructing the
new United States government, and some commentators see the independence of the
decision maker as the primary value behind both Article III and the Seventh Amendment.
See, e.g., Young, supra note 5, at 781. For further discussion of the history and structure of
the U.S. Constitution and its bearing on jury independence, see infra notes 317-53 and
accompanying text.
103. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 30-31
(1975); Wolfram, supra note 12, at 703-08.
104. The need for these provisions has become more obvious recently as we have seen
numerous attacks on judges who have issued unpopular opinions, including some calls for
impeachment or resignation. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, A Declaration of Independence:
Though Open to Criticism, Judges' Rulings Must Not Jeopardize Their Jobs, Rehnquist
Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1996, at A17; Charles W. Hall, Lawyers Defend Va. Judge
Mocked by Dole, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1996, at B3; Katharine Q. Seelye, House GOP
Members Target Judges for Impeachment, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Mar. 16,
1997, at A6.
105. Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions that
help ensure that the pool of jurors from which panels are selected are representative of the
community. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (holding that a state's
exclusion of women from jury panels unless the women specifically registered for jury
service to be unconstitutional); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) ("The
sympathetic and institutional exclusion of women ... deprives the jury system of the broad
base it was designed by Congress to have in our democratic society."); Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) (holding that a trial court cannot remove daily wage-
earners from the jury pool); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (holding
that a court cannot exclude black persons from jury pool). The peremptory challenge,
however, enables the parties to eliminate some jurors without giving a reason. See
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
REv. 369, 369 n.1 (1992). This has led to efforts by the opposing parties to seat a panel of
jurors that is likely to be favorably inclined toward their respective positions. See id. at
411, 413-14. The Supreme Court has recently cut back on the use of peremptory
challenges, holding that the parties in civil cases cannot use the peremptory challenge to
eliminate jurors solely on the basis of race, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 628 (1991), or gender, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140
(1994). The Court has also held that race could not be a basis for peremptory challenges
in criminal cases by either prosecutors, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), or
defendants, see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,58-59 (1992).
106. See George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
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addition, most jurisdictions, including the federa, system, prohibit a
court from inquiring as to the basis for the jurors' decisions.107 These
characteristics of the jury make it possible for juries to serve as a
democratic check on the judicial branch, which is not itself a
democratic institution. 08
2. Political Participation and Deliberation
The jury reflects political values that are not found in any of our
other federal institutions and very few of our state institutions.10 9
Fiist, the jury is an example of participatory, rather than
representative, democracy. Jurors participate directly in an
important governmental decision. Among other things, it has been
said that this kind of direct participation has significant educational
benefits, as citizens learn directly how to be functioning members of
JURY SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 103, 105. Given these characteristics, jurors can suffer no
ill consequences from an unpopular or erroneous decision.
107. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting inquiry into the jury's deliberations,
but permitting evidence of jury's overt acts such as visiting the accident scene). See
generally JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CML PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1086-88
(6th ed. 1993) (discussing prohibition on use of juror testimony to impeach the jury
verdict).
10& See ABABROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 9. It is this independence even
from judges that allows juries, on occasion, to "nullify" the law, for example by refusing to
apply laws they do not like. Jury nullification is a hotly debated topic, but it is easier to
justify in the criminal context, where it may be used to temper justice with mercy, than in
the civil, where its effects may be more perverse. See Sward, supra note 99, at ch. 1. On
jury nullification generally, see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 57-75 (1994); David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima,
Fiction, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 861 (1995); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The
Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165 (1991). It also is harder for
juries to nullify in civil cases because of the many ways judges can control juries, including
evidentiary rulings, directed verdicts, and new trials. See United States v. England, 347
F.2d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1965); Sward, supra note 99, at chs. 6-8. Nevertheless, juries do
sometimes try to nullify civil laws. Indeed, jury rebellion against the doctrine of
contributory negligence, which prevents a plaintiff from recovering from a negligent
defendant if the plaintiff also was negligent (even slightly), led most states to adopt
doctrines of comparative negligence, which allow the negligent plaintiff to recover the
portion of her injuries attributable to the defendant. For discussions of the development
of comparative negligence, see LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Fleming James,
Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949). The ability
of the jury to serve this democratic function of jury nullification has eroded considerably
in recent years because of the devices available to judges for controlling the civil jury. See
Sward, supra note 99, at chs. 6-8. The availability of these control devices may make the
jury much less independent of the judges than the founders intended. If so, the jury has
essentially the same level of independence as the judiciary as a whole.
109. The ideas expressed in this section are developed more fully in Sward, supra note
99, at ch. 1.
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the polity."'
Second, citizens can be required to serve on juries, whereas all
other political participation is voluntary."' This civic obligation
reflects political values best characterized as civic republican or
communitarian, in contrast to the "liberal" values that underlie our
other political institutions." The new civic republicans and
communitarians believe that citizens have political obligations,"'
whereas "liberals"--in the classic sense-believe that participation
should be strictly voluntary.' The knowledge that one has duties to
one's country is said to be valuable in itself, because it strengthens
the bond with fellow citizens and gives each citizen a stake in the
health of the polity. 15
Finally, the jury uses a consensus decision rule rather than the
majority rule found in our other political institutions."6 A consensus
110. See, e.g., ABA/BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 9; see also ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (Richard D. Heffner ed., New
American Library 1956) (1835); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 31-32 (1970) (discussing John Stuart Mill on participation in political processes);
CALEB PERRY PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
56-58 (1953). The Constitution, however, generally reflects the Madisonian view of
participation, which is that direct citizen participation leads to factionalism and is
"unrealistic and counterproductive." Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 431 (1987). Madison preferred that direct participation in
government be limited to the state and local levels. See Richard B. Stewart, Federalism
and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 918 (1985). The federal jury, then, is an anomaly in the
national Constitution-an anomaly that reflects the Jeffersonian view of direct citizen
participation, which was much more favorable than the Madisonian view.
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (1994) (providing that persons who fail to respond to a
federal jury summons may be fined or imprisoned or both).
112. See generally AMTrAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993) (contrasting liberal and
communitarian views); STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND
COMMUNITARIANS (2d ed. 1996) (same); NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS,
VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) [hereinafter
NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING] (same).
113. See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 112, at 247-59; Thomas A. Spragens, Jr.,
Communitarian Liberalism, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING, supra note 112, at 37,
38.
114. See MULHALL & SWIFT, supra note 112, at 13-18; Pamela Johnston Conover et al.,
Duty is a Four-Letter Word" Democratic Citizenship in the Liberal Polity, in
RECONSIDERING THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 147, 164-67 (George E. Marcus & Russell
Hanson eds., 1993). Classic liberalism is a philosophy of limited governmental
intervention into the private lives of citizens. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 124 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (stating that
preservation of private property is the chief end of government). It is probably better
described in today's jargon as libertarianism.
115. See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 112, at 159-60; Spragens, supra note 113, at 49-50.
116. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 48; Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (holding
that the Sixth and Seventh Amendments require unanimous verdicts); American Publ'g
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decision rule requires more extensive deliberation about the issues
than does a majority rule."7 Citizens must come together and
deliberate until they reach a unanimous verdict."' This requires
them to listen to differing views and to search for common ground
among diverse participants.
These values are fairly abstract, but in sum they show that
participation in jury service is valuable per se. The jury produces
secondary benefits as well. Requiring citizens to participate by
deliberating to a consensus is a means of injecting community values
into the decision making process."9 It provides an opportunity for
members of the community to make a statement about the kinds of
behavior that will be subject to civil liability. In negligence cases, for
example, jurors must decide whether the defendant acted reasonably
under the circumstances. Having a jury decide that issue reveals
how the community expects its citizens to conduct themselves. This
may well be a better measure of community sentiment than the
decision of a single judge, who most likely comes from the more elite
ranks of society.12 '
Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897) (holding that unanimity is an essential feature of
common law jury trials); ABRAMSON, supra note 108, at 12 (discussing the unanimous
verdict requirement); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 255
(1980) (explaining the unanimity rule in jury verdicts).
117. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 94-98 (1983); MANSBRIDGE, supra
note 116, at 166; Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority
vs. Unanimity Decision Rules, in IN THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE
COURTROOM 235,249-53 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987).
118. A unanimous verdict is still required in the federal courts unless the parties
consent to a non-unanimous verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 48. Many states permit non-
unanimous verdicts, usually a super-majority. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-248(g)
(1994) (requiring verdict of 10 of 12 jurors); LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1797(B)
(West 1990) (requiring 9 of 12 jurors); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 34A (West
1996) (requiring five-sixths of jurors); see also Sward, supra note 99, at ch. 5 (discussing
the unanimity decision rule and the arguments for and against nonunanimous verdicts in
civil cases).
119. See ABA/BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 9-10.
120. See, e.g., Vinyard v. Vinyard Funeral Home, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 392, 395-96 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1968) (holding that reasonableness is a question for a jury).
121. See ABABROOKNGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 10-11; Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 341, 344; Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA.
L. REV. 1055, 1066-87 (1964). There also are socializing effects from a jury's bringing
diverse people together and requiring them to share their varied perspectives and reach
common ground. This aspect of the experience of jury service should carry over into other
areas of jurors' lives, opening them up to the viewpoints and experiences of others whose
backgrounds may be quite different. Thus, jurors can learn something about getting along
in a multicultural society. They can learn not only about the diversity of perspectives, but
about the common human experience.
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D. Summary and Conclusion
Article III courts reflect the political values of separation of
powers and judicial independence. Non-Article III courts, on the
other hand, are generally created to take advantage of their greater
efficiency or the expertise their judges can bring to the matter and for
the political control they permit. The values underlying the Seventh
Amendment are quite different from either of these. While the
Seventh Amendment may reflect the need for independent decision
makers in the adjudicatory process-a value that overlaps one of the
Article III values-it primarily reflects the values of direct citizen
participation in the functions of government and of deliberation and
consensus-building. This brand of participatory democracy brings
community values to bear on judicial decision making.
These values are not all equal. The structural constitutional
values of separation of powers and judicial independence reflect the
foundational principles of our government and are surely more
important than efficiency or expertise. These structural values are in
even more direct conflict with the "value" of political control over
adjudication. Few would argue otherwise. What we have failed to
recognize, however, is that the Seventh Amendment values of direct
participation and deliberation are also important foundational
values."2 For the most part, the jury is the only federal governmental
institution that reflects these values.12
IV. JUSTIFYING ADJUDICATION IN LEGISLATIVE COURTS: THE
PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCrRINE AND THE BALANCING TEST
While efficiency and expertise are the values that Congress seeks
to effectuate by creating legislative courts, those values are irrelevant
122. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 110, at 108-09; PATTERSON, supra note 110, at
56-57.
123. Seventh Amendment values, however, are more controversial than Article III
values. Even the country's founders disagreed about the proper scope of the public's role
in governmental functions. Jefferson favored broad public participation in government;
Madison, however, feared it. See EDWARD MCNALL BuRNs, JAMES MADISON:
PHILOSOPHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 62-65 (1938) (discussing Madison's views on citizen
participation); PATrERSON, supra note 110, at 56-57 (discussing Jefferson's views on
juries). The jury is a Jeffersonian institution. The electoral college in presidential
elections is a Madisonian institution. It might be expected, then, that the Court would
undervalue juries in evaluating adjudication in legislative courts. Because there is less
consensus about the value of the political participation and deliberation that the jury
embodies than there is about the value of separation of powers and an independent
judiciary, courts may demonstrate more concern for the Article III values. A robust jury
also could cut down on judges' power. While judicial control of juries is strong, it can
never be complete. See supra note 108 (describing jury nullification).
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if legislative courts are unconstitutional., The constitutional
justifications that the Court has developed for legislative courts are
each linked closely to a specific kind of legislative court. Perhaps
because administrative agencies play such a large role in modem
America, the most important justification is the public rights
doctrine, along with the balancing test that has evolved from it.124
The public rights doctrine allows Congress to assign the adjudication
of regulatory and public benefit matters to non-Article III
adjudicators-primarily administrative agencies, though adjuncts
have also figured in the development of the doctrine."z  The
balancing test allows for adjudication of a variety of private rights in
administrative agencies.
While these doctrines were developed to justify non-Article III
adjudication rather than jury-less adjudication, the Court has also
permitted jury-less adjudication in administrative agencies in all
categories of cases, including those involving private rights. Indeed,
the primary question for the Court seems to be not whether Congress
can provide for jury-less adjudication, but whether Congress can
provide for non-Article III adjudication. If Congress can permit non-
Article III adjudication, it usually follows that Congress can permit
such adjudication to be without a jury. In the next section, I take
issue with this approach. But because the Court's legislative courts
jurisprudence is so important to the Seventh Amendment issue, it is
necessary first to describe and analyze that jurisprudence.
A. Development of the Justification
1. Origins of the Public Rights Doctrine
The public rights doctrine was originally founded on the notion
that if Congress can, consistent with the Constitution, allow the
executive or legislative branch to resolve a particular dispute
between the government and a private citizen, there is no bar to its
giving such dispute for resolution to a body that looks like a court but
does not have the protections required by Article III. There is a
historical basis for the view that some matters are inherently "public"
124. Other justifications, which will be discussed in Part VI, are waiver, sovereign
immunity, and the plenary powers rationale. For discussions of the development of the
public rights doctrine, see 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 2.8; PIERCE ET AL., supra
note 20, § 3.7; Fallon, supra note 8, at 951-70; Young, supra note 5. Young's is the most
detailed history.
125. For a discussion of the propriety of applying the public rights doctrine and the
balancing test to adjuncts, see infra notes 235-62 and accompanying text.
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and can be resolved by the political branches. At the time of this
country's founding, litigation between a citizen and the sovereign,
aside from criminal matters, was rare. Citizens could not sue the
government because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,12 6 and the
government regulation that existed was handled outside the judicial
process by the political branches. 127 Disputes between citizens and
the government in its proprietary capacity, such as contract disputes,
were sometimes handled in the common law courts if the government
brought suit,"H but such claims both by and against the government
were often handled in summary proceedings conducted by
government auditors.12 9
Apparently because of this background, early Congresses
thought nothing of giving executive departments the authority to
perform adjudicatory acts with respect to such governmental
matters.130  The power of Congress to confer such adjudicatory
authority apparently received no serious challenge until the middle of
the nineteenth century.
The public rights doctrine began with Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.13 1 That 1856 decision resolved
an Article III challenge to an adjudication by the Treasury
Department of amounts due from a collector of the customs.1 32 The
126. For a discussion of sovereign immunity, see infra notes 416-67 and accompanying
text.
127. English and early American legal theorists did not consider government
administration to relate to "law" at all. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 65, at 259;
FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1-15 (1905). Maitland, in a series of lectures in 1887-88, hesitantly referred to
English administrative "law," but said it had only developed in the previous 50 years or so.
See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 505 (1908); see also
FREEDMAN, supra note 65, at 259 (asserting that the importance of administrative law in
the United States was not recognized until the early twentieth century). There was,
however, more regulation than many modem opponents of regulation care to admit. See
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., Affirmative Government and the American Economy, in
CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 219 (1986).
128. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941) (holding that a suit by
the United States in its proprietary capacity is a suit at common law); Cotton v. United
States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850) (same); Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 172, 181 (1818) (same).
129. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 283 (1856). The government's debtors were often collectors of the revenue who had
failed to pay to the government the taxes or other revenues that they had collected. See id.
at 275. Such debts have a public character.
130. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 1.4; Fallon, supra note 8, at 919.
131. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856); PIERCE ET AL., supra note 20, at 71-72; Young,
supra note 5, at 769, 795.
132. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 275. Authority for the Treasury
Department's adjudication of such cases was granted by the First Congress. See Act of
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Court, citing established practice in England and some of the
states,'3 3 held that such an adjudication did not fall inherently within
the judicial power of Article III.31 Rather, the Court thought that it
was a political matter properly assigned to one of the political
branches of government. 35 The Court was persuaded in part by the
fact that the United States was a party and in part by the fact that the
debt sought to be enforced was a "public" debt, owed by a public
servant to the government and encompassing money he had collected
in connection with his public duties.3 6 The Court said:
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper. 37
In other words, Congress has the power to assign the adjudication of
public rights to non-Article III bodies if it chooses. Congress is still
free, however, to assign adjudication of public rights to the Article III
courts. 3  This is consistent with the historical treatment of such
rights as described in Murray's Lessee."9
In Murray's Lessee, the Court used the term "public rights"
without providing much of a definition. In a sort of negative
definition, the Court suggested that public rights do not involve cases
falling within the common law, equity, or admiralty jurisdiction,
Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66; Fallon, supra note 8, at 919.
133. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276-80.
134. See id. at 281. The Court did say that Congress could give such adjudications to
the courts, however. See id. For a discussion of how the Court's views have evolved as to
whether public rights fall within the judicial power of the United States, see infra note 189.
135. See id at 281-82.
136. See id. at 283. The Court suggested that ordinary contract actions between the
government and a private citizen also could be seen as public rights. See id. The
government, however, was free to sue for breach of contract in the ordinary common law
courts. See id That the citizen could not bring suit against the government in a common
law court was due to sovereign immunity and not the public character of the debt.
137. Id at 284.
138. See id. at 283-84; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that the federal
judicial power extends to "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party"). In
Murray's Lessee itself, government auditors had determined the amount due from the
customs collector, and the Court approved of that adjudication as a "public" right. See
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. But the suit came before the Supreme Court
because the collector challenged that administrative determination in an Article III court,
relying on Congress's limited waiver of sovereign immunity for that purpose. See id. The
waiver did not allow the court to re-determine the debt found by the government auditors,
however. See id. at 284-85.
139. See id. at 283.
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because such cases would concern private rights.14 ° Common law,
equity, and admiralty cases all typically involved disputes between
two or more private parties;41 however in Murray's Lessee, the
government was a party to the dispute.
The Court apparently did not attempt a definition of both public
and private rights until Crowell v. Benson,'42 almost eighty years later.
In that case, the presence of the government as a party became a
more explicit way to distinguish public from private rights. The
Court in Crowell said that private rights concern "the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined"; 143 public rights were
"those which arise between the Government and persons subject to
its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional
functions of the executive or legislative departments. '' 144 Thus, the
presence of the government as a party was an inherent part of the
definition of "public rights." But by 1982, when Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 45 was decided, a mere
plurality of the Court approved of the Crowell definitions of public
and private rights.46 Thus, the stage was set for the development of
the balancing test.
2. Recent Developments in the Justification for Agency
Adjudication: The Balancing Test
Both Crowell and Northern Pipeline contained the germs of this
new method of justifying administrative agency adjudication. In
Crowell, the Court approved of agency adjudication of federal
workers' compensation claims under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 47 Claims brought under the
Act were claims by workers against their employers-two private
parties. Congress had replaced the workers' rights against their
140. See id; Young, supra note 5, at 793.
141. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69-70
& n.23 (1982) (plurality opinion). But see supra note 128 (showing that the government
can be a party to common law civil actions).
142. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. at 50. It is not clear whether this definition would include proprietary matters,
such as contract actions or torts. See infra notes 430-31 and accompanying text. Crowell
itself involved a regulatory matter-specifically, an enforcement under the
Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994 &
Supp. 111996) (now named Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act).
145. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
146. See id. at 67-72 (plurality opinion).
147. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (now named Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act); see Crowell, 285 U.S. at 42-65.
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employers under admiralty law with the administrative remedy
provided by the Act.'48 The Court approved of the administrative
remedy, holding that there was no unconstitutional encroachment on
the Article III powers of the judiciary because the agency had to
enforce its orders in an Article III court. 4 9 In addition, the Court
required that the Article III court review constitutional and
jurisdictional facts de novo.50 Indeed, the Court viewed the agency
as an adjunct fact-finder, analogizing it to the jury.'5' Thus, while
clearly defining public rights as including only matters where the
government was a party, the Court permitted non-Article III
adjudication of an administrative remedy between two private
parties, as long as the essential judicial functions of enforcement and
jurisdictional and constitutional fact-finding remained with the
Article III court. 2
Northern Pipeline was a more complicated decision. The
plurality found that Congress's grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts was unconstitutional because it gave the non-Article III
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction that was virtually coterminous with
that of an Article III court, including jurisdiction over private
148. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 39-40. I call such rights "replacement rights." See infra
notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
149. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 45. Voluntary compliance with the Commission's
payment orders could be expected in many cases, however, so federal enforcement was
likely to be needed only when there was some dispute over the Commission's resolution of
the matter. See icl at 43-45.
150. See icl at 54, 64; infra note 152 (discussing jurisidictional and constitutional fact
doctrines).
151. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51, 61. It should be clear that the jury has a quite
different constitutional position than does an administrative agency: the former is
constitutionally required under some circumstances, while the latter is entirely a
discretionary creation of Congress. In my schemata, I distinguish between agencies and
adjuncts. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
152. The jurisdictional fact doctrine, which required de novo review of findings related
to the agency's jurisdiction-such as a finding that an applicant for benefits was injured in
connection with his employment-appears to have disappeared. See 5 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE § 29:23 (2d ed. 1984); PIERCE ET AL., supra
note 20, at 123. The same is largely true of constitutional facts, see DAVIS, supra, § 29:23,
except that courts still engage in non-deferential review of "constitutional" facts relating
to First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 508-09 n.27 (1984); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964). See generally Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (discussing the
constitutional fact doctrine).
The Seventh Amendment did not pose a problem in Crowell because the remedy that
the federal statute replaced was a claim in admiralty, in which there was historically no
right to a jury trial. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 45.
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common law claims. 53  Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O'Connor, concurred in the judgment, providing the votes for a
holding of unconstitutionality.54 Justice Rehnquist asserted that it
was unnecessary to hold the bankruptcy courts generally
unconstitutional when the only problem before the Court was the
exercise of jurisdiction over a common law claim. 55 He thought that
a non-Article III court could not exercise jurisdiction over a common
law claim, but would not go so far as to strike down Congress's entire
jurisdictional scheme. 56 Nonetheless, because the jurisdiction over
common law claims was so enmeshed in the bankruptcy courts'
otherwise constitutional jurisdiction, Justice Rehnquist agreed that
Congress needed to reconstitute the courts' jurisdiction.157
It is the dissent in Northern Pipeline that is most important,
however. Justice White provided an exhaustive analysis of the
Court's past approvals of non-Article III adjudication and asserted
that the only way to make sense of them was to view them as
balancing Article III values against the reasons that led Congress to
create a non-Article III body to adjudicate the particular matter
before it.158 Justice White thought that the balance in Northern
Pipeline favored the jurisdictional grant that Congress had made. 59
Justice White's dissent formed the basis of a new majority that
began to come together just three years after Northern Pipeline. In
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 6 the Court
upheld a mandatory arbitration provision in the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FEFRA"). 161 Arbitration, which is a
153. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85-87
(1982) (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. See id. at 52 (plurality opinion).
154. See id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
155. See id (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
156. See id at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. See id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
158. See idL at 92-118 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell. See id. at 92 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also
filed a separate dissent to point out that the Court's holding was reflected in the Rehnquist
opinion. See id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
159. See id at 116-17 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the balance favored the
jurisdictional grant because, among other things, there was Article III review of
bankruptcy court decisions, the jurisdictional grant was not a political power grab, and the
reasons for the grant were compelling).
160. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
161. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)) (providing for binding arbitration); Thomas,
473 at 594.
1068 [Vol. 77
1999] JURY TRIALS IN LEGISLATIVE COURTS
form of non-Article III adjudication, 62 was required when a second
manufacturer wanted to make use of data submitted by an earlier
manufacturer and the two manufacturers could not agree on the
amount of money that the second manufacturer had to pay the first
for the use of the data. 63 In contrast to the relatively searching
review of the matters at issue in Crowell, judicial review of the
arbitrators' award was limited to claims of "'fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct.' "I'
The Thomas Court approved of this mandatory arbitration,
relying on two distinct grounds. First, the Court devised an expanded
definition of "public rights." Although the claim was one between
private parties and so appeared to concern only private rights as
defined in Crowell and the Northern Pipeline plurality, the Court
determined that the claim had the characteristics of a public right
because (1) it was created by Congress, and (2) it was invested with a
public rather than private purpose in that the ability of "follow-on
registrants" of the pesticide to make use of data submitted by earlier
registrants "serves a public purpose as an integral part of a program
safeguarding the public health." '165 Thus, rights could be "public"
even if they involved claims between private parties as long as they
were created by the legislature rather than the common law and were
an integral part of a scheme designed to promote public health and
safety. I call these rights "quasi-public."' 66
There was also a second ground for the decision, however. In
words reminiscent of Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline, the
Court in Thomas considered Article III requirements in light of "the
origin of the right at issue [and] the concerns guiding the selection by
162. Arbitration is sometimes undertaken voluntarily by the parties as an alternative to
judicial dispute resolution. See 1 EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02 (1994). But see Dwight Golann, Making
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487,
491 (1989) (noting that ADR processes are not frequently chosen voluntarily by litigants).
When arbitration is mandatory, however, it replaces Article III adjudication and should be
viewed as non-Article III adjudication.
163. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573. Manufacturers of products covered by the Act had
to submit data on product safety. See id. at 571. Rather than duplicate expensive testing
that had already been done, manufacturers seeking later approval for identical products
wanted to use product safety data submitted by earlier applicants. See id at 571-72. They
could do so only if they compensated the earlier manufacturer. See id. at 572. The agency,
however, was ill-prepared to adjudicate disputes over the amount of compensation, so
Congress provided instead for mandatory arbitration. See id. at 573-75.
164. Id- at 573-74 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982)).
165. Id at 589.
166. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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Congress of a particular method for resolving disputes."1 67  In
Thomas, the Court found it significant that Congress had created the
rights being adjudicated, so that those rights did not fall "within the
range of matters reserved to Article III courts. 1 68  In addition,
Congress was searching for a "pragmatic solution to the difficult
problem of spreading the costs of generating adequate information
regarding the safety, health, and environmental impact of a
potentially dangerous product.1 169  These factors outweighed any
need to preserve what had to be a minimal Article III interest:
because the rights at issue could have been determined by Congress
or the executive, there was little encroachment on the Article III
judiciary.
The Court in Thomas apparently had not decided whether to
stay with a public rights rationale or adopt the balancing test first
articulated by Justice White in Northern Pipeline. But a year after
Thomas, the balancing test received a more explicit articulation in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor."0 Schor was an
Article III challenge to the power of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC") to hear a common law counterclaim to a
regulatory dispute that was within the agency's jurisdiction. Like
Northern Pipeline, Schor thus involved a purely private right. But
unlike the Court in Northern Pipeline, the Court in Schor upheld
non-Article III adjudication of that right.71
Congress had authorized the CFTC to hear claims by traders
against brokers that arose under the Commodity Exchange Act or
CFTC regulations in order to provide an expeditious and inexpensive
alternative to litigation, though litigation in an Article III court
167. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587. For general commentary on the Thomas decision, see
Fallon, supra note 8, at 930; Young, supra note 5, at 852-56; Richard M. Thomas, Note,
Formalism and Functionalism: From Northern Pipeline to Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co., 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1003 (1986). As Justice White argued in
his Northern Pipeline dissent, balancing had always been at least an implicit part of the
analysis when Congress set up non-Article III courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113-15 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); Ralph U.
Whitten, Consent, Caseload, and Other Justifications for Non-Article III Courts and
Judges: A Comment on Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 20
CREIGHTON L. REv. 11, 12-19 (1986). The balancing test seemed to become more explicit
in Thomas, however.
168. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587 (distinguishing the statute at issue in Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932), which involved the adjudication of state created rights that had
replaced existing common law rights).
169. Id at 590.
170. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
171. See id at 857.
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remained open." The CFTC then adopted a rule allowing the
agency to hear counterclaims by the brokers against the traders if the
counterclaims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, such
as a counterclaim for the debt owed to the brokers; such
counterclaims would be compulsory in the federal courts.7 1 The
question was whether the CFTC's hearing such counterclaims
comported with Article III.'7 In language reminiscent of Thomas,
the Court identified a number of "factors" that it said helped decide
whether non-Article III adjudication was permitted:
Among the factors upon which we have focused are the
extent to which the "essential attributes of judicial power"
are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in
Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to
be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III."7
Applying these factors, the Court held that (1) while the right
being adjudicated in the counterclaim was clearly a private right with
its source in the common law; (2) the encroachment on the judicial
branch was minimal because the power of the agency was quite
limited, especially as the parties had to go to an Article III court for
enforcement of the agency's orders; and (3) Congress's intent to
provide an expeditious and inexpensive alternative to litigation
would be thwarted if the brokers could not assert counterclaims in
the CFTC proceeding, because the desire for a single forum to
resolve the entire dispute would drive the parties into courts. 76
There are at least two ways to view these developments. One is
that there are now two distinct tests for administrative adjudication:
the public rights doctrine, which allows administrative adjudication of
public rights, and the balancing test, which must be applied if non-
public rights are at issue. Under this view, the balancing test
supplements the public rights doctrine. A second way to look at
these developments is that the balancing test has supplanted the
public rights doctrine altogether, so that all administrative
172- See id at 836.
173. See id- at 837; 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (1997); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (defining
compulsory counterclaims).
174. The Court first determined that the CFTC had the statutory power to promulgate
such a rule. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 842-43. The rule is found at 17 C.F.R. § 12.19.
175. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
176. See id. at 848-56.
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adjudications are tested by its methods.'77
Even if the balancing test is always used, pure public fights will
always satisfy the test, at least under the Court's current
jurisprudence. 78 The Court in Schor identified three factors to be
weighed in the balance. The first is the degree of encroachment on
the Article III judiciary. 79 Significantly, the Article III judiciary is
usually thought to be adequately protected if there is Article III
review of agency action.80 A pure public right, however, could be
determined by Congress or the executive, so there is no
encroachment on the Article III judiciary even if Article III review is
extremely deferential or even non-existent. 81  The second Schor
factor is the origin of the right." Rights that originate in the
common law are more likely to require Article III adjudication than
those that originate in Congress.' 3  Pure public rights do not
originate in the common law but in congressional enactments, so this
factor weighs in favor of non-Article III adjudication. The final
Schor factor is the reason for Congress's choice of a non-Article III
court."s This factor is unimportant with respect to pure public rights
because Congress has extremely broad discretion in its choice of an
adjudicatory body for pure public rights. 85 Thus, even if the
balancing test applies to all administrative adjudications, there should
be no problem with administrative adjudication of pure public rights.
177. See infra note 362 for an argument that this second view makes more sense.
178. I question the soundness of that jurisprudence, however. See infra notes 186-262
and accompanying text.
179. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
180. See id. at 853; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52 (1932); see also Fallon, supra
note 8, at 917-18 (arguing that Article III review of agency decisions protects Article III
values); Redish, supra note 16, at 199, 206-08 (same).
181. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 284 (1856). While Article III might not require review of agency action, the Due
Process Clause probably would. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,355-56 (1958).
182. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
183. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70
(1982) (plurality opinion). But see Schor, 478 U.S. at 853-54 (holding that pure private
rights can be heard in a non-Article III court with appropriate safeguards). This points up
one irony of the public rights doctrine: Congress could not assign adjudication of state
common law claims to non-Article III federal bodies, but could assign adjudication of a
wide range of federal matters to such bodies. Federal courts thus could find much of their
time taken up with state rather than federal matters.
184. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
185. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. Once again, there may be some
due process concerns, see supra note 181, but there should not be any Article III concerns.
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B. Making Sense of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
Courts and commentators frequently note that the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence relating to the public rights doctrine and the
balancing test is quite confused." 6 In this section, I will do some
sorting that I hope will help to clarify some aspects of that doctrine.
The task is a difficult one because it is multidimensional. It requires
a consideration of the kinds of rights that the Court's doctrine
embraces, the protections that are required for the various kinds of
rights in order to preserve Article III values, and the characteristics
of the courts in which adjudications have been justified under these
doctrines. These issues sometimes overlap.
1. Kinds of Rights Adjudicated Under the Public Rights
Doctrine/Balancing Test and the Scope of Review
Throughout the development of the public rights doctrine and
the balancing test, the Court has continued to distinguish only two
kinds of rights: public and private. In the previous section, however,
I hinted at a need to break down the categories even further. I
identify four categories, in order of their progression from public to
private rights: pure public rights, quasi-public rights, replacement
rights, and pure private rights. It is important to make these fine
distinctions because, as I have shown, the nature of the right weighs
heavily in the Schor balance. Furthermore, if we recognize the
different gradations, we can better fine tune the Article III analysis:
the four categories present different kinds of challenges to our
constitutional principles and therefore require different kinds of
responses. Finally, recognizing only two kinds of rights obscures the
Seventh Amendment issues, as I will show in the next section.
a. Pure Public Rights
Pure public rights concern regulatory or public benefit
adjudications between the government and a private party. These
rights originate in a statute enacted by Congress, rather than in the
common law, and the government is always a party, seeking to
protect the public health, safety, or welfare by enforcing'17 or
186. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 847; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Fallon, supra note 8, at 916; Redish & LaFave, supra note 17,
at 417-29.
187. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-17 (1987) (government's suit against
real estate developer in federal court seeking civil penalties for environmental damage).
Murray's Lessee is generally thought to be the first public rights case. See Young, supra
note 5, at 795. Its status as a "pure" public rights case is problematic, however. It did
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defending 8 such laws. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may assign the adjudication of pure public rights to legislative
courts.189  The rationale is that if Congress could conclusively
determine a matter, it can assign adjudication of that matter to
tribunals that it creates, without regard for the requirements of
Article III.9 Indeed, it could even be argued that Article III does
not require judicial review of public rights matters: oversight by the
judicial branch could be viewed as encroachment on the
constitutional powers of the legislative and executive branches.'
Congress has not gone so far, however, perhaps because even if
Article III does not require judicial review, due process probably
involve an action between the government and a citizen with respect to customs
regulation. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274. The claim, however, was
essentially a debt collection--the government sought money collected on its behalf by one
of its employees. See id. The fact that it was a regulatory, rather than a proprietary, debt
is what gives it a public character. I question the accuracy of calling ordinary breach of
contract actions between the government and a private citizen "public" rights, as there is
no regulatory or public benefit element to such matters. It seems to me that such
proprietary matters involving the government are more akin to private rights.
188. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (authorizing persons aggrieved by administrative
orders to challenge orders in federal court); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 160-64 (1970)
(tenant farmer's action for declaratory judgment against a Department of Agriculture
regulation); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1967) (drug manufacturer's
action for declaratory judgment against FDA labeling and advertising requirements); 21
C.F.R. § 10.25 (1997) (authorizing citizens to initiate administrative proceedings
challenging FDA orders).
189. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284. It seems clear that the judicial
power extends to public as well as private rights matters. See Redish & LaFave, supra
note 17, at 418 (arguing that the term "suits" encompasses administrative disputes).
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the traditional core of the federal judicial power is
private disputes. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68-70 & n.25 (plurality opinion).
Indeed, in the past the Court has suggested that at least some public rights matters may
not even be cognizable in an Article III court because they do not fall within the judicial
power of the United States. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 578 (1933)
(interpreting the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over controversies to which the
United States is a party to mean controversies to which the United States is a party
plaintiff); cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (saying that
territorial courts are "incapable of receiving" jurisdiction over cases falling within the
Article III judicial power). That position has been abandoned, however, in part because it
is inconsistent with the language of Article III. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
550-51 (1962). The judicial power includes "Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party" and "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, [and] the
Laws of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, so public rights cases do fall
within the literal language of the Constitution. Indeed, if this were not the case, Article
III courts would not be able to review public rights matters decided initially in the
administrative agencies. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 545 n.13; Fallon, supra note 8, at 943-46.
190. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
191. Those who emphasize the separation of powers aspect of the constitutional
structure rather than the checks and balances aspect could advocate such a view. See
STONE ET AL., supra note 69, at 387-88.
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does.192 While Congress generally provides for some Article III
review of public rights adjudication, that review is quite deferential. 193
To confuse the issue further, Congress often provides that public
rights matters be adjudicated initially in an Article III court.'94 Thus,
Congress's options with respect to public rights matters are quite
broad. At one extreme, it can create a non-Article III court to hear
such matters, with highly deferential review in an Article III court; at
the other, it can give such matters to Article III courts in the first
instance.
The public rights doctrine originated at a time when
governmental administration was not thought to involve "law" at
all. 95 Thus, it was easy to see Congress as having broad discretion in
handling administrative or regulatory matters. There are good
reasons to question that view, however. First, it is now clear that
legal matters arising out of governmental administration are within
the constitutional jurisdiction of Article III courts. 96 Indeed, that
was implicit even in Murray's Lessee, in which the Court said that
Congress could have given the matter before it .to an Article III
court' 97-- an impossibility if the Constitution did not encompass
jurisdiction over public rights.198 Furthermore, we no longer view
governmental administration as primarily political in nature; rather,
192. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958). ,
193. See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334, 344 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying
arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard).
194. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (providing for jurisdiction of federal district
courts over civil suits under the Endangered Species Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994)
(providing for jurisdiction of federal district courts over civil suits under the Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994) (providing for jurisdiction of federal district courts over civil
suits under the Noise Control Act). Congress's ability to give citizens a right of action
against government agencies to enforce congressional mandates has been undermined
somewhat by developments in standing doctrine. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot give a right to sue to citizens who
do not otherwise meet the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability requirements for
standing).
195. See supra note 127. Murray's Lessee, which originated the doctrine, was an 1856
decision. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
196. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing federal court jurisdiction over
controversies to which the United States is a party); see also supra note 189 (describing
cases that discuss whether judicial power extends to public rights matters). In a strained
attempt to accommodate sovereign immunity, this clause was at one time interpreted to
include only claims involving the United States as plaintiff. See Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553, 572-78 (1933). This position was rejected in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 562-71 (1962). Even the Williams interpretation, however, would leave public rights
cases subject to Article III jurisdiction, but only when the government is seeking to
enforce an order-not when a citizen is challenging an order.
197. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284.
198. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 545 n.13; Fallon, supra note 8, at 943-46.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
we have developed a substantial body of administrative law, which
regulates and restricts the government itself. To some degree, that
may reflect due process rather than separation of powers concerns, 99
but this development makes it clear that administration is susceptible
of judicial analysis.
Second, as both the Court and commentators have noted,
separation of powers principles seem to require more Article III
oversight of public rights matters than of private rights matters,200
though the Court has never taken that position as a matter of
constitutional law. If Congress can impose regulatory duties upon
the citizens and then create its own tribunals to adjudicate and
enforce those rights and duties with minimal oversight by the Article
III courts, considerable governmental power will be concentrated in
the hands of one branch-precisely the circumstance that the framers
were trying to guard against.201 This is an argument based on the
structure of the Constitution rather than its precise language, but that
approach has been advocated by commentators2°2 and employed by
the Court.20 3
The problem is compounded by the fact that pure public rights
involve the government itself as a party. When the government sues
a private citizen, there is already considerable inequality between the
parties, just as there is in a criminal case.2°4 That inequality is made
worse when the litigation is conducted in a court whose judges are
potentially under the control of the very governmental body that
created the rights and duties. Administrative adjudication of public
199. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,355-56 (1958).
200. In Northern Pipeline the Court stated:
Doubtless it could be argued that the need for independent judicial
determination is greatest in cases arising between the government and an
individual. But the rationale for the public-rights line of cases lies not in political
theory, but rather in Congress' and this Court's understanding of what power was
reserved to the Judiciary by the Constitution as a matter of historical fact.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 n.20 (1982)
(plurality opinion); see also Young, supra note 5, at 837 ("Are not the executive and
legislative branches more likely to attempt to influence judges in cases ... where the
federal government is a party?").
201. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
202. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-69 (1969).
203. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,221-23 (1995).
204. The consequences are not as severe as they are in a criminal case, though civil
regulatory matters can be significant for the parties involved.
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rights, then, could threaten both the structural separation of powers
interests and the interests of individuals in an independent
adjudicator. At the very least, then, it appears that there should be
meaningful Article III review of public rights matters adjudicated
initially in non-Article III courts. Highly deferential review, such as
often occurs today, does not adequately preserve constitutional
values.2
05
b. Quasi-Public Rights
When Congress creates a new regulatory right but allows private
parties to enforce that right against other private parties, the right
might be characterized as quasi-public. In such cases, the private
right of action substitutes for government regulatory actions.
Perhaps reflecting their close relationship to pure public rights, the
Supreme Court has held that quasi-public rights may be adjudicated
in legislative courts with only limited Article III review. 6
There are many examples of legislative court adjudication of
quasi-public rights, including Thomas, where this extension of the
definition of "public rights" was first articulated.20 7  The original
claim in Schor-the claim by the trader against the broker to
vindicate rights granted by act of Congress--was also a quasi-public
right, as it was a claim based on a regulatory law enacted by Congress
and was between two private parties20 The rights of a debtor in
bankruptcy could also be characterized as quasi-public: the debtor's
rights are created by act of Congress to regulate and resolve
insolvencies, and the rights are granted against other private
parties20 9 Once again, Congress often provides for adjudication of
205. Congress, of course, has the power to change regulatory laws, so it would continue
to have considerable control over the substantive law that applies to public rights. An
independent adjudicator can help to ensure that whatever the law is, it is fairly
administered.
206. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1985);
supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. In Thomas, a dispute that arose under a
regulatory law was decided by binding arbitration, and the arbitrators' award was
reviewable only for fraud, misrepresentation, and other misconduct. See Thomas, 473 U.S.
at 573-74.
207. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 588. As I noted earlier, the Court has always
distinguished only public and private rights; the term "quasi-public" is not the Court's.
208. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986).
Jurisdiction over the original quasi-public right claim was not at issue in Schor. See id. at
838. Rather, the trader challenged the agency's power to hear his common law
counterclaim-a pure private right--so the Court did not address the status of quasi-
public rights. See id
209. The Court has said that bankruptcy is arguably a public right, see Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,71 (1982) (plurality opinion),
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quasi-public matters in Article III courts,210 but the Supreme Court
cases suggest not only that Congress has considerable discretion in
assigning quasi-public matters to legislative courts, but that legislative
courts may adjudicate quasi-public rights subject to only deferential
Article III oversight."'
As with public rights, there are reasons to question whether the
Court's approach is correct. Some of the same considerations apply
to quasi-public rights as to public rights-quasi-public rights are
certainly as susceptible of judicial determination as public rights.
Indeed, they involve classic issues of private litigation; only the
source of the law makes them different from ordinary common law
actions. Furthermore, as with public rights, administrative
adjudication of quasi-public rights concentrates governmental power
in one political branch. On the other hand, quasi-public rights
neither involve the government/private citizen inequality, nor
implicate the potential problem of one party controlling the court
before which it has a case pending. Those differences make
administrative adjudication of such rights somewhat less problematic.
Nevertheless, administrative adjudication of such rights still gives
Congress or the executive the opportunity to influence the outcome
of particular cases in accordance with the prevailing political
orientation. Thus, such administrative adjudication still raises
serious separation of powers concerns, which could be eased with less
deferential Article III oversight. Such oversight should be sensitive
but under the schemata I have described here, "quasi-public" is more accurate. It also
might be argued that bankruptcy is really a replacement right, see infra notes 213-19 and
accompanying text, because it replaces ordinary debtor/creditor law. I think quasi-public
is more accurate, however, because bankruptcy generally had ancient statutory rather than
common law origins, see Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English
Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 7-8 (1919), and because there is explicit
constitutional authority for Congress to create bankruptcy law, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1997) (discussing the origins of bankruptcy law); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
BANKRUPTCY §§ 1-1, 1-2 (1992) (same).
210. See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106 (1991)
(age discrimination); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982)
(employment discrimination); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 753 (1979) (age
discrimination).
211. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985)). Review of the arbitrators' decision in
Thomas was limited to claims of "'fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.'"
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 573-74 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982)).
212. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), for example, is well-known for
bending with the prevailing winds. Indeed, the NLRB performs much of its rulemaking
function through adjudication. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 6.8; Bernstein,
supra note 95, at 574; Peck, supra note 95, at 255-56; Shapiro, supra note 95, at 922.
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to the particular threat to Article III values that such adjudication
presents.
c. Replacement Rights
Sometimes, rather than creating entirely new rights, Congress
will provide a new administrative remedy that replaces existing
common law remedies. Replacement rights are similar to quasi-
public rights in that they both involve matters that arise between two
private parties rather than one private party and the government and
they both concern a remedy created by Congress.213 But quasi-public
rights have no direct counterpart in the common law, whereas
replacement rights supplant existing private rights-usually rights
created by the states. The Court appears to be more solicitous of
replacement rights than of quasi-public rights, perhaps because in the
absence of the replacement remedy, the parties would have had
rights to an Article III court for their state law claims.214 Thus, while
the Court in Thomas, adjudicating a quasi-public right, permitted
deferential review of the arbitrators' award,215 the Court in Crowell,
adjudicating a replacement right, approved the federal worker's
compensation scheme only because an Article III court was required
to enforce the administrative order and because that Article III court
engaged in de novo review of certain administrative fact-finding.216
As noted, the worker's compensation scheme in Crowell v.
Benson is one example of a replacement right. Replacement rights
are also adjudicated in bankruptcy proceedings. In a decision
interpreting the scope of the Seventh Amendment rather than
Article III, the Court held that by filing a claim against the estate, a
213. The issue is complicated somewhat by the fact that an issue could be between two
private parties in the legislative court, but between the government and one of the parties
on appeal to an Article III court. Often, enforcement of the decision of a legislative court
is done by the government suing the party who is resisting the legislative court's order.
See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 838; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 476
(1951); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 36 (1932). I am concerned here, however, only
with the power of the legislative courts, so I characterize the right as a "quasi-public" or
"replacement" right if the matter was between two private parties in the legislative court.
214. Of course, the statement in the text is only true if there is diversity of citizenship.
If there is no diversity, the parties must sue in state courts, which are obviously not Article
III courts. State courts, however, like Article III courts, are independent of Congress.
215. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592-93.
216. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 65 (holding that jurisdictional facts and constitutional
facts are reviewed de novo). The Crowell Court, however, allowed review of other
administrative fact-finding on a substantial evidence standard, which is more deferential.
See id. at 46. The Court called the rights at issue in Thomas a variety of public rights, and
it said that Crowell involved private rights. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
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creditor transforms his common law claim, such as a breach of
contract claim, into an equitable claim for his share of the estate.217
Thus, the federal equitable rights the creditor gains in bankruptcy
replace state common law rights. Interestingly, however, Article III
review of the bankruptcy courts' adjudication of such replacement
rights is more deferential than the review that was approved in
Crowell 18 This result could possibly be justified on the ground that
bankruptcy is adjudicated by an adjunct rather than an administrative
agency, and thus the Article III court theoretically has more direct
and frequent oversight of the non-Article III adjudication.219 On the
other hand, it could reflect confusion as to the kind of rights that are
at issue and the threat to constitutional values posed by non-Article
III adjudication of such rights.
Because replacement rights are created by Congress, they raise
the same separation of powers problems as public and quasi-public
rights and may require searching Article III review for all the same
reasons. But other constitutional values could also be at issue in
administrative adjudication of replacement rights. Specifically,
because replacement rights generally replace common law or
equitable rights arising under state law, they implicate federalism
concerns. If Congress has broad authority to create such replacement
rights and assign their adjudication to administrative agencies, that
could be a threat to the constitutional division of power between the
federal government and the states. The federalism problem is two-
fold. First, Congress may exceed its authority merely by creating the
replacement right: it may be beyond its Article I powers, for
example. Article III courts, however, will review that question de
novo, as it is a question of constitutional interpretation. This should
be adequate protection for that federalism issue. Second, even if
Congress has the power to create the replacement right, the state
may retain considerable power over residual or related matters.
Assigning adjudication of the replacement right to agencies could
make it difficult for the states to develop a coherent judicial doctrine
with respect to such related matters. Article III oversight is not likely
217. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323,336-37 (1966).
218. Findings of fact by bankruptcy judges are reviewed by the district judge on a
clearly erroneous standard. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berryman Prods., Inc. (In re
Berryman Prods., Inc.), 159 F.3d 941, 943 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1998). Conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed de novo. See Daniels-Head & Assocs. v. William M. Mercer, Inc.
(In re Daniels-Head & Assocs.), 819 F.2d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing bankruptcy
court's conclusions of law de novo).
219. For a discussion of the differences between agencies and adjuncts, see infra notes
232-62 and accompanying text.
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to solve this problem.
d. Pure Private Rights
Pure private rights have their origins in traditional sources of
law, such as the common law, equity, or admiralty, and generally
involve disputes between two private parties 2 0  In its earliest
decisions, the Supreme Court had suggested that pure private rights
must be adjudicated in Article III courts.' That holding was
certainly undermined by Crowell v. Benson, however, because the
Court called the rights at issue there "private," but allowed
administrative adjudication of them as long as there was sufficient
Article III oversight.tm  The Crowell decision was, then, a precedent
that made it easier for the Court to allow the administrative
adjudication of pure private rights in Schor-again with extensive
Article III oversight.' 3 Despite Northern Pipeline, bankruptcy courts
also continue to adjudicate pure private rights, as bankruptcy courts
have jurisdiction over claims by the trustee, representing the debtor
in bankruptcy, against alleged debtors of the estate?24
220. The government can file suits at common law as well and might do so when it is
acting in its proprietary capacity. While the government's presence might tempt one to
call the rights thus involved "public," they are arguably more like private rights. The
government, when suing in its proprietary capacity, is acting just as any private citizen
would act.
221. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272,284 (1856). Of course, pure private rights are often adjudicated in state courts, which
are not Article III courts. The statement in the text applies when the matter is
adjudicated in federal tribunals.
222- See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
223. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986).
Once again, the Court talked only of public and private rights, but I have suggested four
categories, so that the rights at issue in Crowell are different from those at issue in Schor.
By the time Schor was decided, the Court essentially had abandoned the concept of
jurisdictional facts. See Northern Pipeline Contr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 82 n.34 (1982) (plurality opinion); 3 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 17.9. Schor did
rely, however, on the fact that, like the agency in Crowell, the CFTC could only enforce its
orders in an Article III court. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 836. Whether the requirement is a
significant check on agency action is open to question, however. If review of the agency's
fact-finding is based on a deferential standard, it may not be a significant protection.
Under both Schor and Crowell, fact-finding is reviewed according to a weight of the
evidence standard, which is more deferential than the de novo standard, but less so than,
say, the clearly erroneous standard that federal appeals courts use in reviewing judicial
fact-finding. See 2 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 15.1 (1986). In addition, some litigants will not find it worthwhile to challenge
the agency's orders and, therefore, will never test them in an Article III court.
224. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1994) (authorizing proceedings to recover
fraudulent conveyances); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989)
(proceeding to recover fraudulent conveyance brought in bankruptcy court against a party
who had not filed a claim in bankruptcy); Miller v. BTS Transp. Servs. (In re Total
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So far, the Court has approved of the non-Article III
adjudication of pure private rights only when they bear some
relationship to public or quasi-public rights already before the
legislative court.m For the most part, this approach serves the
efficiency interest in non-Article III adjudication. Thus, in Schor, the
private counterclaim was related to the original quasi-public claim
brought before the CFTC. 2 6 Similarly, if bankruptcy is characterized
as a quasi-public right, then the adjudication of pure private rights
relating to bankruptcy serves the same efficiency ideal. It is unlikely
that the Court would approve of the adjudication of private rights by
non-Article III courts -when those private rights are unrelated to a
public or quasi-public right otherwise properly before the non-Article
III tribunal. 7
The separation of powers problem with non-Article III
adjudication of pure private rights is harder to see than it is with the
other kinds of rights described here. Congress has not created the
right at issue and presumably has no interest in it, so private rights
are in a much different position than public, quasi-public, or
replacement rights, which are all congressionally created. It is still
possible, however, that Congress may wish to influence the outcome
in cases involving private rights that are adjudicated along with a
public or quasi-public right already before the non-Article III court.
In such circumstances, Congress might want to influence the outcome
of the related private claim as well. Article III review, especially if it
were non-deferential, could help to mitigate this problem.
Federalism is also an issue with respect to private rights. Private
rights are normally determined in the state courts, so Congress would
be usurping some of the power of the state courts in providing for
non-Article III adjudication of private rights. Of course, federal
courts often hear state law claims under either diversity jurisdiction'28
or supplemental jurisdiction. 9 But the Constitution provides for
Transp., Inc.), 87 B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (proceeding to collect pre-petition
account receivable); Allard v. Benjamin (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 49 B.R. 900, 903
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (proceeding for breach of fiduciary duty).
225. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 850-54.
226. See id at 843.
227. Whether replacement rights could, or should, support such non-Article III
adjudication of private rights is a more difficult question. Arguably, they should not
because the non-Article III adjudication of replacement rights is already a significant
encroachment on Article III values and because replacement rights also threaten
federalism values.
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
229. See id. § 1367.
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those exercises of federal power, whereas it does not provide for non-
Article III adjudication.230 In addition, Article III courts not only are
independent of the federal political branches, but. they also have
devised numerous decisional rules designed to protect states'
interests in defining the contours of their laws.231 Non-Article III
courts may have less concern for state issues and certainly less
experience in dealing with them. Article III review is unlikely to
have much of a mitigating effect on this problem because it is the
initial ouster of the state court's jurisdiction that -threatens
federalism-once the state court loses jurisdiction, it does not get it
back.
2. Kinds of Courts in Which the Public Rights/Balancing Test
Applies
The nature and scope of review that is required may also depend
on the kind of non-Article III court that is being used. While the
public rights/balancing test has been applied in both administrative
agencies and adjuncts, it has been applied most prominently with
respect to administrative agencies.z 2 Indeed, the earliest statement
of the public rights doctrine, in Murray's Lessee, involved the
230. Diversity jurisdiction is certainly explicit in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cl. 1. Constitutional authority for supplemental jurisdiction is less clear, however.
The current supplemental jurisdiction statute requires that the claims for which there is no
independent basis for federal jurisdiction must be part of the same "case or controversy"
as the claims that do have a basis for federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This ties
supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional language. Certainly non-federal claims that
were totally unrelated to the federal claims would be beyond the power granted the courts
in Article III. As long as non-Article III adjudication of state issues remains tied to the
non-Article III adjudication of public or quasi-public rights that are federal questions, the
non-Article III adjudication of state issues would be analogous to Article III adjudication
of supplemental claims. This mitigates somewhat the encroachment on state power
because it is no greater than the encroachment represented by supplemental jurisdiction.
231. For example, federal courts deciding state law issues must follow the state's
authority as to the meaning of the state's laws. See, e.g., McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980); Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906,
907-08 (1st Cir. 1957). In addition, federal courts sometimes abstain from hearing state
law issues in deference to the state courts. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
334 (1943) (upholding federal court abstention to allow state courts to formulate state
policy on the allocation of oil rights). See generally Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in
the Law of Federal Courts, 60 N.C. L. REV. 59 (1981) (examining abstention doctrines).
232. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 838 (1986);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37 (1932). Thomas concerned arbitration, but the statute
and regulations being adjudicated in Thomas were administered generally by the EPA.
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 572 (1985). Congress
ultimately selected arbitration because the valuation of research data could not be handled
expeditiously by the agency. See id. at 572-73.
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Treasury Department, an executive department of the government. 32
Given the nature of the original public rights doctrine, it is easy to see
why administrative agencies would be so important in the
development of that justification. The public rights doctrine as
originally conceived related to the sovereign functions of
government-revenue collection in Murray's Lessee, for example-
and administrative agencies are where many of those sovereign
functions are handled. Because the balancing test evolved from the
public rights doctrine, it, too, is used mainly with respect to
administrative agencies. The public rights doctrine and the balancing
test are now the most prominent of the justifications for non-Article
III adjudication, primarily because the bureaucracy has grown
exponentially this century, and with it, the number of agency
adjudications.' At the same time, of course, it is that very
relationship to the sovereign function that makes administrative
agencies problematic: they represent a potential threat to the
structural value of separation of powers.
It is harder to see why the public rights doctrine and the
balancing test might be used with respect to adjuncts, but such use of
those doctrines is not especially problematic. It is interesting that the
public rights doctrine and the balancing test have been used with
respect to only one of the adjuncts-the bankruptcy courts.235 That
magistrate judges have not been involved in the development of
these justifications may be because magistrates handle matters
originally filed in Article III courts, 36 so they are more clearly seen as
adjuncts to the Article III courts. Because bankruptcy courts have
their own rules and procedures 7 and because the parties sometimes
can file bankruptcy-related papers directly with the bankruptcy
courts,23s those courts appear more separate from the Article III
courts to which they are adjuncts.
The Article III justification for magistrate judges is that they act
233. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272,274-75 (1856).
234. See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 20, § 2.8; FALLON ET AL., supra note 21, at 393.
235. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67
(1982) (plurality opinion). The doctrine also played a role in a bankruptcy court case
where the Seventh Amendment rather than Article III was at issue. See Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-54 (1989); infra notes 288-304 and accompanying text
(discussing Granfinanciera).
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1994).
237. See id. § 2075.
238. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5001.
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"subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court." 9 The public
rights doctrine and the balancing test never come into play. The
Magistrates Act contains a list of procedural motions, such as
motions for summary judgment or for injunctive relief, that
magistrate judges cannot determine unless the parties consent.240 The
essence is that these motions dispose of the case or a part of it.24'
Magistrate judges may hear such dispositive motions without the
parties' consent, but they merely make recommendations to the
district judge, who makes a de novo determination of the matter.242
A de novo determination does not require a de novo hearing; rather,
the judge can consider the record developed by the magistrate judge,
including transcripts of any hearings, and make her own decision
based on those documents.2 43 On the other hand, magistrate judges
may hear and determine non-dispositive matters, such as motions for
protective orders, subject to deferential review by the district
judge.2" Thus, magistrate judges have considerably more
independent authority with respect to non-dispositive matters.
Whether the magistrate judge is deciding a dispositive or a non-
dispositive matter, however, he remains "under the district court's
total control and jurisdiction."'245
At first glance, the Bankruptcy Code seems to draw a distinction
similar to that in the Magistrates Act246 between dispositive and non-
dispositive matters. But there is a significant difference between the
powers of magistrate judges and the powers of bankruptcy courts.
The Bankruptcy Code distinguishes between "core" and "non-core"
proceedings2 47 and allows bankruptcy judges to hear and determine
core matters. But the list of "core" matters includes virtually every
bankruptcy issue that might arise, including such ultimate issues as
confirmation of plans2' and dischargeability of debt.249 Some of the
matters that the statute defines as "core" are broad enough to
encompass ordinary common law claims. For example, core
239. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980).
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
241. See, e.g., NLRB v. Frazier, 966 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1992).
242. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
243. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682-83.
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
245. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681.
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
247. See id. § 157 (1994).
248. See id. § 157(b)(2)(L).
249. See id. § 157(b)(2)(I).
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proceedings include "orders to turn over property of the estate," 250
which can require the adjudication-and disposition-of a common
law fraudulent conveyance action.251 Review of a bankruptcy judge's
decision on a "core" matter is much like review by appellate courts of
district courts' decisions, with a de novo standard applying to
questions of law and a clearly erroneous standard to questions of
fact.' Thus, bankruptcy judges have considerable independent
control over most matters that might arise in bankruptcy, with review
of many matters on a highly deferential standard of review. By
contrast, bankruptcy judges can only make recommendations as to
non-core matters, unless the parties consent to the matter being
heard by the bankruptcy judge.23 Non-core matters are matters that
are related to the bankruptcy, but do not fall within the list of core
matters. An example would be a tort claim against the debtor.24 The
difference between core and non-core proceedings seems to be not
that one disposes of rights and the other does not, but that core
proceedings are more closely related to substantive bankruptcy rights
than non-core proceedings.'
The upshot of this is that while the Magistrates Act requires
more intense supervision by an Article III judge of dispositive
matters that could determine the case, the bankruptcy statute
requires less intense supervision by an Article III judge of "core"
matters, which could determine the parties' rights-including
common law rights-in bankruptcy. Perhaps because of these
significant differences, it is more important to have a constitutional
250. Id § 157(b)(2)(E).
251. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 50 (1989). I will discuss
Granfinanciera in the next section, but it should be noted that Granfinanciera calls into
question the bankruptcy courts' power to hear and determine matters of private law.
While only the Seventh Amendment was at issue in Granfinanciera, the Court said that
the Article III and Seventh Amendment analyses were the same, see id. at 53, and that ajury was required for private, common law actions heard in the bankruptcy courts, see id.
at 55, 58-59. If the analysis is the same, it is possible that an Article III court also is
required for such actions. That would be consistent with Northern Pipeline.
252 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 209, 5.11. The issue is somewhat
more complicated than this summary suggests, but the text captures the essence of the
standard of review applied to bankruptcy courts' decisions on core matters. See generally
3 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 18.9(d) (6th ed. 1994)
(discussing standards of review).
253. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(4), (c)(1)-(2).
254. See, e.g., Bokum Resources Corp. v. Long Island Lighting Co. (In re Bokum
Resources Corp.), 49 B.R. 854, 866 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985) (claim of tortious interference
with contract). Some tort claims against the debtor must be heard in the district court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (providing that personal injury and wrongful death claims be
heard in the district court).
255. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 209, § 3.01(4)(c)(ii).
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check on the classification of matters as "core" or "non-core" than on
the classification of matters as dispositive or non-dispositive. The
Court has turned to the public rights doctrine and the balancing test
to perform this check. Those tests, however, are not as good a fit
with the bankruptcy courts as they are with administrative agencies.
The essence of the work that administrative agencies do is public: it
involves the administration of regulatory matters. But the essence of
the work that the bankruptcy courts do is private: it involves the
reordering of what is primarily private debt. Thus, it should not be
too surprising, given the Supreme Court's public rights focus, that the
only Supreme Court case that struck down non-Article III
adjudication on the basis of the public rights doctrine involved a
bankruptcy court rather than an administrative agency2 6
Bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges do share one
characteristic that protects them from the influence of the political
branches-they are appointed by courts rather than by Congress or
the executive.1 7 Furthermore, they can be removed from office only
for specified reasons and only by the court. 5s In addition, the district
courts retain considerable discretion to refer matters to magistrate
judges or bankruptcy courts and to withdraw those references at any
time.259 Thus, unlike administrative agencies, there is no separation
of powers problem with adjuncts because Congress and the executive
cannot control them, at least as they are currently structured. There
also appears to be no federalism problem. Magistrate judges perform
tasks otherwise proper to the district courts and do not encroach on
state powers. The power of Congress to establish uniform
256. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52
(1982) (plurality opinion). As I will show shortly, the Supreme Court also has held that a
jury is required in bankruptcy courts for private rights, see Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55,
58-59, but it has been inconsistent as to whether an Article III court is required for such
rights. Compare Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76 (plurality opinion) (holding that an
Article III court is required to exercise jurisdiction over private rights matters arising
under the bankruptcy laws), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 857 (1986) (holding that the non-Article III Commodity Futures Trading Commission
may exercise jurisdiction over certain private rights matters without violating Article III).
For a discussion of this inconsistency, see infra notes 305-14 and accompanying text.
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1994) (providing that bankruptcy judges are appointed by
circuit court judges); id. § 631(a) (providing that magistrate judges are appointed by
district court judges).
258. See id § 152(e) (providing that bankruptcy judges are removable by the judicial
council of the circuit only for "incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or
mental disability"); itL § 631(i) (providing that magistrate judges can be removed by a
majority of the district court judges only for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty,
or physical or mental disability").
259. See id. § 157(a), (d) (bankruptcy courts); id § 636 (magistrate judges).
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bankruptcy laws is given in the Constitution,260 and it necessarily
involves reordering of private debt created under state law; the
states, in ratifying the Constitution, consented to that encroachment
on their powers. Furthermore, the use of non-Article III courts to
resolve bankruptcies is no more an encroachment on states' rights
than would be the undoubted power of Congress to give bankruptcy
jurisdiction exclusively to the district courts. Even adjudication of
private matters could be justified under supplemental jurisdiction
principles.26'
In short, neither magistrate judges nor bankruptcy judges are
serious threats to the structural values reflected in the Constitution.
On the other hand, bankruptcy judges still seem to have considerably
more independence than magistrates, and "adjunct" may not be a
proper characterization of them. While bankruptcy courts may be a
constitutionally acceptable tribunal, they arguably cannot be justified
either as "subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court, ' 262 or as
adjudicators of public rights. The balancing test that has evolved
from the public rights doctrine may justify them, however, especially
as they represent no threat to structural constitutional values, at least
as presently configured.
3. Summary and Conclusion
Recognizing four categories of rights adjudicated in legislative
courts makes it possible to understand the precise nature of the
threat to constitutional values-if any-that such courts pose.
Contrary to the Court's holdings, adjudication of pure public rights
and quasi-public rights in legislative courts does more damage to
separation of powers values than does non-Article III adjudication of
pure private rights. The Court seems to have it exactly backwards on
this point. At the same time, however, adjudication of pure private
rights in legislative courts is more a threat to federalism than to
separation of powers. Adjudication of replacement rights in
260. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
261. By contrast, supplemental jurisdiction could not justify adjudication of private
rights matters in administrative agencies because agencies are not a part of the Article III
judiciary. Supplemental jurisdiction applies in Article III courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1994). Schor suggests that Congress has some limited power to provide for supplemental
jurisdiction in agencies as well, see Schor, 478 U.S. at 844-47, but such a course could be
dangerous. Supplemental jurisdiction in Article III courts is constitutionally limited to
matters that are part of the same "case or controversy" as the original federal matter. 28
U.S.C. § 1367. There is no similar explicit constitutional limiting principle for
supplemental jurisdiction in agencies.
262. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980).
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legislative courts threatens both separation of powers and federalism
values. This threat to separation of powers values can be mitigated to
a considerable degree by Article III oversight, but not if the courts
employ highly deferential standards of review. It is hard to see how
Article III oversight will cure federalism problems, however.
In addition, a more careful exploration of the differences
between administrative agencies, bankruptcy courts, and magistrate
judges makes it possible to explicate further the threats to
constitutional values posed by administrative agencies and adjuncts.
Administrative agencies pose a threat to both separation of powers
and federalism values. Adjuncts, which are deemed part of the
Article III district courts and under the district courts' constant
control, pose a lesser risk than do agencies, which are independent of
the Article III judiciary. Adjuncts pose little risk to separation of
powers values because their judges are appointed and supervised by
Article III judges, not Congress. And they pose little threat to
federalism values because they exercise only that jurisdiction that is
given to Article III courts by the Constitution-a jurisdiction that the
states consented to by ratifying the Constitution. If this analysis is
correct, then adjudication of private rights by an adjunct such as a
bankruptcy judge poses the least significant threat to our
constitutional separation of powers and federalism values. But that is
precisely the kind of case in which the Supreme Court has been most
solicitous of those values.
V. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS/BALANCING TEST AND THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
In the cases discussed so far, the Seventh Amendment usually
was not explicitly at issue. But because agencies operate without
juries, we must ask whether jury-less administrative adjudication
comports with the Seventh Amendment. The short answer is that the
Supreme Court has never seemed particularly troubled by such
adjudication. Over the years, the Court has upheld jury-less
adjudication of public or quasi-public rights in administrative
agencies on a variety of theories. Within the last twenty years,
however, the Court has settled on the public rights/balancing test as
the way to justify such adjudication. In this section, I will first
describe the evolution of the Court's Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence. I will then analyze the constitutional and policy issues
that pertain to the choice between an Article III court and a jury-less
non-Article III court. This analysis shows that the Court's approach
ignores important Seventh Amendment values.
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A. Supreme Court Doctrine
There are two prongs to the Supreme Court's Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence. The first concerns the kinds of cases in
which the Seventh Amendment applies. The doctrine as to this
prong developed in the context of Article III adjudication. The
second prong concerns the kinds of courts where juries will be
required, and it arises in the context of legislative courts. The
doctrine as to this prong is quite confused, particularly because the
cases are inconsistent with the Court's statement that its Article III
analysis applies to Seventh Amendment issues. In this subsection, I
will describe the Court's doctrine and identify the problems with it.
1. Kinds of Cases
In Curtis v. Loether,263 the issue before the court was whether a
jury trial was constitutionally required in an Article III court when
Congress created a new statutory right-one that had not existed at
all in the common law.2  In Curtis, a prospective tenant claimed
racial discrimination in violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 and brought an action for damages against the prospective
landlord in an Article III court.25 The Court held that "[t]he Seventh
Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and
requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and
remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts
of law. 266 This language suggests that there are two requirements for
the Seventh Amendment to apply: first, the statute must create legal
(as opposed to equitable) rights and remedies; and second, the action
must be triable in an ordinary Article III court.267
To determine whether the first requirement is met, the Court in
later cases developed a two-part test for deciding whether a statute
created legal rights and remedies. The first step requires courts to
find a common law or equitable action that is analogous to the
statutory action; if the analogous action was one at common law
rather than in equity, this suggests a right to a jury trial.268 The
second step, however, is more important. It requires the courts to
263. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
264. See i& at 189-90.
'265. See id. at 190.
266., Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
267. As I will show, the evidence as to whether this second "requirement" is really a
requirement is decidedly mixed. See infra notes 271-314 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
565, 573-74 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
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determine if the remedy is -one that would have been available in a
common law court rather than a court of equity prior to the merger
of law and equity.269 For the most part, that means that the plaintiff
must be seeking a damages remedy if there is to be a jury trial. 0
2. Kinds of Courts
Curtis's second requirement-that the matter be enforceable "in
the ordinary courts of law" for a jury trial to be necessary-could, if it
is really a requirement, open the door wide for Congress to
circumvent the jury altogether with respect to causes of action it
creates.2 7' Under the Article III jurisprudence discussed in the last
section, rights such as those at issue in Curtis would be characterized
as quasi-public, and adjudication of such rights could be assigned to a
non-Article III court with deferential review by the Article III
courtsY2  But Curtis was decided in 1974, before most of the
development of Article III doctrine described in the last section took
place, and there is some question whether that development
undermines the second requirement. 73 If it does not, then the
Seventh Amendment applies only in Article III courts, regardless of
the kind of case being adjudicated. As I will show, that result seems
inconsistent with the language of the Seventh AmendmentY4 If the
second requirement is not viable, then the Seventh Amendment
ought to apply in any case where the two-step process would define
269. See, e.g., Terry, 494 U.S. at 565; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18. The two-step analysis
was implicit in Curtis itself. There, the Court, in a footnote, found some common-law
actions that it said were analogous to the action for race discrimination in housing, see
Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96 n.10, but also noted that the remedy was clearly one for
damages, see id. at 197.
270. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 2.6(3) (2d ed. 1993). Other legal remedies include recovery of land and
recovery of chattels. See id. §§ 4.2, 5.17. Replevin, for example, is a legal remedy. See id.
§ 5.17(2).
271. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194.
272 See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
273. It also could be argued that the second requirement is not a requirement at all.
Curtis itself concerned a matter brought in an Article III court, and the Court could have
been saying that a jury is always required for matters involving legal rights and remedies in
an Article III court without saying anything at all about whether matters involving legal
rights and remedies in non-Article III courts required a jury. Some recent bankruptcy
cases seem to treat the second requirement as viable, however. Those cases first apply the
two-part test to determine whether the matter is legal, then ask whether Congress can
nonetheless permissibly withdraw the matter from Article HI courts or juries. See
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 49 (1989); In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194-95
(5th Cir. 1994). To answer the second question, the courts use the public rights doctrine
and the balancing test. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53; Clay, 35 F.3d at 194.
274. See infra notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
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the rights at issue as legal, regardless of the court in which the
adjudication takes place. Such an outcome, however, would disrupt
administrative procedure, because public rights can also constitute
legal rights.275 To illustrate the dilemma we are in, a brief history of
the Court's Seventh Amendment jurisprudence regarding
administrative agencies is in order.
While the Court has always approved of jury-less adjudication in
administrative agencies, the rationale for such adjudication has been
difficult to pin down. At one point, the Court simply assumed that
the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable when administrative
adjudication was within Congress's power.276 Later, the Court said
that fact-finding by the National Labor Relations Board did not
involve a suit at common law at all, but rather was a "statutory
proceeding."27 7 Still later, the Court seemed to recognize that jury
trials may be incompatible with agency adjudication, which is
founded on expert, rather than amateur, decision making.278 The
Court has also upheld jury-less adjudication in bankruptcy courts by
deciding that bankruptcy courts were courts of equity and that one
who had filed a claim against a bankrupt's estate had transformed his
claim from a legal one to an equitable one.279 These analyses are
either highly conclusory and therefore unsatisfactory, or too narrow
to be of general use.
In 1977, the Court finally brought these cases together under the
rubric of the public rights doctrine in Atlas Roofing Co. v.
275. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,427 (1987) (holding that liability for a
civil penalty sought by the United States involves a legal right). Oddly, the Court in Tull
decided that liability for the civil penalty was a legal issue that required a jury, but that the
amount of the penalty was a question for the judge. See id. at 426-27. Indeed, the Court
professed to find "no evidence that the Framers meant to extend the right to a jury to the
remedy phase of a civil trial." Id. at 426 n.9. This drew a sharp rebuke from Justice Scalia,
who said that the Court's division of responsibility for liability and penalty phases was
unprecedented. See id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921). In Block, the Court upheld
Congress's power to establish, temporarily in wartime, a commission to determine fair
rents in the District of Columbia. The commission's adjudication of rents replaced
landlords' common law actions of ejectment. See id. at 153-54.
277. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937). This rationale
was undermined by Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974), in which the Court said
that the Seventh Amendment does apply to statutory actions. Jones & Laughlin, however,
could also be justified under the public rights doctrine.
278. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 382-83 (1974) (discussing Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)); JAFFE, supra note 23, at 90.
279. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329 (1966). Thus, the right of the creditor in
bankruptcy was a replacement right.
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Occupational Safety & Health Review CommissionY°0 Atlas Roofing
was a challenge, on Seventh Amendment grounds, to fines assessed
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.21 In
Atlas Roofing, the Court held that Congress had the power "to create
new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their
enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law-such
as an administrative agency-in which facts are not found by
juries."' The Court's language suggests that it thought that the right
to a jury trial attaches only in Article III courts, giving life to Curtis's
second requirement. 3
Atlas Roofing, however, must have seemed to be a relatively
easy case. It concerned the adjudication of a pure public right by an
administrative agency. Historically, pure public rights would not
have been heard by juries.' Since Atlas Roofing, however, the Court
has applied the public rights doctrine to bankruptcy courts,215
developed the balancing test, 6 and held that civil penalties like the
one at issue in Atlas Roofing concern legal rights and remedies.28
The question now before us is how these developments affect the
analysis of the right to a jury trial in administrative agencies and
bankruptcy courts. The Court itself has suggested that the analysis is
exactly the same whether the issue is Article III or the Seventh
Amendment. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,8 the Court said:
[I]f a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the
question whether the Seventh Amendment permits
Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does
not employ juries as factfinders requires the same answer as
280. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
281. See id. at 447-48. The petitioners in Atlas Roofing were each fined for working
conditions that had resulted in an employee's death. See id. at 447. One petitioner was
fined $7500 for willful violation of a safety standard. See id The other was fined $600 for
a serious violation of a safety standard. See id. Both petitioners were ordered to abate the
hazard immediately. See id.
282. Id. at 460. The matter at issue in Atlas Roofing was a pure public right as I have
defined the term. See supra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
283. The Court clearly thought that it was simply following long-standing law even
though the public rights doctrine was a new way of justifying it. See Atlas Roofing, 430
U.S. at 450-56, 460 (citing cases).
284. See supra text accompanying note 127.
285. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71-72
(1982) (plurality opinion). The Court in Northern Pipeline determined that only private
rights were at stake in that case. See id at 71. It is not clear what the Court would have
done had it determined that public rights were at stake.
286. See supra notes 147-85 and accompanying text.
287. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,422 (1987).
288. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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the question whether Article III allows Congress to assign
adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III
tribunal.... [I]f Congress may assign the adjudication of a
statutory cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal, then
the Seventh'Amendment poses no independent bar to the
adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.2s9
The outcome of Granfinanciera, however, belies this language.
Granfinanciera, which was decided after the Court had developed the
balancing test to assess non-Article III adjudication, was a Seventh
Amendment challenge to jury-less adjudication of a private right in a
bankruptcy court.291 The Court there required a jury trial for a claim
by a bankruptcy trustee against a third party to whom estate property
allegedly had been fraudulently transferred.2 91 The third party had
not filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.29 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court first applied the two-part test described above
and determined (1) that a fraudulent conveyance action was one that
would have been tried to a jury prior to the merger of law and equity,
and (2) that the relief sought was legal-money damages. 93 Thus,
the action involved legal rights and remedies as required by Curtis,294
but it was not assigned for adjudication to an Article III court.
The Court then considered whether Congress had "permissibly
withdrawn jurisdiction over that action by courts of law and assigned
it exclusively to non-Article III tribunals sitting without juries. 2 95
Specifically, the Court said that "[t]he sole issue before us is whether
the Seventh Amendment confers on petitioners a right to a jury trial
in the face of Congress' decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to
adjudicate the claims against them. ' 296 The answer to this question,
289. Ma2 t 53-54.
290. See id at 36.
291. See id. at 64.
292. See id. This makes Granfinanciera consistent with Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966)-the third party in Granfinanciera had not filed a claim in the estate, while the
third party in Katchen had. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58; Katchen, 382 U.S. at 325;
cf. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42,44-45 (1990) (holding, after Granfinanciera, that one
who files a claim in bankruptcy waives the right to a jury trial).
293. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42-49.
294. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text.
295. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 49.
296. Id. at 50., The Court's very statement of the issue is odd, given that the Court
ultimately said that the Article III and Seventh Amendment analyses are the same. See
supra text accompanying note 289. If a jury is required, and if the Seventh Amendment
and Article III require the same analysis, it would seem that an Article III court is
required as well. See Redish & LaFave, supra note 17, at 431. The Court ultimately
concluded, however, that the Seventh Amendment required a jury in the case before it
without deciding whether Article III required a judge with life tenure and salary
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the Court thought, dependedon whether the legal rights at issue were
public or private.297
Acknowledging that its conclusion was open to debate,298 the
Court nonetheless held that only private rights were at stake in
Granfinanciera.2 99 The Court apparently believed the point to be
debatable because under Thomas, Congress could permit non-Article
III adjudication of matters between two private parties if the matters
were "closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program,"3" and
bankruptcy was arguably a federal regulatory program3 1 But the
fraudulent conveyance action in Granfinanciera was a private right
because it (1) was a dispute between two private parties, (2) that had
passed into the bankruptcy context virtually unaltered from its
common law roots,302 and (3) that had not been transformed into an
equitable action because the transferee had not filed a claim in the
bankruptcy.3°3 In other words, the fraudulent conveyance action in
Granfinanciera was not a pure public right, a quasi-public right, or a
replacement right.3 4 Thus, a jury was required.
protections in that case. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64. The Court explicitly said it
was not considering the question of whether bankruptcy courts could conduct jury trials.
See id. That issue remained open and generated considerable commentary and a variety
of proposals for judicial or legislative action. See, e.g., Anthony Michael Sabino, Jury
Trials, Bankruptcy Judges, and Article III: The Constitutional Crisis of the Bankruptcy
Court, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 258 (1991); Skelton & Harris, supra note 46; Symposium,
Jury Trials in Bankruptcy Courts, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1991); Ned W. Waxman, Jury
Trials After Granfinanciera" Three Proposals for Reform, 52 OHI6 ST. L.J. 705 (1991).
Congress has since authorized bankruptcy judges to preside over jury trials, but only if the
district court has designated the judge to conduct such trials and the parties all expressly
consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1994). This power is similar to the power of magistrates
to conduct jury trials with the consent of the parties. See id. § 636(c)(1); S. Elizabeth
Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of Article I and the Seventh
Amendment, 72 MINN. L. REV. 967,1045 (1988).
297. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51.
298. See id. at 55. The Court was never very clear about the reasons for its decision,
and there was a total of four opinions in the case. The opinion of the Court was written by
Justice Brennan. Justice Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justices White
and Blackmun each dissented. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun's dissent.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 54.
301. See id. I have suggested that bankruptcy itself is a quasi-public right, which
Thomas would permit to be adjudicated by a non-Article III tribunal. See supra note 209
and accompanying text.
302. Fraudulent conveyance actions can be brought under either of two provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code. The Code itself establishes an action for fraudulent conveyance.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). In addition, the bankruptcy trustee may recover fraudulently
conveyed property under state law using § 544(b).
303. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 57-58.
304. Because the party to whom the property had been conveyed had not filed a claim
in bankruptcy, waiver is also not a justification for jury-less non-Article III adjudication.
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Granfinanciera muddies both the Article III and the Seventh
Amendment waters to a considerable degree. This can be seen by
comparing the outcome in Granfinanciera to that in Schor. In both
Schor and Granfinanciera, the issue at stake was a pure private
right. 05 Yet the Court allowed non-Article III adjudication of the
private right in Schor, but did not allow jury-less adjudication of the
private right in Granfinanciera.3 6 This is so even though the Court in
Granfinanciera asserted that the Article III and Seventh Amendment
analyses are the same."° There are at least three possible ways to
account for these different outcomes. First, the Article III and
Seventh Amendment analyses are in fact different, and the Court is
more solicitous of the Seventh Amendment than of Article III.308
There are several problems with this explanation for the outcomes in
Schor and Granfinanciera. One is that it is not what the Court plainly
said .3 9 Furthermore, Granfinanciera seems consistent with Northern
Pipeline, which refused to allow a non-Article III court to hear a pure
private rights matter.31 This gives some credence to Granfinanciera's
statement that the Article III and Seventh Amendment analyses are
the same. Schor, however, then remains inconsistent with the cases
and the doctrine. Finally, if the considerations are different for
Article III and the Seventh Amendment, the Court, having held that
they are not different, has given us no hint as to how to analyze those
differences.
A second possible explanation for the different outcomes in
Schor and Granfinanciera is that Schor involved an administrative
See infra notes 395-415 and accompanying text (discussing waiver).
305. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833,853 (1986).
306. Had the issue arisen, the Court might have found that the customer in Schor had
waived his right to a jury trial by bringing his claim against the broker in the agency where
no jury functioned rather than in an Article III court. See infra notes 395-415 and
accompanying text.
307. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
308. In other contexts, the Court has not seemed particularly solicitous of the Seventh
Amendment. For example, it has approved of numerous devices for controlling juries,
some of which significantly reduce the jury's utility. See Sward, supra note 99, at chs. 6-8.
309. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53-54; supra text accompanying note 289.
310. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 50-51
(1982) (plurality opinion). The Article III issue was not argued before the Supreme Court
in Granfinanciera, so the absence of a decision on the matter is not determinative. See
Petitioner's Brief, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (No. 87-1716).
Although the Court has not yet resolved whether bankruptcy courts can conduct jury
trials, since Granfinanciera, Congress has given bankruptcy courts the power to conduct
such trials with the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1994).
311. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64.
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agency and Granfinanciera an adjunct. This would also account for
the outcome in Northern Pipeline, which, like Granfinanciera,
involved the adjunct bankruptcy courts. This explanation would
mean that the Court is more likely to allow jury-less non-Article III
adjudication of pure private rights in an administrative agency than in
an adjunct. With regard to the Seventh Amendment, the logic of this
could be that if adjuncts are subsidiaries of Article III courts, the
right to a jury trial attaches to matters involving legal rights and
remedies because they are somehow "really" in an Article III court.
The logic fails with respect to the Article III issues, however, because
it suggests that the Court should be less concerned about adjuncts
hearing pure private rights matters than administrative agencies, but
the cases go the other way. 12 This second explanation would,
however, account for the Court's statement that the Article III and
Seventh Amendment analyses are the same. A major problem with
this explanation is that the Court has given no hint that it even
considered the difference in the kind of non-Article III court that was
used. And, once again, if this difference is significant, the Court has
not told us why or how to analyze the issues.
A third possible explanation is that the party objecting to the
mode of adjudication-whether the objection was to the non-Article
III status of the court or to the lack of a jury-was voluntarily before
a non-Article III court in Schor, but was an involuntary defendant in
both Granfinanciera and Northern Pipeline. This, however, sounds
more like the waiver justification for non-Article III adjudication,
which I will address shortly.313 And because the Court held in Schor
that a party cannot waive the institutional interest in the separation
of powers reflected in Article III, 31 it cannot really be said that the
plaintiff in Schor had properly waived his interest in an Article III
court by bringing his claim in an administrative agency. In other
words, it did not matter that the plaintiff in Schor was in the
administrative agency voluntarily. Neither the plaintiff in Schor nor
the defendant in Granfinanciera had properly waived any objection
to the mode of adjudication.
312. Compare Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality opinion) (holding that an
adjunct cannot hear a claim involving a pure private right), with Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986) (holding that an agency can hear a
private right claim if balancing test favors it). If an adjunct is "really" an Article III court,
then the balancing test should find much less of an encroachment on Article III values
when an adjunct is used than when an agency is used. See supra notes 232-62 and
accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 395-415 and accompanying text.
314. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
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3.' Summary and Conclusion
The Court has said that the Article III and Seventh Amendment
analyses are the same, so that if the public rights doctrine or the
balancing test allows Congress to assign a matter to a non-Article III
court, it can do so without providing for a jury.315 The cases,
however, are not entirely consistent with that statement. In
particular, Schor seems to have treated pure private rights differently
than did Granfinanciera and Northern Pipeline. It is difficult to
account for these different outcomes given the Court's explicit
refusal to recognize differences. The possible explanations that I
have presented all have significant problems. I think, however, that
the differences between Article III and the Seventh Amendment are
the most cogent, and in the next two subsections, I will try to explain
why.3 16
B. Constitutional Issues
In the course of the legal development described above, the
Court has said a number of things about the right to a jury trial in
administrative agencies. First, it has said that the same analysis
applies to the Seventh Amendment issues as to the Article III
issues.317 Second, it has suggested that the Seventh Amendment
applies only in an Article III court,3"' but subsequently undermined
that suggestion by requiring a jury trial in a bankruptcy case.319
Third, it has said that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to
"public rights" when those public rights are adjudicated in an
administrative agency, 320 but it has indicated that a jury trial is
required if public rights are adjudicated in an Article III court.321
315. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53-54.
316. It does appear that the difference between agencies and adjuncts might be easier
to accommodate to the existing balancing test. My point is that the difference between
Article III and the Seventh Amendment is more important than the difference between
agencies and adjuncts.
317. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,53-54 (1989).
318. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974). The statement was relatively weak
in Curtis because Curtis involved an Article III court. The statement is reinforced,
however, by a comparison of Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), and Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987). See
infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text (comparing Atlas Roofing and Tul).
319. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64. The Granfinanciera Court, however, did not
say that the jury trial could be conducted in the bankruptcy court; rather, it left that issue
open. See id.
320. See Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 460.
321. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 427. The Court did not explicitly address the question
whether public rights matters adjudicated in Article III courts require a jury, but rested its
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Taken together, these statements suggest that the kind of court in
which the matter is adjudicated is a critical factor in deciding whether
a jury is required.
In this subsection, I will examine the Court's pronouncements in
light of the language, structure, and history of the Constitution and
the values that underlie the Seventh Amendment. I conclude that it
is wrong for the Court to apply the same test to the Seventh
Amendment issues as to the Article III issues. While there are a
number of reasons for my conclusion that are grounded in the
language, structure, and history of the Constitution, I argue that the
strongest evidence of the analytical distinction is that Congress has
less power to abrogate the Seventh Amendment than to establish
non-Article III courts. I argue further that even if. Congress has some
power to abrogate the Seventh Amendment, the tests for
determining the constitutionality of a non-Article III court are not
appropriate for determining the constitutionality of jury-less
adjudication.
1. The Seventh Amendment and Article III Are Analytically
Distinct
English legal history provides some evidence of an analytical link
between the judicial power and the jury. Specifically, English legal
history supports considerable legislative or executive power over the
allocation of disputes to one kind of dispute resolution body or
another, usually with the result that the chosen allocation determines
the right to a jury trial. Thus, the historic power of the Chancery-
the executive arm of the king-and of Parliament over the creation of
common law actions could determine whether a case was heard in a
common law court, where there was a jury trial, or a court of equity,
where there was not.3' Once the court was selected for resolution of
a particular kind of dispute, there was no independent judgment
about whether a jury trial would be available. This history is quite
consistent with the language in Granfinanciera that Article III and
the Seventh Amendment are subject to the same analysis.
The American system, however, is different in significant ways
decision on the two-part test, which it articulated more clearly than Curtis had. See id at
417-18; supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text. Tull, however, involved a pure public
right as I have defined the term. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 414-15; supra notes 187-205 and
accompanying text.
322. See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, MODERN EQuITY 1-28 (2d ed. 1937);
THEODORE F.T. PLUcKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 163-65, 180-
81, 695-707 (5th ed. 1956).
1999] 1099
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
from the English, in particular because the United States has a
written Constitution and England does not. Thus, the first objection
one might raise to the idea that the Seventh Amendment applies only
in Article III courts is the language of the Constitution. Article III
vests the "judicial Power of the United States" in the Supreme Court
and any lower courts that Congress creates.323 The judicial power
extends to a wide range of matters, including common law actions
between citizens of different states, controversies to which the United
States is a party, and cases arising under the Constitution and laws of
the United States.324 The Seventh Amendment, on the other hand, is
not coterminous with Article III: it preserves the right to a jury trial
only in "Suits at common law,"3' which comprise only a small part of
the federal judicial power. The judicial power and the Seventh
Amendment, in other words, are very different things.
One could still argue, of course, that because the judicial power
encompasses suits at common law, an exercise of the judicial power is
required before the Seventh Amendment applies. But it does not
follow from the fact that the Seventh Amendment always applies in
Article III courts that it does not apply in non-Article III courts.
Furthermore, the language of the Seventh Amendment itself does
not suggest that an Article III court is required before the Seventh
Amendment attaches.326 The amendment does not say that the right
to jury trial attaches in suits at common law brought in Article III
courts, but only that it attaches in suits at common law. The only
reference to courts in the Seventh Amendment is in the amendment's
provision that "Court[s] of the United States" cannot re-examine jury
fact-finding except according to existing common law principles. 32 7
More importantly, Congress has different powers with respect to
the judiciary and the jury. Article III of the original Constitution is
323. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
324. See id § 2, cl. 1. The relevant text of Article III is as follows:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to
Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of
another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.
Id.
325. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
326. See id. See supra note 11 for the text of the Seventh Amendment.
327. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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the judiciary article, but the Constitution gives Congress considerable
authority over the creation of federal courts and the definition of
their jurisdiction.32 Congress could have declined to create lower
federal courts altogether, with the result that matters otherwise
within the federal judicial power would have been relegated to the
state courts, which are clearly not Article III courts.329 Because
Congress can leave matters otherwise within the Article III
jurisdiction of the federal courts to the non-Article III state courts, it
can also create its own non-Article III courts, at least to adjudicate
the matter in the first instance.330 Thus, Congress's power to decline
to create Article III courts is consistent with a power to create
Article I courts.33'
There is no indication, however, that Congress has a similar
power with respect to the civil jury. Indeed, the history of the
Seventh Amendment suggests otherwise. While Article III contains
a guarantee of a criminal jury trial, the original Constitution did not
mention civil juries at all. During the ratification debates, opponents
of the Constitution feared that the failure to guarantee a civil jury
meant that the civil jury was abolished.3 32  Proponents of the
328. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; Redish & LaFave, supra note 17,
at 442-50. The nature and scope of Congress's power over the jurisdiction of the courts
remain subjects of considerable debate and difficulty. See Barry Friedman, A Different
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1
(1990); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Martin H. Redish,
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REv. 143 (1982); Lawrence Gene Sager, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword. Constitutional Limitations on Congress's
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
329. See Hart, supra note 328, at 1365; Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v.
Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 467 (1978); David L.
Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317,
341 (1977).
330. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-04 (1973). It is possible that either
Article III or the Due Process Clause requires that there be review in an Article III court.
See Fallon, supra note 8, at 933.
331. Of course, one could also argue that if Congress creates any courts at all, they
must be Article III courts. The cases described in this Article make it plain that the Court
has rejected that argument. Furthermore, it cannot be literally true because the doctrine
of sovereign immunity gives Congress the power to dictate the mode of a citizen's
proprietary suit against the government, see infra notes 416-67 and accompanying text, and
because Congress would have to create non-Article HI courts to handle local matters in
the territories given that Article III courts would not have jurisdiction over such matters,
see infra notes 483-84 and accompanying text. If Congress can create non-Article III
courts in these contexts, it is a short step to acknowledge its power to create them in other
contexts.
332. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 12, at 679-80.
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Constitution, on the other hand, argued that the civil jury was not
abolished, but that Congress would have the flexibility to provide for
a civil jury or not, as it saw fit.333 But because the-civil jury in colonial
America had served as a buffer against the excesses of the king,334 the
absence of a civil jury guarantee was a major sticking point during the
ratification debates.35 The result was that the right to a civil jury
became part of the Bill of Rights. This history suggests that the
Seventh Amendment was born of an unwillingness to trust Congress
to do the right thing with respect to the right to a civil jury trial and is
therefore an independent check on Congress's powers to determine
the mode of adjudication.
In addition, nothing in Congress's power to create courts and
give them jurisdiction suggests that it encompasses a power to
abrogate the right to a jury trial. Article III draws no distinction
between law and equity, which in England was the primary
determinant of the right to a jury trial; rather, the judicial power
extends to both legal and equitable matters.336 Congress has never
provided for separate courts of law and equity in the United States,
though federal courts used different procedures for legal and
equitable matters until 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure took effect.337 When the Seventh Amendment refers to
"Suits at common law," then, it cannot be referring to suits in a
particular court, but rather to suits raising matters that would have
been heard in a common law court, if one existed.338 This is
reinforced by the historical fact that the same Congress that drafted
the Seventh Amendment also enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which provided for a unitary court system.3 39 Thus, the right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment is defined not by the court in
which the matter is pending, but by the nature of the matter at
333. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
334. See NELSON, supra note 103, at 31; Wolfram, supra note 12, at 653-55.
335. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80
HARV. L. REv. 289,295-99 (1966); Wolfram, supra note 12, at 667-73. The anti-federalists
were the main proponents of a civil jury guarantee. See Henderson, supra, at 295.
336. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity .... ).
337. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 270, § 2.6(1), at 148 n.2.
338. This indeed is how the Court has interpreted the amendment. See Dimick v.
Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474,476 (1935); Wolfram, supra note 12, at 640-41.
339. Both were drafted by the First Congress, many of whose members also had
participated in the drafting of the Constitution. See Resolution of 1789, 1 Stat. 97, 97-98
(Bill of Rights); Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 73-93; see also Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,37 HARV. L. REV.
49, 130-31 (1923) (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Bill of Rights).
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issue.340
It should be conceded that it probably never occurred to the
drafters of the Seventh Amendment that "Suits at common law"
would be heard in any kind of federal court other than one
established under Article III. While the First Congress provided for
administrative adjudication of public rights, as in Murray's Lessee,'4
there is no indication that it thought a jury would be required there.
And the Seventh Amendment clearly did not apply to the state
courts.2 The drafters, however, also never contemplated the wide
range of cases now heard by agencies, including quasi-public,
replacement, and private rights as well as pure public rights. Thus,
the drafters' probable understanding at best supports only the
contention that public rights are not subject to a jury trial. Even that
340. The historical power of the jury at the time of ratification also lends some support
to the idea that the jury is an independent check on Congress's powers with respect to the
judiciary. Unlike the civil jury in England, the civil jury in America was thought to have
power to decide law as well as fact. See Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America:
Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1993); Wolfram, supra
note 12, at 705-06 n.183. This power of the jury suggests that the jury was an independent
political actor in the early United States, unlike the jury in England. It also suggests that
one of the jury's constitutional roles is to check the power of government-a role arguably
inconsistent with jury-less adjudication of even "public" rights. See Young, supra note 5,
at 837 ("Are not the executive and legislative branches more likely to attempt to influence
judges in cases ... where the federal government is a party?"). In Northern Pipeline, the
Court said:
Doubtless it could be argued that the need for independent judicial
determination is greatest in cases arising between the Government and an
individual. But the rationale for the public-rights line of cases lies not in political
theory, but rather in Congress' and this Court's understanding of what power was
reserved to the Judiciary by the Constitution as a matter of historical fact.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 n.20 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
There are two problems with relying too heavily on this historical law-making power,
however. First, it was quite short-lived, as the law-making power of the jury began to
erode shortly after ratification of the Constitution. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 28-29, 84-85, 141-43 (1977); Note,
The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE LJ. 170, 172-83 (1964).
In addition, the language of the Seventh Amendment suggests no law-making role for the
jury in that the amendment prohibits courts of the United States from re-examining only a
jury's fact-finding except in accordance with common law procedures. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
341. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
284-86 (1856); see Fallon, supra note 8, at 919.
342. See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 645-46. The Bill of Rights was not applied to the
states until the Fourteenth Amendment imposed due process and other requirements on
the states. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.2
(4th ed. 1991). The Seventh Amendment remains one of the few provisions in the Bill of
Rights that has not been applied to the states. See id. My analysis might require that the
Seventh Amendment apply to the states. See infra note 353.
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conclusion, however, is called into question by the Court's decision in
Tull v. United States,343 where a jury was required in an Article III
court to determine liability for a civil penalty sought by the
government.344
Finally, the Seventh Amendment is a constitutional right, a part
of the Bill of Rights, and Congress has no power to abrogate such
rights. Indeed, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to protect such
rights against challenges from the political branches of government.345
A comparison with the First Amendment right to free speech is
instructive. While the Court has held that the federal and state
governments have the power to impose time, place, and manner
restrictions on the exercise of that right, 6 it has limited their power
to prevent the exercise of that right altogether to obscenity,347 and to
situations where the speech presents a clear and present danger, such
as when speech is an incitement to violence34s Even then, the Court
requires that there be no less restrictive alternative. 349 By contrast,
the Court's use of the balancing test suggests that the Seventh
Amendment can be abrogated whenever Congress convinces the
Court that it is more expeditious to do so.350
The Court's treatment of these two amendments may be based
on a view that the First Amendment right of free speech is more
important than the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Free
speech, after all, is essential to the functioning of a democracy, -51 but
democracies function throughout the world without a civil jury.
Furthermore, the jury may be seen as simply procedural, rather than
as embodying a substantive right. But the Constitution provides
separately for a right to due process of law,352 so it would be a mistake
to subsume the right to a jury trial under the due process right.
343. 481 U.S. 412,427 (1987).
344. See id at 426-27.
345. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,175-76 (1803).
346. See generally 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 57, § 20.7, at 23 (discussing limits on
First Amendment rights).
347. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (holding that obscenity can be
banned based on community standards).
348. See generally 3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 57, § 20.7 n.18 (discussing limits on
First Amendment rights).
349. See id. § 20.10.
350. As I will show shortly, the Court's failure to protect Seventh Amendment rights is
exacerbated by its failure to include Seventh Amendment values in the balancing test. See
infra notes 355-68 and accompanying text.
351. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); LOCKE, supra note 114, at 169;
3 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 57, § 20.2.
352 See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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Whatever the reason for the Court's being less solicitous of the
Seventh Amendment than of other fights embodied in the Bill of
Rights, I suggest here that it is a mistake. The right to a jury trial is
not simply a feature of Article III courts, and it is not simply a part of
due process. Rather, the Seventh Amendment is an independent
constitutional right reflecting certain principles that are an important
part of our political heritage.35 3
2. Even if Congress Has Some Power to Abrogate the Seventh
Amendment, the Public Rights Doctrine and the Balancing Test Are
Not Appropriate Tests
History provides some reason to think that a distinction between
public and private rights is appropriate for analyzing the scope of
both Article III and the Seventh Amendment. In England, the civil
judicial power extended almost exclusively to private disputes,354 and,
because the jury trial was a part of judicial proceedings, so did the
jury trial. In the course of American history, however, both the
judicial power and the right to a jury trial have expanded from their
English origins to encompass not only private matters, but also
matters best characterized as pubic.355
Despite what might appear to be tandem development of Article
III and the Seventh Amendment, however, the analytical base is
different, as I have explained.3 6 The scope of the judicial power is
delineated in Article III and seems to include virtually any kind of
case that could arise.35 7 The Seventh Amendment, on the other hand,
applies only to "Suits at common law." Historically, suits at common
353. This approach might result in the Court's deciding that the Seventh Amendment
applies to the states. So far, the Court has rejected that suggestion, though most of the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights have been held to apply to the states. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 342, § 10.2. But if the Seventh Amendment does not depend on the
kind of court in which it is asserted for its applicability, there is no reason why it should
not apply to the states.
354. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68-70
(1982) (plurality opinion).
355. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra note 189 and accompanying text
(discussing the scope of federal judicial power). Any quasi-public right that allows for
money damages, for example, is likely to fall within the definition. See Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1974). So are public rights that involve civil penalties. See Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1987). At least one commentator has argued that this
expansion is not constitutionally required and that the Seventh Amendment should be
limited to traditional common law actions, with any expansion beyond those actions to be
purely statutory. See Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study
in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 531 (1975).
356. See supra notes 322-53 and accompanying text.
357. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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law were those triable in the common law courts, as opposed to the
courts of equity, in England."' I have already argued that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is not defined by the court in
which the matter is pending.3 59 If the Seventh Amendment is
indifferent to the kind of court in which the matter is pending, then
all that is left is the two-step test that the Court recently developed to
define Seventh Amendment rights. 6° All that matters under the two-
step test is that the case involve matters analogous to the kind of case
that would have been heard in a common law court, and that a legal
remedy, usually money damages, is sought. Because public rights can
be analogous to common law actions and can involve a legal remedy,
this definition of "Suits at common law" brings cases within the reach
of the Seventh Amendment that would not have been tried to a jury
in England in 1791.361
If the scope of the Seventh Amendment is defined by the nature
of the matter at issue and not by the court in which the suit is
pending, and if that definition of "Suits at common law" comes from
the two-part test, then the distinction between public and private
rights has no significance for the Seventh Amendment analysis. If
the court in which a matter is pending is irrelevant to a determination
of one's Seventh Amendment rights, then a jury trial should be
available to adjudicate even public rights in non-Article III courts
whenever the two-part test is met. Under this reasoning, the public
rights doctrine should have no bearing on one's Seventh Amendment
rights.362
The balancing test is equally inappropriate, at least as it is
358. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA, § 49 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed.
1886).
359. See supra notes 322-53 and accompanying text.
360. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565,
573-74 (1990); Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18; Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194; supra notes 263-70 and
accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., Tull, 481 U.S. at 425 (requiring a jury to adjudicate a public right),
Public rights in England would have been considered the province of governmental
administration rather than law and would have been handled administratively. See
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-84
(1856); see also sources cited supra note 127 (discussing the late development of
administrative law).
362. This analysis may raise questions about whether the public rights doctrine is
appropriate for determining the scope of Article III as well. If Article III on its face
includes matters that would be characterized as public, a distinction between public and
private rights does not seem to be a viable analytic tool for determining Congress's power
to create non-Article III courts. Perhaps this is a reason to view the balancing test as
supplanting rather than supplementing the public rights doctrine.
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currently structured. As I have shown, Article III and the Seventh
Amendment both protect the independence of judicial decision
makers, though the Seventh Amendment arguably goes beyond
Article III as it also aims to protect the independence of juries even
from judges.363 But I have also argued that beyond that basic
similarity, Article III and the Seventh Amendment protect quite
different values. While Article III reflects an institutional interest in
separation of powers, the Seventh Amendment reflects the value of
citizen participation and deliberation.364 The question, then, is
whether the balancing test accommodates all of these values. The
short answer is that it does not.
Citizen participation and deliberation cannot be preserved by
allowing legislative courts to adjudicate matters without a jury.
Furthermore, the solution that courts and commentators generally
propose for reconciling agency adjudication with the requirements of
Article III is review of agency action in an Article III court.365 Even
if Article III review is a satisfactory means of preserving Article III
values, that solution simply does not vindicate the unique Seventh
Amendment values: if jury-less adjudication is used in the first
instance, jury-less review in Article III courts does nothing to protect
citizen participation and deliberation.
One complication arises, however. The Court has not, so far,
recognized the Seventh Amendment values as foundational in the
sense that it regards the separation of powers value as
foundational.366 Indeed, I have suggested that .the Court treats the
Seventh Amendment as if it is less important than the other rights
found in the Bill of Rights; the Court might also view the Seventh
Amendment as merely an aspect of due process.367 If the Court does
not see the Seventh Amendment values as important in their own
right, it may be unwilling to make them part of the balancing test. To
ignore Seventh Amendment values when there is a Seventh
Amendment challenge to non-Article III adjudication, however, is to
ignore the very basis for the challenge. Those values deserve, at the
363. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
364. See generally supra notes 65-72, 109-21 and accompanying text (discussing Article
III and Seventh Amendment values).
365. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (1985);
Fallon, supra note 8, at 946-47.
366. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that Article III reflects some institutional
values that cannot be waived but the Seventh Amendment does not. See infra notes 395-
415 and accompanying text (discussing waiver).
367. See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
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least, to be weighed in the balance.3 s
C. Policy Issues
If my arguments so far are accepted, the result would be a
radical transformation of American adjudication. Jury trials would
be required in administrative agencies where civil penalties were at
stake, or where one private party was seeking compensation from
another. That we have not gone in this direction may be largely
because the policy issues seem, at first, to favor jury-less adjudication
in administrative agencies. These policy issues are both more
concrete and easier to articulate than the constitutional issues. 69 If
jury-less adjudication is constitutional, then, we might well choose it.
Furthermore, we may be so overwhelmed by the practical reasons for
jury-less adjudication that we are less inclined to look for the
constitutional reasons that might point us toward requiring a jury.
For these reasons, we need to consider the policy reasons for jury-less
adjudication even if we believe that jury-less adjudication is
unconstitutional.37 °
The policy issues tend to track the non-Article III values that I
identified earlier.3 71 Expertise is a strong justification for avoiding
juries in administrative agencies. Many regulatory matters are quite
complex and reflect legislation that is itself the result of considerable
research, investigation, thought, and democratic decision making.
Adjudications of such matters require decision makers who
understand the rationale behind the complex regulations, and, often,
368. Many cases and commentators have noted that the Court's Article IIIjurisprudence is a muddle. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 847-48 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); Fallon, supra note 8, at 916;
Redish & LaFave, supra note 17, at 417-29. Part of the reason for this is that the balancing
test is unclear: we do not know, for example, how much weight the various factors should
receive. Some commentators suggest that there is no principled way to limit the balancing
test. See Redish & LaFave, supra note 17, at 417-29. In addition, Article III values tend to
be abstract, such as the structural value in separation of powers, whereas non-Article III
values are more concrete, meaning that courts are more likely to find that non-Article III
values outweigh Article III values. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 935-43. Factoring in
Seventh Amendment values could, I concede, confuse the issue even more. That
possibility is no excuse, however, for ignoring important constitutional values.
369. Cf. Fallon, supra note 8, at 935-36 (noting that concrete, practical reasons for
Congress's choosing non-Article III adjudication are easier to see than the somewhat
abstract constitutional reasons for not doing so).
370. Of course, if jury-less adjudication of matters meeting the two-step test is
unconstitutional even in administrative agencies, the policy reasons are irrelevant. I
consider them here because they may obscure the constitutional issues.
371. See supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
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who can sort through mounds of technical data. But the essence of a
jury is that it is a body of lay decision makers who are brought
together for a single case and who disperse afterward. The jury's
strength is in its ability to bring common sense and community values
into its decision making. These attributes are less important in
adjudicating complex regulatory disputes, which depend more on
technical data for their resolution.
There are some problems with the expertise rationale for
administrative adjudication, however. First, not all agency
adjudications involve complex matters. Some are quite routine3 2
Second, even with respect to complex matters, the view that lay
adjudicators would be incompetent is undermined by the fact that
juries routinely handle complex regulatory material and technical
data in Article III adjudication. As I have noted, Article III courts
often handle public, quasi-public, and replacement rights disputes,
which often have a complex regulatory statute at their base. To be
sure, there are those who argue that juries should not handle such
matters, and at least one court of appeals has held that it is a
violation of due process for juries to handle complex matters that are
beyond their capabilities.373 It is by no means clear, however, that
juries are incapable of handling such matters; some commentators
argue that juries are quite competent if given competent guidance
from the bench. 74 The existing empirical evidence is not conclusive
either way.375
Third, even if we allow jury-less administrative adjudication of
public or quasi-public rights, expertise is not a sound justification for
adjudicating private rights within administrative agencies without a
jury. There is no need for expertise in the resolution of ordinary
common law claims, which juries have been deciding competently for
centuries.376 Arguably, there may also be little need for expertise
372. Many Social Security adjudications would be relatively uncomplicated, for
example. See Jon C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue
Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 1289,
1323-24 (1997).
373. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1088 (3d Cir. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
374. See ROBERT L. McBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING THE JURY § 2.11 (1969);
Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury
Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727,764-74 (1991).
375. See ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM:
A CASE STUDY 99-104 (1984); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries in Complex Cases: Taking
Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note
82, at 181, 228.
376. There are, of course, those who argue that juries are not competent even for such
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even for replacement rights, which are generally founded on common
law principles. These kinds of disputes are the very essence of the
jury's traditional work. Any test that allows such disputes to be
adjudicated regularly in administrative agencies without a jury, then,
is not justified by the need for expertise.
Efficiency may provide a better justification for allowing jury-
less adjudication of private rights in an administrative agency, at least
if the matter is already before the agency because of a public or
quasi-public right. In such circumstances, it could be more efficient
to allow private counterclaims to be asserted there as well, even if
that means that no jury will determine common-law claims. It is
more efficient to have the entire dispute resolved in a single forum
than to split the dispute among a number of forums. The problem,
however, is that Congress could, and often does, provide for the
adjudication of disputes that include both public and private
components in Article III courts, where there will be a jury. If
Article III courts can handle both the basic public or quasi-public
dispute and any private counterclaims, then the only efficiency costs
will be those associated with the more extensive procedures found in
Article III courts. Those are costs we have chosen to bear because
we believe that they enhance fairness.
Perhaps one of the strongest policy arguments is that it is now
too late to provide for juries in agencies. 37 Administrative agencies
adjudicate some 350,000 matters every year,378 and providing for jury
trials in those adjudications would be a logistical nightmare and a
costly undertaking. The bureaucracy is simply too big and too busy
relatively simple matters. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 108-40 (1949); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 186-87 (1988); Warren E. Burger,
Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205,210-11 (1985); Leon Green, Jury Trial and
Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 483-84 (1956). The evidence, however, does not bear
them out. See, e.g., ABA/BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 8; HARRY KALVEN, JR.
& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-117 (1966); Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward
the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 248, 261-68; Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey
of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil
Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746-50 (1989). While there are occasional incompetent jury
verdicts, there are occasional incompetent decisions by judges as well. Both are
correctable--the jury verdict by the judge's granting a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, see FED. R. CIV. P. 50, or for new trial, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59, and the judge's
decision by an appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
377. Cf Fallon, supra note 8, at 916-17, 919 (arguing that administrative agency
adjudication is too entrenched in common practice to require Article III adjudication
instead).
378. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 21, at 393.
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to provide juries for all adjudications. It is not even clear that a non-
Article III judge could preside over a jury trial,379 so requiring a jury
might move many such cases into the courts, which are already
overburdened. Requiring a jury trial for agency adjudications could
bring the government to a screeching halt.
At the same time, there is a much more subtle reason for
supporting at least a limited access to juries for the kind of regulatory
matters that are heard in agencies. It has long been noted that the
jury is a tool for teaching citizens about government and about their
role in government.8 Indeed, studies have shown that citizens who
have served on juries have considerably more respect for the judicial
system after their service than they had before.381 But most citizens
today know little about the largest component of the federal
government-the administrative agencies. If they were involved in
some aspect of the agencies' work, perhaps citizens would have a
better understanding of what agencies are trying to do and how they
are trying to accomplish their goals. Helping an agency decide
whether a civil penalty is in order for workplace safety violations, for
example, could bring the agencies' work home to ordinary citizens.
Thus, logistical problems aside, there might be good reasons for
trying to involve citizens more directly in agency decision making.382
D. Accommodating an Expanded Right to Jury Trial
If I am right that the Seventh Amendment requires jury trials for
"Suits at common law," even in non-Article III courts, the question
remains how to deal with the substantial problems that such a holding
would engender. There are several possibilities. One is that the
Court could overrule its line of cases establishing the two-part test
and hold that the Seventh Amendment applies only to claims that
existed in 1791 in England. This has been proposed,383 and it would
379. The issue has come up with respect to bankruptcy courts, which may now handle
jury trials with the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1994). The Supreme
Court has never decided, however, whether the parties could be forced to accept a jury
trial presided over by a non-Article III judge.
380. See ABA/BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 9; DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
110, at 128.
381. See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think- Expectations and Reactions of
Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra
note 82, at 282, 284-86.
382. Regulatory matters are, of course, sometimes heard in Article III courts, with the
result that a jury of ordinary citizens might see some of the regulatory effort. Those cases
are relatively few in number, however, and they do not necessarily give citizens a glimpse
of how the agencies work.
383. See Redish, supra note 355, at 531; Redish & LaFave, supra note 17, at 450-52.
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certainly simplify the Seventh Amendment analysis.
This solution is unsatisfactory, however. First, it would require
the overruling of a substantial line of precedent-one to which at
least a majority of the members of the current Court adhere, at least
to some degree.a8 Second, it would mean that the right to a jury trial
would be significantly curtailed in the Article III courts as well as
non-Article III courts. Whether there was a right to a jury trial for
statutorily-created rights would depend entirely on Congress. Such a
holding seems inconsistent with the history of the Seventh
Amendment. That history suggests that the framers did not want to
leave the right to a jury trial to Congress, 385 which is what such a
holding would mean. One could argue, of course, that all the framers
cared about was ensuring that there would be no erosion of the right
to a jury trial,386 and that they must have contemplated that any
expansion of the right, such as to new statutory actions, would be
made by Congress. But the framers probably never contemplated the
enormous expansion of statutory rights that we have seen over the
course of our history. Given the mood of the post-revolutionary
times, it is just as easy to argue that the framers would have approved
of the Court's two-part test, which helps to maintain the jury's
position relative to the total body of law. In addition, if the framers
saw the right to a jury trial as an independent check on Congress's
384. In Terry, all of the Justices accepted at least some part of the two-part test as
determining the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters &
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990). All except Justice Brennan thought
that analogies between statutory actions and English common law actions from 1791
played at least some role in determining the modem right to a jury trial. See id. at 574-81
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Four of them-Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun-applied the standard
two-part test. See id. at 565-73. Justice Stevens used the analogy as part of a more
amorphous balancing of factors. See id. at 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia thought that the
analogy was the only part of the test that had to be applied in Terry. See id. at 584-95
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). If their position had prevailed, there would have been no right
to a jury trial in Terry. Of course, three of the justices who accepted the analogy as part of
the test for the Seventh Amendment have since retired, along with Justice Brennan, who
thought that the remedy alone should determine the matter. See id. at 574-81 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Even so, there is no hint that the
Court might reject the precedent and adopt Redish's suggestion that the Seventh
Amendment should apply only to those claims that were heard in common law courts in
England in 1791. See Redish, supra note 355, at 531.
385. See supra notes 328-35 and accompanying text.
386. The Seventh Amendment provides that the right to a jury trial shall be
"preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. That language is consistent with such an
interpretation.
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powers, as I have suggested,3" they could hardly have approved of
Congress's creating new rights and depriving citizens of the right to
jury trial as to those rights.
Another possible solution to the problem is that agencies could
retain full jurisdiction over injunctive and other equitable relief, but
that common law relief such as penalty and damage claims would be
shuttled to the Article III courts. In some cases, equitable and legal
relief might be sought in the same case. It is possible, if that
happened, that the agency could complete its adjudication first,
because its presumably more efficient procedures would enable it to
act faster. It is then possible that the agency's fact-finding would
preclude further fact-finding in the courts."' The Court has held that
a judge's fact-finding in an equity case precludes relitigation of the
same issues in a later legal action, even if that means that a jury will
not decide the issues in the legal action.389 It has also held that an
agency's adjudication can preclude relitigation of issues in later
judicial proceedings if the agency's proceedings were sufficiently
judicial.390  Under the Court's current doctrine, if an agency
determined that a regulated party was liable for a penalty, there
would be nothing left for a jury to do, as the amount of the penalty
would be a question for the judge.391 The right to a jury trial would
be meaningless if preclusion often prevented a jury from deciding the
issues. Of course, this solution threatens to increase the burden on
the courts even if preclusion would prevent relitigation of fact-
finding.
A third possible solution is that legislation concerning an agency
could be structured so that, while the parties had the right to bring
the matter in either an Article III court or the agency, they would
have an incentive to bring it in an agency that operated without a
jury. This is similar to the legislation in Schor, in which Article III
adjudication was an option.39  If agency adjudication were
sufficiently attractive, the parties might prefer to waive their right to
387. See supra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
388. See generally COUND ET AL., supra note 107, at 1281-82 (discussing preclusion of
Article III claims by administrative adjudication).
389. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,337 (1979).
390. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982) (describing what agency proceedings must
include to be sufficiently judicial); cf. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99
(1986) (discussing preclusive effect of state agency proceedings in federal court).
391. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,426-27 (1987).
392. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,855 (1986).
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a jury trial so as to take advantage of it. As I will demonstrate in the
next section, there is no obstacle to a knowing waiver of the right to a
jury trial. 93 This solution could be difficult to administer, however,
because it would require the consent of both parties. Both parties
have a right to a jury trial, and if one of them thought she would be
advantaged with a jury and the other did not, it is likely that the
matter would be heard in an Article III court with a jury.
Finally, the Court could continue to apply the Article III
balancing test to the Seventh Amendment issue, but factor Seventh
Amendment values into the balance. If that were to be done,
however, it is hard to see that jury-less adjudication would be
approved very often, especially if the Court recognizes that there are
institutional values in the Seventh Amendment that are analogous to
the institutional values reflected in Article III. While Article III
review can preserve Article III values, there is no comparable
alternative to a jury trial.
E. Summary and Conclusion
I have argued that there are good reasons for finding that the
Constitution requires a jury trial regardless of the nature of the court
in which the matter is pending. I have also suggested that the
seemingly strong policy reasons for jury-less administrative
adjudication have made it easy to ignore the constitutional infirmities
of such adjudication. In any event, a self-perpetuating structure has
developed making change difficult-virtually any change in direction
would cause severe disruptions, and there is no perfect solution to the
disruptions. It may well be that the status quo, however weak its
constitutional base, at least represents a fair compromise between the
right to a jury trial and the needs of the administrative state. I think,
however, that the Seventh Amendment values are more important
than we have acknowledged so far, and that the right to jury trial has
already been seriously compromised by current doctrine-especially
by the balancing test, which brings more matters into jury-less
legislative courts. Any move to further curtail the right to a jury trial
would be an unacceptable route to take. The structure that has
developed carries the potential for further curtailment of those
values, in large part because it does not recognize them.
393. See infra notes 395-415 and accompanying text.
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VI. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JURY-LESS ADJUDICATION IN
NON-ARTICLE III COURTS
There are three other primary justifications for jury-less
adjudication in non-Article III courts. These are waiver, sovereign
immunity, and the plenary powers of Congress.394 While waiver can
apply in any kind of court, sovereign immunity tends to justify jury-
less adjudication in special courts created to hear claims against the
government, while the plenary power rationale is used to justify such
adjudication in military and territorial courts. Waiver and sovereign
immunity can also apply in Article III courts. 'In this Part, I briefly
review these justifications.
A. Waiver
Waiver has been used to justify jury-less adjudication in a wide
range of circumstances, from adjudication in Article III courts to
adjudication in administrative agencies. It has its limits with respect
to non-Article III adjudication, however, because the parties cannot
waive the institutional interest in Article III adjudication. Waiver
has considerably more value, however, with respect to the Seventh
Amendment, as the right to a jury trial is clearly a waivable right.
1. Justification for Non-Article III Adjudication
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, the
Supreme Court said that a party who takes advantage of the CFTC's
administrative procedures for resolving claims against brokers
thereby waives her personal interest in having an Article III court
hear any related common law counterclaims asserted against her by
the broker.3 95 But while Article III in part protects the litigants'
personal interests in an independent adjudicator, it also protects the
institutional interest in separation of powers.396 The personal interest
is waivable, but the institutional interest is not.397 Thus, to the extent
that the institutional interest in preserving the separation of powers is
threatened if a non-Article III adjudicator decides a particular
394. I have also pointed out that magistrates are justified as subsidiaries to the Article
III court and under the Article III court's control. See supra note 239 and accompanying
text. This justification applies to the Article I status of the magistrates, but not to the jury
trial. The use of magistrates does not deprive the parties of a jury; indeed, litigants retain
a right to a jury trial before an Article III judge unless they consent to have a jury trial
before the magistrate. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
395. See Schor, 478 U.S.at 850.
396. See id at 848-51.
397. See id at 851.
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matter, the parties cannot waive Article III adjudication. Some other
justification is required to account for non-Article III adjudication
when separation of powers is implicated, as it always will be to some
extent, and in Schor, that justification was the balancing test.398
In Schor, the party who brought the administrative claim against
his broker had the option to file suit in an Article III district court.399
Having chosen the simpler and more expeditious agency procedures,
he was bound by all of their ramifications. Indeed, the Court
appeared to consider the option to sue in the federal courts as
mitigating the encroachment on the judicial branch, which is part of
the balancing test.400  Thus, a clear and voluntary waiver could
influence the Court in its application of other justifications for the
use of a non-Article III court.4 1
2. Kinds of Issues Where Waiver Is Used
Waiver is of very limited utility in justifying non-Article III
adjudication because of the parties' inability to waive the institutional
interest and because some evidence of knowing waiver must be
present. Thus, waiver can provide only a partial justification for any
particular non-Article III adjudication. It is probably most
significant with respect to private rights: in Schor, for example, it was
important in justifying non-Article III adjudication of a private,
common law counterclaim. 4 2  The Court has permitted legislative
courts to assert jurisdiction over public, quasi-public, and
replacement rights without regard to the consent of the litigants.40 3 It
is more difficult to justify adjudication of private rights in such courts,
so any indication of consent must be welcome to the courts.
398. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test).
399. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.
400. See id. at 851.
401. Some claims against the United States may be brought in either the U.S. district
courts or the Court of Federal Claims, but this concurrent jurisdiction is generally over
smaller claims. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1994) (providing that district courts have
jurisdiction over most claims against the United States that are for less than $10,000), with
id. § 1491(a)(1) (providing that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over similar
categories of cases with no dollar limitations). Adjudication in the Court of Federal
Claims is generally justified on sovereign immunity grounds rather than waiver. See infra
notes 417-29 and accompanying text. The statutes cited here show that there can be some
overlap.
402. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 854-55.
403. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1984)
(quasi-public right); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1931) (replacement right);
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,284 (1856)
(public right).
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3. Waiver and the Seventh Amendment
a. Supreme Court Doctrine
It is much easier to view waiver as a justification for jury-less
adjudication than as a justification for non-Article III adjudication.
For one thing, we have long recognized a power to waive the right to
a jury trial in both civil and criminal cases.4 4 Even in the ordinary
federal courts, parties who do not ask for a jury trial are deemed to
have waived it.4"5 In addition, the Court has not recognized an
institutional interest in the right to a jury trial similar to the
institutional interest in separation of powers in the Article III
jurisprudence. Thus, unlike non-Article III adjudication, waiver can
provide the sole justification for jury-less adjudication.
b. Constitutional Issues
There are, nevertheless, some constitutional concerns about
waiver of the right to a jury trial. First, I have suggested that there
might well be some institutional interests in the Seventh
Amendment, which reflects the values of democratic participation
and deliberation.4"6 There are, however, some differences between
the Article III institutional interests and the Seventh Amendment
institutional interests. Separation of powers is a structural value in
our federal government. It goes to the heart of how our government
is organized. Democratic participation and deliberation, by contrast,
are less structural because democratic theory itself accommodates
many models of citizen participation and deliberation.4 7 Some
models provide for considerable participation and deliberation, and
some are primarily representative, with little direct participation.4 8
404. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (criminal case); United States v.
Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 621 (1951) (civil case). Indeed, people have a right to waive any
personal constitutional right, such as the right against self-incrimination. See Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243 (1969).
405. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38. The power to waive the right to a jury trial in federal
courts dates to 1865 when Congress first permitted the parties to opt for a bench trial. See
Act of Mar. 3,1865, ch. 86, § 4,13 Stat. 500, 501.
406. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
407. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLrnics FOR A NEW AGE (1984) (describing participatory democracy); DAVID HELD,
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987) (same); JAMES L. HYLAND, DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (1995) (describing various kinds of democratic
participation); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 116 (same).
408. Two very different models are illustrated by Mansbridge, who calls her more
participatory version "unitary democracy" and the more representative one "adversary
democracy." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 8-22.
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No one model is always best, and a democracy may well function
better if different models are at work within it at the same time."9
But if, as I suggest, the jury is the only governmental institution we
have that reflects the ideal of direct citizen participation and
deliberation, we may have more of an institutional interest than first
appears-the interest in preserving the only governmental institution
that reflects these values. If so, we should at least consider the extent
to which Seventh Amendment values are compromised before we
allow the parties to waive their right to a jury trial.410
Second, any waiver of Seventh Amendment rights must be
knowing. This is standard constitutional fare: waiver of any
constitutional right must be knowing and voluntary.41' The
government can, however, do things that influence the choice. It can,
for example, make the choice to waive a constitutional right more
attractive than the choice to assert it.412 That is what happened in
Schor, where the administrative proceeding was more expeditious
than Article III adjudication would have been, so most litigants
would be likely to choose the administrative proceeding. While
Schor involved the waiver of the litigants' personal interest in an
Article III court, the principle applies with equal force to the Seventh
Amendment.
c. Policy Issues
Our use of the waiver doctrine will reflect the value we place on
the jury. If we consider the jury to be an important component of our
adjudicatory process, we will make waiver harder to assert; if we view
the jury as more of a burden than a benefit, waiver will be easy to
assert. It is certainly easy to see the jury, which is a highly inefficient
409. See icL at 300.
410. It may seem less palatable to foist a jury trial on unwilling litigants than to require
those litigants to sue in an Article III court. This may be why we accept waiver of the
right to a jury trial more easily than we accept waiver of Article III adjudication. But this
reluctance may stem from our failure to recognize our institutional interest in the jury.
411. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (discussing waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(discussing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United
States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing the Seventh Amendment right tojury trial).
412. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661
(1990) (permitting waiver of First Amendment free speech rights to gain advantages of
incorporation); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219-20 (1978) (permitting waiver of
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in exchange for reduced sentence);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (permitting waiver of Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination to avoid death sentence).
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decision maker,4 3 as a burden in an era of overcrowded dockets.414
And our policies have long reflected a desire to diminish the jury's
importance: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves are
said to reflect an anti-jury bias that prevailed among their drafters.415
But this approach devalues the institutional values reflected in the
jury. Thus, even if our institutional interests in the jury do not have a
constitutional dimension, I suggest that any method we adopt for
allowing or encouraging waiver of the right to a jury trial should take
account of those institutional values.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The public rights doctrine and the balancing test permit
Congress to assign claims by or against the government in its
sovereign, or regulatory, capacity to non-Article III courts. But
citizens can also have proprietary claims against the government,
such as tort claims or breach of contract claims. For such claims, the
government is much like any private citizen. Nevertheless, under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, Congress has extremely broad power
to determine the conditions of adjudication. In many instances,
Congress has created specialized non-Article III courts to adjudicate
such claims. 416  Congress also usually provides for jury-less
adjudication, whether the adjudication takes place in a specialized
court or an Article III court.
1. Justification for Non-Article III Adjudication
The doctrine of sovereign immunity holds that because the
sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, the sovereign may give
413. See Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 22,47-50.
414. Commentators differ as to what has caused the litigation explosion. While some
think that we have become more litigious, others attribute the increase in litigation to
other factors, such as the increase in population and the legislatures' creation of hundreds
of new causes of action. See HUBER, supra note 376; JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE
LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT
HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991); George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of
Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 462 (1985); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System--and Why Not?, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Carl Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 857, 860 (1993).
415. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1993, at 53, 66-67; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 969
(1987).
416. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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consent but attach conditions.4 17 While the federal government has
granted a sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress has
generally imposed significant restrictions on the right of citizens to
sue the government. One common condition is that the case be
heard in a non-Article III court by judges without the tenure and
salary protections provided by Article III.418 At the same time,
however, if the government in its proprietary capacity sues a private
citizen, it must generally bring the suit in an Article III court.419
The condition that a citizen suing the government bring the suit
in a non-Article III court is not particularly onerous when one
considers the alternatives. First, the historical method for claiming
against the government was to seek private legislation, and that
method is still available.42 It is, however, costly and time-consuming,
and the claim could get lost in the political process. Alternatively,
the citizen could wait for the government to sue in an ordinary
417. See MeElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880). Although there is no
explicit basis for sovereign immunity with respect to the federal government in the U.S.
Constitution, sovereign immunity was invoked early in the country's history through
judicial action. See Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and Clean Water:
A Supreme Misstep, 24 ENVTL. L. 263, 267 (1994). The doctrine had "become so
'entrenched' in the decisions of American courts that by mid-nineteenth century the rule
attained the 'immutability of a maxim.'" THEODORE R. GmUrARI, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMrUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 37 (1970).
The only reference to sovereign immunity in the Constitution is the Eleventh
Amendment, which was added to ensure the sovereign immunity of states. See Herbert
Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's
Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2240 (1996); Vicki C.
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1988).
418. The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is instructive. Among other
things, that court can hear "any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). While
many proprietary claims against the government are thus heard in specialized courts, the
Federal Tort Claims Act provides a notable exception. The United States District Courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims. See id. § 1346(b).
419. See id. § 1345 (providing that district courts have jurisdiction over claims by the
United States). The Court has consistently held that suits by the government against a
citizen are suits at common law. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604
(1941); Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850); Dugan v. United
States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 181 (1818). The United States also could sue in state
courts, which are not Article III courts. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 222 (1882)
(dicta); United States v. American Ditch Ass'n, 2 F. Supp. 867, 868 (D. Idaho 1933)
(dicta).
420. Without the government's waiver of sovereign immunity, this is the only
alternative. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV.
625,635 (1985).
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federal court, where Article III judges would hear the case, and then
assert her claim as a counterclaim. That, however, gives the
government the momentum and the opportunity to shape the suit-
assuming the government would bring suit at all.42 Under the
circumstances, the Court of Federal Claims, even with its Article I
status, seems to be a good alternative. Indeed, this is especially so
given that there is Article III review of any decision of the Court of
Federal Claims.41 Applying something similar to the balancing test
that developed for agency adjudication,423 then, there is virtually no
encroachment on Article III values because sovereign immunity
would have shunted such claims to the legislature prior to the waiver
of sovereign immunity and because an Article III court reviews the
legislative court's judgment. Thus, Congress's determination to give
citizens with claims against the government a relatively expeditious
judicial determination of those claims in a non-Article III court is a
reasonable one.
The sovereign immunity rationale is complicated somewhat by
the fact that compulsory counterclaims can be asserted in the non-
Article III courts that are created to hear claims against the
government.424 Thus, if a citizen files suit against the government in
the Court of Federal Claims, she will be met with any compulsory
counterclaim the government has against her, and she will not be able
to litigate either her claim or the government's counterclaim in an
Article III court.4' As I noted, however, if the government were to
bring that same claim independently, it generally would have to file
suit in an ordinary U.S. district court.426 The Court has never found
this anomaly problematic. As the Court said in 1880 in McElrath v.
United States:427
Congress, by the act in question, informs the claimant that if
he avails himself of the privilege of suing the government in
the special court organized for that purpose, he may be met
with a set-off, counter-claim, or other demand of the
421. See United States v. Rosati, 97 F. Supp. 747,749 (D.N.J. 1951).
422. Court of Federal Claims decisions are appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, which is an Article III court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
423. See supra notes 147-85 and accompanying text. Justice White has argued that the
balancing test explains virtually all of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on Article I
courts. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 92-118
(1982) (White, J., dissenting).
424. See 28 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) (Court of Federal Claims); FED. CL. R. 13(a) (same).
425. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880).
426. See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
427. 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
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government, upon which judgment may go against him,
without the intervention of a jury .... 428
While the Court has fallen into an easy sovereign immunity
justification for such conditions on suits against the government, it
never questions the propriety of sovereign immunity itself. Some
commentators have suggested that sovereign immunity is an odd
concept in a democracy.429 Indeed, the government's broad waiver of
sovereign immunity is an acknowledgment that a democracy requires
that the government be accountable. The primary effect of federal
sovereign immunity, then, is to permit Congress to set the conditions
for suits against the government.
2. Kinds of Issues that Government Claims Courts Hear
Because the government is always a party in government claims
courts, it would be easy to conclude that such courts hear only public
rights matters. But when the government acts in its proprietary
capacity, it is acting like a private citizen, and claims against it are
much like private claims among private citizens. Such claims do not
implicate the government's regulatory power at all, and exercise of
the regulatory power is part of my definition of public rights.43 Thus,
the claims heard under the sovereign immunity rubric are much more
in the nature of private rights than public. 31
428. Id. at 440.
429. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1
(1924); Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The
Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties
Defendant, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 387 (1970); Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must
Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 383 (1970); Edward P. Davis, Jr., Note, Sovereign Immunity-An
Anathema to the "Constitutional Tort," 12 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 543 (1972).
430. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
431. This is so even though the government will not always be subject to the same law
as other private citizens, because sovereign immunity allows it to devise its own legal
principles for any suits it consents to defend. Government contracts, for example, may be
governed by a federal common law of contracts rather than the ordinary state contract law
that governs everyone else. See S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946)
(holding that federal common law governs contract involving real estate owned by the
United States); Padbloc Co., Inc. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369, 377 (1963) (holding that
federal common law governs contracts of the United States). Even when the courts create
new law for government contracts, however, it is never very different from the law that the
common law has evolved, and the common law is inherently concerned with private law.
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (noting that the common law is concerned with private rights);
EUGENE W. MASSENGALE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL CONTRACT LAW 9-10 (1991)
(noting that United States usually opts to subject itself to ordinary common law contract
principles).
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3. Sovereign Immunity and the Seventh Amendment
Like the requirement that actions be brought in non-Article III
courts, jury-less adjudication is another of the conditions that
Congress usually attaches to its consent to suit.432  The sovereign
immunity doctrine has become somewhat confusing, however, and
the constitutional and policy issues are more complicated than the
courts generally admit.
a. Supreme Court Doctrine
As long ago as 1880, the Court permitted Congress to condition
its waiver of sovereign immunity on jury-less adjudication of claims
against the government.433 That holding was reaffirmed one hundred
years later.' As was true with non-Article III adjudication, this
makes some sense given that in the absence of a court for such
claims, citizens asserting a claim against the government would have
to go to Congress itself, seeking private legislation to pay the claim.435
Obviously, no jury was involved in such private legislation. But as I
have shown, courts that handle claims against the government also
determine counterclaims asserted by the government. The
jurisprudence of the right to jury trial in that context is more
complicated.
Four scenarios will illustrate the complexity. First, suppose that
the only claim in the suit is a claim by a citizen against the
government. As I have shown, there is no constitutional right to jury
trial when a citizen sues the government for money damages, even if
the same suit between private parties would be subject to a jury
trial.436 This is true whether the claim is brought in a specialized
court like the Court of Federal Claims43 or an ordinary U.S. district
court.48  Congress can provide for a jury by statute and has
occasionally done so. 439
432. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981); McElrath, 102 U.S. at 440.
433. See McElrath, 102 U.S. at 440.
434. See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160. The federal government has given a very wide-
ranging consent to suit. See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3656 (3d ed. 1998). Nevertheless, as long as such consent is required,
it is likely that the courts will uphold conditions that the government deems proper,
including the condition that the suit be tried without a jury.
435. See Shimomura, supra note 420, at 626-27.
436. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
437. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941); McElrath, 102 U.S. at
440.
438. See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160.
439. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994) (providing for no jury generally in district courts
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The second scenario reverses the parties, so that the government
is claiming against the citizen. In that scenario, there will be a right
to a jury trial in those cases where such a right is generally applicable;
in other words, either party can demand a jury for the government's
claims if a jury would be available for similar claims between private
parties.440
The third and fourth scenarios are more complicated. In the
third, the government sues a citizen in a federal district court and the
citizen counterclaims. While the Supreme Court has never addressed
the issue, it is widely assumed that there is a right to jury trial for the
government's claim against the citizen, but not for the citizen's claim
against the government." Principles of preclusion may prevent the
government from relitigating issues found by the jury, however. 4 2
The rules applicable to the third scenario simply track the rules that
would apply if the claim and the counterclaim had been brought
separately. But in the fourth scenario, if a citizen sues the
government in a legislative court and the government counterclaims,
there will be no right to a jury trial for either the citizen's or the
government's claims.4 3 This does not track what would happen if the
two claims were brought separately. This same rule apparently
applies if the citizen were to sue initially in a federal district court,
though there has been virtually no analysis of the issue.4 4
for claims against the government, but allowing jury for claims for recovery of taxes and
penalties).
440. See Austin v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1170, 1175 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1987)); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2314, at 114 (2d ed. 1995).
441. See United States v. Rosati, 97 F. Supp. 747, 748-49 (D.N.J. 1951); 8 JAMES
WILLIAM MOORE ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.40(2)(d) (3d ed. 1997); 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 440, § 2314.
442. See United States v. Schlitz, 9 F.R.D. 259, 261 (E.D. Va. 1949). The Supreme
Court in 1959 held that when legal and equitable claims are raised in the same case, a jury
must first hear the legal claims, so that any fact-finding by the jury would apply to both
legal and equitable claims. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508
(1959). A suit that concerns claims for money damages both by and against the
government concerns only legal issues. Thus, the rationale of Beacon Theatres is not
directly applicable. It is not clear that the Court would require claims by the government
to be heard before claims against the government, thus effectively requiring a jury for all
common issues of fact, though lower courts seem to require that sequencing. See Schlitz, 9
F.R.D. at 260-61. Such a requirement would make sense, especially when the
counterclaim is compulsory. The government, having sued first, takes the risk that a jury
might determine some of the issues in the case.
443. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426,440 (1880).
444. See Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745, 748-49 (2d Cir. 1960)
(holding that there was no right to jury trial on the government's counterclaim in Article
III courts, citing McElrath); Terminal Warehouse v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 327, 328
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b. Constitutional Issues
Two constitutional issues relating to jury-less adjudication in
sovereign immunity cases deserve attention. The first is whether
such cases are "Suits at common law" and therefore subject to the
Seventh Amendment. The second is whether Congress can
constitutionally condition such suits on jury-less adjudication.
i. "Suits at common law"
The easy answer to the question whether suits against the
government are suits at common law is that they are not. At
common law, a citizen could not sue the sovereign because of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, so such suits were virtually unknown.
Furthermore, even when the government consents to be sued, it often
provides its own set of legal rules to govern such suits, usually by a
set of federal common law rules." 5 Thus, the government is often not
subject to the same set of common law rules as everyone else.446
These factors suggest that such suits are not suits at common law.447
On the other hand, such suits might be classified as suits at
common law under the Court's current two-step jurisprudence. The
first step is whether the claim would be classified as legal or equitable
at common law."' Such suits could not have been brought in either
law or equity in England in 1791 in the absence of the government's
consent. The government, however, could consent to suit in either
the common law courts or in equity. This means either that such suits
are not suits at common law or that the first step is inconclusive, as it
almost always is.449 But the Court has repeatedly said that the second
(D.N.J. 1950) (same).
445. See supra note 431.
446. One exception is tort claims brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1994)' (providing that FTCA claims against the government be
brought in U.S. district courts, which shall apply the law of the state in which the suit is
brought).
447. Indeed, the Court has so held. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572
(1962) (holding that suits against the United States are not suits at common law because
they require a waiver of sovereign immunity); McElrath, 102 U.S. at 439-40 (same).
448. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,564-65
(1990).
449. See id. at 574-75 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("For the past decade and a half, this Court has explained that the two parts of the
historical test are not equal in weight, that the nature of the remedy is more important
than the nature of the right."). Some justices have argued that the first step should be
determinative. See id. at 592-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Others argue that the first step
should be dropped altogether. See id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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step--characterizing the damages as legal or equitable-is the more
important one anyway.45 If compensatory damages are sought
against the government, then, the suit in which they are sought is
arguably a suit at common law. If so, a jury ought to be required for
such suits.
ii. Analogy to the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The Court has repeatedly said that when Congress grants
consent for the government to be sued, it has virtually unlimited
discretion to condition that suit.451 In other circumstances, however,
there are limits on the power of Congress to condition government
benefits on a citizen's forgoing assertion of a constitutional right.45 2
The question is whether there should be such limits in this context.
While the analogy to cases where the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine has been applied is not exact, there are at least some
similarities.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been said to apply
when "[g]overnment offers a benefit that it is constitutionally
permitted but not compelled to offer, on condition that the recipient
undertake (or refrain from) future action that is legal for him to
undertake (or refrain from) but that government could not have
constitutionally compelled (or prohibited) without especially strong
justification. '453 The doctrine generally arises when the government
seeks to condition a benefit, such as a tax exemption or a subsidy
(including welfare benefits), on accepting limits on a constitutional
right.45 4
450. See, e.g., id. at 565; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989); Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,421 (1987).
451. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1980); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S.
484,501 (1967); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,587 (1941); McElrath, 102 U.S. at
440.
452. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(holding that government cannot condition the right to unemployment benefits on
beneficiary's willingness to work on Saturday in violation of religious tenets); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 395 (1984) (holding that government cannot
condition federal funding on a ban on political editorializing); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 359 (1976) (holding that the government cannot condition a public job on the
relinquishment of the right to free association). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (discussing the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Symposium, Unconstitutional Conditions, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989) (same); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968) (same).
453. Sullivan, supra note 452, at 1427.
454. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 395 (holding that government
cannot prohibit television stations receiving federal grant money from editorializing);
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Conditioning consent to being sued on forgoing the right to jury
trial is somewhat different, but there are similar elements. The
government "benefit"-which the government is permitted but not
compelled to grant-is the privilege of suing the government in a
judicial proceeding, rather than having to assert claims directly in
Congress. The future action that the citizen must refrain from is
making a demand for a jury trial, both for the citizen's claims against
the government and for any claims the government may assert by
counterclaim in the same proceeding. This means that the citizen
must give up a constitutional right in order to avail itself of the
government benefit. This is certainly so as to the government's
claims against the citizen, but if my arguments about the applicability
of the two-step test are correct, it may also be true as to the citizen's
claims against the government. Arguably, the government could not
constitutionally prohibit a jury trial on demand in such circumstances
without "especially strong justification.""45
Even if the Court were to accept that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine applied in such a circumstance, however, it is not
clear that the Court would find the condition unconstitutional. The
Seventh Amendment, despite occasional odes to its glory,4 56 is a
relatively weak constitutional right.457 Over the more than two
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971) (holding that government can condition the
receipt of welfare benefits on consent to home visits); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (holding that government can condition broadcast licenses on
licensees' airing both sides of an issue).
455. Sullivan, supra note 452, at 1427. Despite some superficial similarities, I do not
see the waiver doctrine as implicated in the government's conditioning consent to suit on
forgoing the right to a jury trial. Waiver must be knowing and voluntary. See Milone v.
Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 1994). In Schor, for example, the parties had a choice
between jury-less non-Article III adjudication and adjudication in an Article III court with
a jury. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1985).
The only. time the claimant has anything resembling a choice to accept or reject a
condition on the right to a jury trial is when the claimant and the government are claiming
against one another. In that circumstance, the choice that a claimant has is between suing
in a non-Article III court-and giving up the right to a jury trial even as to the
government's claims against her-and waiting to be sued by the government. See supra
notes 420-22 and accompanying text. While choice is not completely eliminated in that
context, it is more coercive than if there is a free choice, as in Schor, between an Article
III court and a non-Article III court. The line between conditions and waiver is an
uncertain one, however.
456. See, e.g., ABAfBROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 98, at 2; DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 110, at 127-28; Kalven, supra note 121, at 1075; Prentice H. Marshall, A View
from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 159.
457. Among other indicia of this weakness is the fact that the Seventh Amendment is
one of the few amendments from the Bill of Rights that have not been incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.
Supp. 1025, 1040 (E.D. La. 1972), affd per curiam sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S.
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hundred years of this country's constitutional history, it has been
redefined and eroded to the point where it is in danger of losing
much of its value. 58 The Court could well find, explicitly or
implicitly, that the right to a jury trial is not a constitutional right that
can only be abrogated with "especially strong justification. '459
c. Policy Issues
It is easy to understand why Congress might fear giving the
determination of claims against the United States to a jury. Just as
private entities that might be thought of as "deep pockets"
sometimes fear a jury, so might the government.460 The fear may not
be altogether justified, however. There are a number of studies
suggesting that juries generally do a good job of sorting out liability
and damages issues without regard for whether the defendant is
rich.461 There are, of course, occasional verdicts that seem extreme
and that grab headlines, but most jury verdicts are within a
predictable range and are quite reasonable. 46
Neither expertise nor efficiency provides a strong justification
1098 (1973); ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 57, § 17.8, at 256 n.12; see also Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not apply in
territorial courts in Puerto Rico even if all the other amendments of the Bill of Rights do);
supra notes 341-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of the
Seventh Amendment).
458. See generally Sward, supra note 99 (documenting the erosion of the Seventh
Amendment).
459. Sullivan, supra note 452, at 1427.
460. See Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 61, 71; Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1124,1127 (1992).
461. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM 10-12 (1995); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY 11-22, 191-220 (1995); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 460, at 1124-
77; Galanter, supra note 460, at 71-72; Saks, supra note 414, at 1274-77.
462. One of the most notorious recent cases concerned a woman who bought a cup of
coffee at a drive-through window at a McDonald's restaurant and suffered severe third-
degree burns when she spilled the coffee on herself. The jury awarded her $2.9 million,
$2.7 million of which was in punitive damages. See Here's a McHot Verdict, USA TODAY,
Aug. 19, 1994, at B1. The punitive damage award was later reduced to $660,000. See
McDonald's Coffee Award Reduced 75% by Judge, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,1994, at A4. The
jury's verdict, however, may not have been as unreasonable as it seemed. McDonald's
officials testified that they knew they were selling coffee at a temperature that was unfit
for consumption, that others had been burned by the coffee, and that they had no
intention of changing their practices. See S. Reid Morgan, McDonald's Burned Itself,
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at 26 (Morgan was the plaintiff's attorney). The jury's
award of $2.7 million in punitive damages represented two days' gross sales of coffee for
McDonald's. See id.
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for jury-less adjudication of claims by or against the government.
Even when there is specialized law, such as government contract law,
the principles are not greatly different from ordinary common law
contracts. 463  No special expertise is required, as juries routinely
determine common law contracts claims. Furthermore, while jury-
less adjudication is undoubtedly more efficient than adjudication with
juries,4 4 the Seventh Amendment reflects an understanding that the
benefits of the jury outweigh some loss in efficiency.
Even if the Court continues to hold that claims against the
government are not subject to the Seventh Amendment, efficiency
alone does not justify depriving a litigant of a jury trial for a
counterclaim by the government. Article III courts regularly handle
the reverse situation, requiring a jury for claims by the government
while providing no jury for counterclaims by the citizen,46 and there
is no reason why legislative courts could not do the same.466 Indeed,
the current rules make it apparent that the government is unwilling
to subject itself to the same adjudicatory procedures that govern
ordinary citizens.467
C. Extraordinary Plenary Powers of Congress
The justification for territorial courts and military courts seems
to be that Congress can create those courts to adjudicate matters
arising under some extraordinary plenary power that it possesses.
But because the precise nature of the plenary power under which
Congress is acting will vary, the precise rationale for non-Article III
adjudication will also vary. Furthermore, unlike the other rationales,
the rationale for jury-less adjudication in territorial courts does not
track that for non-Article III adjudication.468
463. Compare Beatty v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 204,206-07 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (defining
duress with respect to government contracts), with Wolf v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 357
S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (defining common law duress).
464. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 441-44 and accompanying text.
466. That should not be difficult for the Court of Federal Claims. While that court is
based in Washington, D.C., it hears claims arising throughout the United States, see 28
U.S.C. § 173 (1994), and holds hearings on those claims in the locales where they arise.
467. That, unfortunately, is not unusual. It was only in 1995 that Congress subjected
itself to various federal employment laws that have long applied to everyone else. See
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified at 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1438 (1997)).
468. Military courts do not hear civil matters, see I GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note
63, § 2-11.00, so the Seventh Amendment is not implicated in their use. I will discuss
military courts briefly in connection with Article III issues, but my main interest is in the
territorial courts, where both Article III and the Seventh Amendment are at issue.
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1. Justification for Non-Article III Adjudication
Military courts are justified as necessary and proper to
Congress's exercise of its extraordinary plenary power over military
matters.469  Because military discipline and order have serious
implications for our national defense, military courts are thought to
be necessary to enforce military discipline.470 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has upheld a wide range of departures from the judicial norm
in the military courts, including the use of judges with no fixed term
of office,471 and the use of summary courts-martial where the accused
is not permitted to have counsel.472 In addition, unlike their civilian
counterparts, service- personnel are not permitted to sue their
superior officers for violation of constitutional rights.473  While
acknowledging that the military is bound by the due process clause,
the Court in these cases generally bows to Congress's authority to
decide what process is due in the military context.474 This deference
to Congress extends to Congress's decision that military crimes must
be adjudicated in non-Article III courts.475
Territorial courts are justified as necessary and proper to
Congress's plenary power to provide for local as well as national
governance in the territories.476 In the absence of state government,
Congress must create the territorial institutions, including courts, that
handle local matters. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
need not provide Article III courts to handle territorial judicial
469. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the power "To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"); Weiss v. United States,
510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983); Dynes v. Hoover,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 65,78-79 (1857).
470. See, e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300 (discussing the need for a special system to
enforce military discipline).'
471. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 181.
472 See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 48 (1976). Summary courts-martial are
used for minor offenses where the penalties are not very severe. See id. The accused can
elect to be tried instead in a special or general court-martial, where he would have a right
to counsel, but risks a more severe penalty if he does. See id. at 46-48.
473. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305.
474. See, e.g., Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177 (deferring to Congress's decision that military
judges are not required to have a fixed term of office); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,
67 (1981) (deferring to Congress's choice to exclude females from the selective service);
Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 43 (deferring to Congress's decision not to provide counsel in
summary court-martial hearings).
475. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857); see also Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (holding that the Constitution gives Congress power to establish
procedures for military justice).
476. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397
(1973); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,546 (1828).
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matters .477
While the plenary power justification so far has been most
prominent for military and territorial courts, it is potentially much
broader. For example, adjudication in administrative agencies is
arguably necessary and proper to the administration of most of
Congress's powers under Article I. In other words, Congress's power
to eliminate Article III adjudication could be limited only by its
Article I powers. Even if its Article I powers are not as sweeping as
was once thought,478 they are formidable. If this justification were
given a broad reading, it could be used to permit adjudication in
administrative agencies and adjuncts without going through the
balancing test. A plenary powers justification would require only
that the means chosen be necessary and proper to the exercise of the
power-in other words, all that would matter would be the reasons
for Congress's choosing non-Article III adjudication.479 Article III
values would no longer be relevant. This is an odd result given that
the plenary powers rationale is designed to justify non-Article III
adjudication. Thus, I suggest some alternative rationales for military
and territorial courts.
As to military courts, the balancing test that justifies
administrative adjudication of a wide range of issues could also justify
adjudication in military courts. Military crimes, which are the subject
matter of military courts, are created by Congress rather than the
477. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 397-404.
478. Until recently, it had been thought that those powers were almost unlimited. A
wide variety of legislation has been upheld, for example, under the Commerce Clause.
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(upholding civil rights legislation); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 697-98 (1948)
(upholding labeling requirements for medications). In the last few years, however, the
Supreme Court has begun to cut back on Congress's Commerce Clause power. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98, 116 (1997) (holding that some aspects of gun control
legislation exceed Congress's powers under the Constitution); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549,551 (1995) (striking down legislation prohibiting guns within proximity of schools
as exceeding Congress's power under the commerce clause); cf. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997) (holding that Congress, in enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, exceeded its enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
479. Even if the rationale did not sweep so broadly, some powers of Congress might
fall within it. For example, the Court has long held that Congress has plenary power over
the definition of citizenship (beyond the constitutional minimum) and immigration
matters. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 672 (1898). The Immigration
and Naturalization Service, then, might be justified under the plenary powers rationale
rather than the public rights doctrine. If some Article I powers of Congress are
"extraordinary plenary powers" and some are not, however, distinguishing between them
could be quite difficult.
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common law.480 There is some Article III review of military courts, at
least as to constitutional claims.41l  And Congress's reason for
creating such courts-the maintenance of military discipline 4 ---is
particularly strong, as it implicates the national defense. Thus, on
balance, non-Article III courts seem to be justified for trial of
military claims.
The strongest rationale for territorial courts is that Congress has
no alternative to creating non-Article III courts to handle local
territorial matters. As a practical matter, Congress is bound to create
judicial institutions in the territories to handle local judicial matters,
but Article III courts would have no jurisdiction to hear local
matters. As to disputes between citizens of the territory, there would
be no diversity jurisdiction. Furthermore, unless Congress is
legislating directly in the territory, matters arising under local law
could not be said to arise under federal law.483 Thus, Congress has no
power to create Article III courts to handle local territorial matters
between citizens of the territory.4 4
Even if Congress had the power to give such local territorial
matters to Article III courts-perhaps because it was legislating
directly---the analogy to state courts suggests that it should not do so.
480. See 1 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 63, § 2-31.00.
481. See 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (1994) (providing that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction by
writ of certiorari over certain cases decided by military courts); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 142 (1953) (holding that Article III courts have jurisdiction over collateral attacks on
military convictions involving constitutional claims). See generally Major Richard D.
Rosen, Civilian Courts and the Military Justice System: Collateral Review of Courts-
Martial, 108 MIL. L. REv. 5, 50-57 (1985) (discussing judicial review of courts-martial).
482. See supra notes 469-75 and accompanying text.
483. Cf. Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a claim arising under laws promulgated by an Indian tribe pursuant to the
federal Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") does not arise under federal law unless the
validity or construction of IRA is at issue).
484. The constitutional status of a district court's jurisdiction over claims between
citizens of a territory and citizens of a state is itself uncertain. While Congress has
provided for such jurisdiction by statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (1994) (providing that the
word "state" as used in the diversity statute includes territories), the constitutional basis
for such jurisdiction is uncertain. In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court held such jurisdiction
constitutional, but no theory supporting such jurisdiction garnered a majority of the Court.
See id. at 583-604 (plurality opinion); id. at 604 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Three justices
held that citizens of the District of Columbia were not citizens of states within the
meaning of Article III, but that because the government of the District was within
Congress's Article I power, Congress had the power to give such controversies to the
Article III district courts. See id. at 588, 596-600 (plurality opinion). Two justices thought
that the term "State" in Article III encompassed the District of Columbia, thus forming a
5-4 majority for the constitutionality of such jurisdiction. See id. at 623-26 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
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State courts are not bound by the strictures of Article III, and the
states have devised a wide range of procedures for selecting their
judges and for determining their terms of office. State judges may be
elected, appointed, or appointed with the requirement that they
undergo a retention election at periodic intervals.' Some have life
tenure, but most are appointed or elected for fixed terms.486 By
analogy, territorial courts fulfilling the same functions as state courts
need not be treated as Article III courts with the full range of Article
HI protections.'
In short, there are justifications for territorial courts that do not
depend on the mere existence of a plenary power in Congress.
Because the plenary power rationale, standing alone, has the
potential to undermine Article III values, these other justifications
are better. The strongest justification for territorial courts is that
Congress has no choice but to create non-Article III local courts.
2. Kinds of Issues Heard Under the Plenary Powers Rationale
Local territorial courts generally have the same jurisdiction as
the state courts, which is to say that they can hear any matter not
given exclusively to another court.4s  The non-Article III United
States district courts that exist in some of the territories hear both
local matters and matters that are within the Article III
jurisdiction.4s9 Thus, both kinds of non-Article III territorial courts
could hear private rights matters as well as public, quasi-public, and
replacement rights cases.490
3. Plenary Powers and the Seventh Amendment
The plenary powers rationale for the creation of territorial
courts says that Congress can create such courts if they are necessary
for the execution of some extraordinary plenary power of
485. See MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATrERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DIsCIPLINE §§ 2.2-2.8 (1987).
486. See IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 6 (six year term); R.I. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (life tenure);
S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 7 (eight year term); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 409-10
(1973).
487. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 390-91.
488. See 48 U.S.C. § 1424-1(b) (1994) (establishing legislative authority for the creation
of local courts in Guam); id. § 1611(b) (establishing legislative authority for the creation of
local courts in the Virgin Islands).
489. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (Guam); id §§ 1611-1612 (Virgin Islands); id. § 1821-
1822 (Northern Mariana Islands).
490. Military courts hear only criminal matters arising under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 817 (1994).
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Congress.491 The Supreme Court, however, has not justified jury-less
adjudication in local territorial courts on that basis. Rather, it bases
the right to a jury trial on how well integrated the territory is into the
United States.
a. Supreme Court Doctrine
As I have shown, three kinds of courts operate in the territories:
Article III courts, non-Article III local courts, and non-Article III
federal courts.41 There is a right to a jury trial in the Article III
courts in the territories. 493 The right to a jury trial in the other two
kinds of courts depends on whether the territory is integrated into the
United States.494 A non-integrated territory is one that had a well-
developed legal system when the United States acquired it, such as
Puerto Rico and the Philippines. 495  By contrast, the Court,
disregarding native populations, thought that integrated territories
were simply territories that offered "opportunity for immigration and
settlement by American citizens, 496 who took the full rights of
citizenship, including the right to a jury trial, with them into the
newly settled territory. Examples include Alaska and Louisiana. 497
The rationale for the distinction between integrated and non-
integrated territories is quite democratic:
Congress has thought that a people like the Filipinos or the
Porto Ricans, trained to a complete judicial system which
knows no juries, living in compact and ancient communities,
with definitely formed customs and political conceptions,
should be permitted themselves to determine how far they
wish to adopt this institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and
when.498
Thus, there is no right to a jury trial in non-integrated territories
491. The Seventh Amendment does not apply at all in criminal matters, so it is not
implicated in military courts, which hear only criminal matters. See 1 GILLIGAN &
LEDERER, supra note 63, § 2-11.00. Thus, I will discuss only territorial courts in this
section.
492 See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
493. See Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir. 1987).
494. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,304-05 (1922).
495. See id. at 304-10. Many laws relating to Puerto Rico implied integration. For
example, the congressional legislation establishing a government for Puerto Rico provided
most of the protections of the Bill of Rights and allowed Puerto Ricans to become U.S.
citizens. See iL at 305-08. The Court, however, rejected that implication. See id. at 313.
496. Id. at 309.
497. See id
49& IL at 310.
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unless the citizens themselves choose one.499
It appears that the only integrated territory in the United States
today is the District of Columbia .50  There is a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial in the local courts in the District of Columbia, 0'
but it is the only territory where that is so. Thus, for example, Puerto
Rico has a civil law rather than a common law heritage, and its local
courts do not use juries."° Some of the other territories have chosen,
by statute, to use juries for at least some cases in their local courts. 3
At least one lower court has said, following Supreme Court
precedent, that the Seventh Amendment does not apply in the non-
Article III federal territorial courts."° But because the non-Article
III federal courts in those territories are bound by any local decision
to use juries, and because most territories require juries, there will, as
a practical matter, generally be juries0 5 Thus, the right to a jury trial
in most modem territorial courts is statutory, not constitutional. But
because there is usually a statutory right to a jury trial, there is very
little litigation over the Seventh Amendment in those courts.
To summarize these principles, there is a constitutional right to a
jury trial in all Article III courts in the territories. There is no
constitutional right to a jury trial in the local courts of non-integrated
territories, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, but
499. See id.
500. In addition to the District of Columbia, American territories today include Puerto
Rico, Guam, The U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American
Samoa. Statutes related to the territories are found in Title 48 of the United States Code.
501. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 370 (1974); Capital Traction Co.
v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899). This doctrine survived a reorganization of the District's
courts that was designed to give the courts a structure similar to that of the states. See
Pernell, 416 U.S. at 367. Prior to the reorganization, the District had courts with
overlapping local and federal jurisdiction similar to that of the so-called U.S. District
Courts in Guam and the Virgin Islands. See id. The old structure, then, consisted of a
single court system, in an integrated territory, having both local and Article III
jurisdiction. See id. It is understandable that a jury would be required in those courts: in
the absence of a right to jury trial in those courts, citizens living in the territory would
have no Seventh Amendment right in any court in the territory. Now, however, there is a
local court system consisting of the superior court and the court of appeals, as well as trial
and appellate Article III courts. See id That is much more similar to the state systems.
The Court does not require juries in the state courts, and one wonders why they should be
constitutionally required in the analogous courts in the District of Columbia.
502 See Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 849 (1st Cir. 1987). The Seventh
Amendment is applicable, however, to the Article III federal court in Puerto Rico. See id.
503. See supra note 57.
504. See American Pac. Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Siciliano, 235 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1956)
(holding that the Constitution does not require jury trials for civil cases in the District
Court of Guam).
505. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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there could be a statutory right. There is, however, a constitutional
right to a jury trial in the local courts in integrated territories, such as
the District of Columbia. Furthermore, while there is no
constitutional right to a jury trial in non-Article III federal courts in
non-integrated territories, those courts are bound by any local statutes
conferring a right to a jury trial. These principles make sense of the
case law; the question now is whether the case law makes sense.
b. Constitutional Issues
If a territory has only one kind of court to hear both local
matters and matters within the Article III jurisdiction, the Court's
integration model makes considerable sense. Citizens moving into
integrated territories would lose one of their constitutional rights if
there were no court in the territory that was required to provide a
jury trial. Non-integrated territories are defined, however, as
territories with established populations using established judicial
institutions and procedures. If they do not use juries, their citizens
are not losing a well-established right if the Seventh Amendment
does not require juries in their local courts. 0 6
The integration model makes less sense today, however. First,
the District of Columbia is the only integrated territory today and
thus is the only territory where the model protects the right to a jury
trial. But the integration model results in a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial in the local courts in the District of Columbia as
well as the Article III courts; citizens in the District of Columbia,
then, have a constitutional right to have a jury hear local matters
when citizens in the states have no such right. 07
Second, citizens in most territories, integrated or non-integrated,
have access (or could have access) to both local courts and some kind
of federally created court.508 The varieties of access to federal courts
include a territory's having its own Article III court, 9 a territory's
506. The Court, in distinguishing between integrated and non-integrated territories,
has always ignored native populations. But Native Americans had well-developed dispute
resolution procedures within their own tradition, even if those procedures did not look
like courts in the common law or civil tradition. See AUERBACH, supra note 80, at 128;
James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of
Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 69-71, 73-75 (1997).
507. See supra note 501 for a discussion of how the model may have made more sense
when the District had only one kind of court.
508. Federal Article III courts, of course, will have limited jurisdiction.
509. Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia use this model. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
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having its own non-Article III federal court,51° and an Article III
federal district court located in a nearby state having jurisdiction over
claims arising in the territory.51 Thus, most territorial judicial
systems have a structure similar to the court structure in the states,
with local courts and federal courts. This suggests that the right to a
jury trial should track the doctrine as to the states. The reasoning
would be that local courts in the territories are the functional
equivalent of state courts, and as long as the Seventh Amendment
does not apply to state courts, it should not apply to local territorial
courts either. I call this the state analogy model. The state analogy
model would not require juries in the local courts in the District of
Columbia or any other territory, but there would be a constitutional
right to a jury trial in the federal territorial courts, whether they were
established under Article I or Article III.
There are potential problems with the state analogy model,
however. First, I suggested earlier that if the right to a jury trial is
defined solely by the two-part test, which determines whether the
right and the remedy at issue existed at common law or had common
law analogues, the Seventh Amendment should apply to the states*.12
If this suggestion were to be accepted, it would also apply to local
courts in the territories, even if the citizens of those territories had
never used juries. The Court so far has shown no inclination to apply
the Seventh Amendment to the states, however.
Second, the non-Article III federal courts, which hear both local
and Article III matters, do not have a precise analogue in the state
systems, so it is not clear how the state analogy model would work
with these courts. But if, as now, there is no Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial in these courts, some serious constitutional
problems could result. Persons bringing civil suits in such courts
based on Article III jurisdiction will not have a constitutional right to
a jury trial even if they would have had such a right in any other
federal court. 13 And if there is no Article III court in the territory,
that means that the Seventh Amendment right could be lost
altogether. This would be true even though the territorial court may
510. Guam and the Virgin Islands use this model. See supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
511. For example, the District of Hawaii has jurisdiction over claims arising on several
islands in the vicinity of Hawaii. See 48 U.S.C. § 644a (1994). The statute providing for
such jurisdiction explicitly says, perhaps unnecessarily, that the right to a jury trial applies
to claims arising on those islands. See idL Such an arrangement could certainly be made
for all U.S. territories.
512. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
513. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,309 (1922).
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be the only place the case could be brought.5 14 And the loss of the
right would affect not only citizens of the territories, but also,
potentially, citizens of the states who had business before the local
federal court. This problem could be resolved by the Court's holding
that the right to a jury trial applies in the non-Article III federal
territorial courts to the same extent as in any other federal court; that
is, to matters within the Article III jurisdiction.
These are interesting and potentially troublesome issues, but
they are rarely addressed in the courts and commentary. For the
most part, that is because citizens of most territories have access to at
least one court where juries function, whether constitutionally or by
statute. Thus, there is at present little practical effect from the
absence of a constitutional guarantee.
c. Policy Issues
The Court's concern in Balzac v. Porto Rico51s that citizens of
non-integrated territories might choose not to use a jury if a jury was
not part of their tradition is the strongest policy reason for not
mandating juries in territorial courts.5 16 Leaving it to the territorial
citizens means giving them the one thing that is the essence of a
democracy: choice. 17 This is precisely the choice we give the states.
But to carry the state analogy model one step further, all of the states
provide for a civil jury, suggesting that, to the extent practicable, the
territories should, too. Indeed, there may be particularly strong
reasons for favoring a jury in the territories, especially if their citizens
do not come from a strong democratic tradition. As de Tocqueville
said, "[T]he jury, which is the most energetic means of making the
people rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it how to
rule well." 's
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that juries are constitutionally
required in only two kinds of legislative courts: the adjunct
514. Personal jurisdiction limitations, for example, might prevent the litigants from
suing in another federal district court.
515. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
516. See id. at 309-10.
517. Americans chose the jury trial in federal civil and criminal cases by ratifying the
Constitution.
518. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 110, at 128. I also understand the potential for
chaos if citizens of a territory have no experience with formal judicial institutions or
democratic institutions. That is no longer the case, however, with any of the territories
currently under U.S. jurisdiction.
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meant to be an independent check on the power of Congress to select
adjudicatory methods. The Seventh Amendment exists because the
American people were unwilling to leave a right so important to
them as the civil jury in the hands of Congress. To allow Congress to
avoid the Seventh Amendment by assigning adjudication of certain
matters otherwise meeting the constitutional test for the Seventh
Amendment to non-Article III courts is tantamount to informally
amending the Constitution to limit the reach of the Seventh
Amendment. Finally, the Seventh Amendment reflects the
important structural values of political participation and deliberation,
and the jury is the only federal governmental body that reflects those
values. The jury is a triumph of Jeffersonian republicanism in the
midst of a largely Madisonian constitutional structure.524 There is no
way to preserve that value without preserving the jury itself. Indeed,
I have suggested that using a jury trial in administrative agencies
could have the salutary effect of educating the citizenry about
governmental programs and their administration.525
I have also questioned the Court's jurisprudence as to waiver,
sovereign immunity, and the territorial courts. First, while I
acknowledge that parties to litigation ought to be able to waive their
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial, I have suggested that if
the jury does reflect structural values, as does Article III, then waiver
rules should protect those values. That could mean making waiver
harder to achieve. For example, instead of the presumption in favor
of a bench trial that now exists in Article III courts, 26 there might be
a presumption in favor of jury trials. That presumption should then
carry over into non-Article III courts where a jury is required.
Second, I have suggested that allowing Congress to condition its
consent to suit as to proprietary claims against the government on
jury-less adjudication is constitutionally suspect. It is possible, using
the Court's two-step test for determining the right to jury trial, to find
that claims for damages against the government are subject to the
Seventh Amendment. Conditioning such suits on jury-less
adjudication might also violate the principles behind the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Finally, while I agree that local
territorial courts should not be required by the Seventh Amendment
to use civil juries as long as state courts are not so required, I think
this rule should apply to integrated as well as non-integrated
524. See supra note 123.
525. See supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text.
526. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
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bankruptcy courts and the local courts in integrated territories. As to
the bankruptcy courts, a jury is only required when those courts are
adjudicating pure private rights.519  This means that there is no
constitutional right to a civil jury trial in administrative agencies,
courts that adjudicate claims against the government,5 20 local courts
in non-integrated territories, or bankruptcy courts when they are
adjudicating pure public, quasi-public, or replacement rights.52t In
this Article, I have questioned the Court's rationale as to both Article
III and the Seventh Amendment, even when I occasionally agreed
with its conclusion.5 2
My argument as to the most prominent justification for jury-less
adjudication in non-Article III courts-the public rights
doctrine/balancing test-is based on the Seventh Amendment
language, the constitutional structure, and the values that underlie
the Seventh Amendment. First, the language says that the right to
jury trial is preserved in "Suits at common law."5" If we accept the
Court's interpretation of that language to include new statutory
rights when those rights are analogous to common law rights and the
statutory remedy is legal (the two-part test), then "Suits at common
law" encompasses at least some rights from each of the four
categories that I identified: pure public, quasi-public, replacement,
and pure private. The language gives no hint that the nature of the
court in which the matter is heard is a factor. Second, the history and
structure of the Constitution suggest that the Seventh Amendment is
519. Juries are undoubtedly constitutionally required for matters heard by magistrate
judges as well, but Congress has not attempted to shuttle civil jury trials to magistrates
except with the consent of both parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1994). At the time that
Granfinanciera was decided, jury trials were statutorily required in bankruptcy
proceedings only for personal injury and wrongful death actions. See Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 37 (1989). The Court in Granfinanciera, of course, held that the
Constitution nonetheless required a jury trial for matters involving private rights. See id.
at 54-55. Bankruptcy courts can now conduct jury trials as to all matters triable to a jury
with the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (1994).
520. There is also no right to a jury trial when claims against the government are
adjudicated in Article III courts. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981).
521. This conclusion follows from the Court's statement in Granfinanciera that the
Article III and Seventh Amendment analyses are the same. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S.
at 53-54. Pure public, quasi-public, and replacement rights can all be adjudicated in non-
Article III courts; therefore, they can be adjudicated without a jury. I have, of course,
questioned the soundness of this conclusion. See supra notes 317-68 and accompanying
text.
522. For example, I agree that the Seventh Amendment need not apply to the local
territorial courts, at least as long as it does not apply to state courts. I have some
reservations, however, about the integration model that the Court uses. See supra notes
506-14 and accompanying text.
523. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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territories. There is no reason why the local courts in the District of
Columbia should be subject to the Seventh Amendment if the local
courts in Maryland are not. It may well be that all local courts should
be subject to the Seventh Amendment, but I leave that argument for
another day.
These conclusions could, if given effect, be quite disruptive. For
one thing, most non-Article III courts are not equipped to handle
jury trials. Jury trials in those courts could cause delays and could
disrupt those courts' efforts to administer government policy. The
disruption, while real, may not be as serious as feared, however.
Equitable relief ordered by agencies would be unaffected because the
Seventh Amendment does not apply to equitable actions. Most
quasi-public rights litigation is probably already in the Article III
courts. Even as to public rights actions where civil penalties were
sought, under the Court's two-step test, only the liability for civil
penalties would be subject to the jury's determination; the amount of
the penalty could be left to the agency.527
Another problem with the conclusions I have reached is that
they could undermine the parties' choices as to the mode of
adjudication. Since 1865, litigants in common law actions in courts of
the United States have had a choice between a bench trial and a jury
trial.521 That reflects our assumption that the right to a jury trial is
largely a personal right that the parties should be able to waive. My
suggestion that the Seventh Amendment reflects structural values
that should be protected from waiver could limit the choices that
litigants have, and such a result could undermine their confidence in
the judicial system. Litigants are more likely to accept the results of
litigation, even if they lose, when they feel that the process is a fair
one. This strongly suggests that the parties should retain the ability
to waive the right to a jury trial, whether they are litigating in an
Article III court or a non-Article III court. On the other hand,
applying the Seventh Amendment to non-Article III courts would
actually increase the litigants' ability to choose: at present, they
cannot choose a jury trial for litigation that can only be pursued in an
administrative agency, even if that same litigation in an Article III
court would be subject to the Seventh Amendment.
While I have not worked out the details, then, perhaps the
solution that would best reflect both our structural interests in a jury
trial and the parties' personal rights to choose between a jury trial
527. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,427 (1987).
528. See Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4,13 Stat. 500, 501.
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and a non-jury trial is one that would rely on a modified waiver.
There would be two parts to such a solution. First, the Seventh
Amendment would be made to apply to cases heard in non-Article
III courts. This could be done by applying the two-part test to
matters tried in such courts, and if the matter were subject to the
Seventh Amendment and both parties chose not to waive the right to
a jury trial, either impaneling a jury within the agency or shuttling
cases subject to a jury trial to the Article III courts. Second, the
parties could opt to waive their right to a jury trial, whether in an
Article III court or a non-Article III court, but in the absence of an
explicit waiver, there would be a jury trial. Creating a presumption in
favor of a jury trial would reflect the importance we attach to the
structural values reflected in the Seventh Amendment and would
send that message to the litigants. Permitting a waiver acknowledges
that the parties should have some control over the mode of
adjudication.
I am well aware that many members of the legal profession do
not have a favorable opinion of the jury and that the arguments I
have made here will seem like heresy to them. I am concerned,
however, that the right to a jury trial is eroding before our eyes and
that we seem neither to recognize it nor to care. The creation of non-
Article III courts that operate without juries is just one way that
Congress facilitates this erosion.5 29 In this article, I have argued that
the jury reflects important constitutional values that are not found in
any other federal institution. I have also argued that the
constitutional doctrines that make erosion of the right to jury trial
possible are not well-founded. These are issues that can no longer be
ignored. Neither neglect nor habit should be permitted to serve as a
convenient rationalization for the deterioration of a fundamental
constitutional right.
529. For others, see Sward, supra note 99.
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